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Abstract
Networks have been widely adopted in political science, particularly in connection 
with governance and with the process of policy formation. Every study, if it forms part of 
this universe, bases itself on adopting a network ‘world view’: all studies start with the 
assumption that ‘there is a network here’. Dispiritingly few go on to explain, justify or 
discuss the implications of this assumption with reference to the assumption; in contrast 
this thesis intentionally regresses back to a detailed look at first principles.
This thesis develops and presents a new and valuable approach to the formal analysis 
of networks that form policy. The approach is drawn out of a theoretical consideration of 
the policy process and examined in the context of existing policy network literature.
A test of the usefulness of the approach is made by application to a case. There are 
therefore two intertwined threads of content built around the topic of pension reform. 
The formal analysis of a network of actors is presented alongside a ‘traditional’ case- 
study approach to the policy-making process for the UK and France. These two analyses 
contribute to an assessment of the comparative advantages of the two methods. The 
thesis is constructed with the intention of clearly presenting a new analytical approach 
that can be adopted by other researchers and ensuring that it is adequately justified so 
that it will be adopted.
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MIG Minimum income guarantee
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Chapter I
I. Introduction
This thesis develops and presents a new approach to the formal analysis of networks 
that form policy. To ensure coherency and usefulness the approach is drawn out of and 
justified by a theoretical consideration of the policy process. The approach is also 
examined in the context of existing policy network literature. Although the approach can 
be accepted from the theoretical and methodological descriptions alone a true test of its 
usefulness is made by application to a case. This application also illuminates the 
approach far more effectively than further theoretical detail.
The term ‘networks that form policy’, referred to as NFPs, is used in order to put some 
distance between the concepts and ideas that are proposed and the wider literature that 
already exists on policy networks. NFPs are defined thoroughly later on, but for the time 
being they need to be understood as nothing more than their name suggests. The 
hypotheses that are tested in this thesis are about what the NFP approach can or cannot 
do. The field to which the NFP approach is applied is the case of pension reform, 
however, the investigation in this field only exists to support the testing of the 
hypotheses about the NFP approach.1
There are therefore two intertwined threads of content built around the topic of 
pension reform. The formal analysis of a network of actors is presented alongside, as a 
comparison, a ‘traditional’ case-study approach to the policy-making process for the UK 
and France. The research was conceived in this way from the start as while wishing to 
delve deeply into the ability of mathematics to uncover patterns that can never be
1 The reader should not expect to find sophisticated hypothesising and testing of theories about pension policy or the 
pension policy process. Examples o f the kinds o f hypotheses that this thesis can sustain, given its high theoretical 
content in developing the methodologies, can be found in Chapter 4. Also at the end of Chapter 4 can be found the 
sorts o f hypotheses that other researchers, drawing on the approach developed in this thesis, would be able to test 
using an NFP approach.
11
Introduction
uncovered by non-mathematical methods, I had no wish to lose along the way the colour, 
breadth and life of politics. It was the conflicting attractions of mathematical elegance 
and political messiness that informed my overarching hypothesis, while my years as a 
UK civil servant, most recently in the Department of Work and Pensions, suggested the 
area of research.
Networks and traditional case study
Networks have been widely adopted in political science, particularly in connection 
with governance and with the process of policy formation. Every study, if it forms part of 
this universe, bases itself on adopting what I shall call a network ‘world view’. All 
studies explicitly or implicitly start with the assumption that ‘there is a network here’. 
Dispiritingly few go on to explain, justify or discuss the implications of this assumption 
with reference to the assumption; in contrast this thesis intentionally regresses back to a 
detailed look at first principles. Most studies that engage with questions that belong to 
political science, rather than being purely network analytical exercises, have a strong 
emphasis on the network or the networks, emphasising what Rhodes and various 
collaborators call ‘thick description’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 21-22).2 This thesis looks 
not only at the networks but drops the definite article and also examines networks. Here, 
there is an attempt to balance the importance of ‘telling a good story’3 and all the 
interpretive acts that follow that story with an understanding that even a good story 
carries elements of a model and that other models, in this case network representations, 
can bring in complementary information that would otherwise remain hidden.
The attempt at balance is evident in the overarching hypothesis that is tested and
2 Bevir and Rhodes cite Geertz (1973)
3 Peter Hennessey, perhaps fearing that I may become a barbarian, has on many occasions exhorted me to value
‘telling a good story’. 1 would therefore like to attribute the phrase to him.
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critically examined in this thesis: the organisation o f observations into an NFP model 
and the analysis with suitable methods can reveal valuable information that would not 
emerge from a traditional case study. Despite the way in which this hypothesis is cast, 
the value of engaging stories and intelligent interpretation are far from being attacked, 
with two chapters given over entirely to telling the story around, and interpreting 
instances of, policy making in the field of pensions. Although I am unapologetic about 
the obvious value of narratives or ‘traditional case studies’ and take them as a base 
reference against which to value NFP methods, I am not giving them an easy ride. I will 
approach the traditional case study so as to allow it to be compared to the network 
methods, which involves thinking of it as a complex model with unstated assumptions. 
Parts of this thesis will examine the risks of the hidden ‘modelling techniques’ used to 
reduce complexity in narrative case studies. For example, accepted political language is 
investigated by the network analysis techniques to see if it is really a poorly defined 
‘model’ where generic labels such as ‘civil servant’ lack any structural relevance.
In the conclusion the findings from the case-study and NFP approaches will be 
assessed and the complementarity and the applicability of each method to different 
questions will be discussed. While some specific hypotheses tested by the NFP approach 
are elaborated in later chapters, I will set out here the broad questions that are addressed 
in both the case-study and NFP parts of the thesis; this framework is used to facilitate 
comparison. Such a framework also gives other researchers a clearer way to see how the 
two methods may serve them. The questions to be considered are:
• What characteristics of the policy process relate to its success or failure?
• Who are the important people and what are the things that make them 
important?
13
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• What are the working methods and how did the process unfold?
As explained above these are not rigid questions that will be hypothesised about and 
rigorously tested to draw defensible conclusions as they would be if this was the central 
point of the thesis. These questions exist as an enabling framework for examining the 
fundamental material of the thesis: the approaches.
The scope of applicability of the work
Generally speaking this thesis is concerned with national governments although there 
is no theoretical reason that emerges why it should not also refer to sub-national or 
supranational levels. The main case studies are concerned with specific and mostly self- 
contained strands of pension policy in the UK and France. In addition I use many 
examples from the UK in the theoretical discussion but the theoretical findings suggest 
that there is no reason to doubt that a similar consistent picture could not be built from 
any other country.
It is important to note that what follows is not the only path to achieve the aims set out 
within the constraints given. In mathematics there are alternative methods to solve a 
given problem, all of which are built on solid axiomatic foundations. In cartography the 
Mercator and Peters projections both represent the physical globe and both meet the 
expectations and needs of a variety of naive and sophisticated map users. This thesis is 
one conception of how a system of political mapping can be constructed to lead to 
analytical methods that will usefiil in a range of situations. It does not propose a unique 
solution.
Policy sector: pension policy 'broadly speaking’
Pension policy in this thesis is taken to cover public policy that directly affects the
14
Chapter I
revenue of those who have reached pensionable age. The reason for the ‘broadly 
speaking’ clause is that under my definition pension policy includes topics that may not 
often -  narrowly -  be seen as ‘pensions issues’ especially by economists who may have 
their minds focused on pension funds, equities and replacement rates. I, however, include 
in my definition issues such as taxation regimes of earned income along with other tax 
regime changes directly addressing pensioners, changes to income support levels and 
systems for pensioners, and even ‘active ageing’ policies affecting especially through 
economic incentives the labour market the economic situation of the elderly. Note that 
the word ‘directly’ above implies that policies such as increasing interest rates (thereby 
implicitly increasing most pensioners private income) would not be counted: even 
though the elderly often make this an issue (as they live much more off investment 
income and have low levels of indebtedness) it can never be seen as an explicit 
‘pensions’ policy. However, legislation in the UK that introduced regulation for 
‘stakeholder pensions’ where charges were regulated and forecasts were simplified is, 
theoretically at least, in the list as it was an explicit attempt to encourage higher levels of 
private provision for retirement. Given this definition we must be careful to ensure that 
policies are not judged to be in the list on the basis of success; if the stakeholder 
legislation fails to achieve its aim it will not have affected the revenues of pensioners but 
must be included in the list as this was the intention.
Pension policy is a special policy area and many of the key reasons for this can be 
summed up by its misfit with political life. Politics brings to mind many things for many 
people: short-term, ideologically based, concerned with ends rather than means,
15
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concerned with sexy4 topics, high impact for little spending and based on ‘gut-feeling’ or 
‘political antennae’. Hence pension policy is to a large degree ‘anti-political’ primarily in 
that it is long term not only past the horizon of politicians but also often to the point of 
defeating even the technicians. It also tends to present similar problems irrespective of 
ideological viewpoints, for example the same difficulties exist at a macro level as a result 
of changing demographic profiles whether funded pensions or pay-as-you-go systems are 
preferred (Barr 2000: 9). Pension policy is also ‘unsexy’ to the point of desperation 
suffering the double-whammy of being associated with old-people and economists.5 
Even policies that have little impact are extremely expensive and continue to get more so 
every year. The only typical political tool left standing is the ‘political antennae’ which 
are often tom apart by the conflicting demands of the elderly beneficiaries and the 
younger workforce who have to pay -  often twice -  when reforms demand both that 
better benefits are given to the current elderly and that the current workforce make their 
own provision rather than relying on tomorrow’s contributors.
Despite this anti-political aspect pension policy nevertheless creates ‘an impressive 
level of political controversy’ (Bonoli 2000) and there are other compelling reasons for 
studying this sector. The policy area of pension reform allows reasonable control of 
many of the variables that would usually confound analysis. The problems that have led 
to the need for pension reform are broadly and in many cases specifically the same across 
states. Pension reform does not limit its effects to different subsets of the population in 
different situations - everyone is always affected. Types of pension system, although they
4 This expression has been much misused since the Kelly Affair in 2003/4 (see further details and reference in chapter 
2). It is generally taken to mean a topic which a politician can use to grab the interest o f the public rather than bore 
them to death. It is only tangentially concerned with lying and no more so than politics in general. ‘Sexed-up’ has 
always meant ‘to make interesting’, possibly ‘media-worthy’, not to lie.
5 One of the major problems in pension policy in the UK is that, because it is perceived as so uninteresting, nobody 
thinks about a pension until their retirement appears on the horizon by which time it is too late to do anything o f any 
value.
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differ in detail, are broadly comparable in their economic features. For instance, from a 
broad characterisation of pension systems in Barrientos (1998: 56-62) it can be seen that 
given a context of policy making in networks, the issues and characteristics of alternative 
policy scenarios can be reduced to manageable comparisons.
Theoretical concepts
Understanding what the policy process actually consists of from a network based 
perspective is achieved using insights borrowed from the fields of evolutionary theory 
and ideational theory. Much of the current policy network literature assumes, flying in 
the face of recent mathematical network literature, that categorisation and summarising 
of networks and creating taxonomies is straightforward allowing general statements 
about the policy process to be made. I will show that with neither a fuller appreciation of 
network analysis, nor some kind of background model for the policy process that maps 
onto a network representation, such ideas are, at best, fortunate if they have any 
correspondence to reality and at worst they are destructively misleading.
It is important that the concept of NFPs can be theoretically justifiable as to its place in 
the wider policy process and it should also be made relevant to other theories within 
political science. In order to achieve this the thesis outlines how the NFP concept can be 
placed in a context that draws together three important strands of political science: 
ideational approaches, network theory and evolutionary theory. The conception of 
policies as being built of ideas that can be understood in the same way as genetic 
replicators leads to the view of an NFP as an environment where these ideas can play out 
their evolution. The actors and the links of the network are seen to be the essential 
elements in this selective environment that determines the policy output.
17
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This conception of policy formation is a process analogous to genetic evolution but, 
unlike other work on policy evolution (Dowding 2000; John 1999), it specifically 
concentrates on evolution of policy within an environment which consists of ideas held 
within a network of actors. Here an NFP is a network of policy actors with links that 
represent pathways along which idea-elements can potentially be transmitted. It is 
important to understand that under this conception although the network is made up of 
‘actors’ they are not the units of observation nor the agents: the actors and their idea- 
element pathways form an environment in which ideas evolve in the same way that 
physical geography of the islands of the Galapagos forms an environment where genes 
compete (Astill 2004a).
Structure of the thesis
In Chapters 2 and 3 the case study is presented. The case is pension reform and there 
are two instances examined, the UK and France, that formed two concrete policy 
conclusions, each similar in that it affects the public-private mix of pension provision.6 
The colourful scene and general feeling of complexity are not only vital to demonstrate 
the unique value of case-study but they also set the stage for an appreciation of how an 
NFP model has to cut out much of the ‘garnish’. At the same time we reflect how case 
studies must also do the same process of cutting out and furthermore selectively 
emphasise the ‘garnish’ in order to create a fully rounded interpretation of the collected 
views.
Chapter 4 is a bridging chapter that leads from the traditional case study through to the 
NFP analysis. There is a drawing together of threads from the case studies using the
6 Following the approach of Gerring (2004), the case is taken as ‘pension reform policy process’, from which we 
would hope to generalise to understanding ‘the policy process’. Within the case we take two sub-cases as the units 
o f investigation giving an n=2 investigation. The limitations and complications inherent in conceiving case study in 
this way are discussed at length by Gerring.
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broad framework of questions outlined above. The chapter then proposes the framework 
of nested hypotheses, also within the broad question framework, that are tested in the 
later chapters of the thesis. This bridge leads to the NFP concept making a full entrance. 
Chapter 5 consists of the initial theoretical work examining the nature of both the policy 
process and networks and asserts a set of basic assumptions about NFPs. In Chapter 6 
the existing literature on networks in political science is discussed through the lens of the 
base assumptions. The wide variety of studies are summarised leading to a categorisation 
of literature based on how the idea o f ‘networks’ is used.
In Chapter 7 the base set of assumptions is used to form a model of the policy process 
that both justifiably represents reality and lends itself to analytical use. The model is one 
that lends itself to analysis for testing hypotheses and offers descriptive accounts to 
answer questions of interest to both researchers and practitioners. We can again take 
cartography as analogy here. The making of maps serves those who wish to study the 
spatial distribution of Neolithic settlements as well as it serves those wishing to invade 
their next door country. It achieves this by making available a useful model of the real 
world (the map) for any given area and to a given precision. So, the aim of the NFP 
method is to be map making for politics. The ‘map’ (or model) can then be examined to 
attain information to answer a wide range of questions. We can also extend the analogy; 
map-reading is a skill that has to be learnt to get the most out of a map, but most maps 
have value for those who are not practised in the skill as they present information in a 
readily accessible form. NFP methods should also result in representations that have this 
quality. Beware, however, that in this analogy, the cartographic model (the map) is a 
visual representation of the physical world but NFP methods may not necessarily point to 
a visual representation being the best format for the ‘model’ of the political world. In
19
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short, the NFP model should be a reasonable representation, easily accessible and useful 
to the casual user, but also capable of being analysed in a sophisticated way to test 
advanced hypotheses.
Chapter 8 addresses some of the practical considerations concerned with empirical 
work on NFPs in light of the theory outlined in previous chapters; the mathematical 
representation of the NFP and analytical techniques impact on the quality of data that is 
required while the approach taken to defining the network boundaries and mechanisms 
reflects on the scope of data to be collected and the sampling techniques that will be 
adopted.
In Chapter 9 extensive analysis of the NFP model is carried out to test the hypotheses 
identified in Chapter 7. Conclusions and a consideration of where the NFP concept 
might be heading are presented in Chapter 10.
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II. UK pension policy case study
This chapter consists of the UK case study narrative which examines the development 
of the Pensioner Credit policy in the period before it was presented as legislation - the 
period from roughly early 2000 through to November 2001 when the Pensioner Credit 
bill was given its first reading in the House of Lords. This chapter presents information 
from various sources: the formal interviews conducted with the actors identified as being 
part of the NFP, written sources, both primary and secondary, and from interviews or 
informal discussions with people not identified as members of the NFP. There is also use 
of my personal knowledge of the pension policy sector from the time that I spent in the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), but when possible I have tried to use 
alternative sources to verify this information. It is noticeable that the balance of the 
chapter is a little different from the French case study that follows. This is due to the fact 
that the UK policy process was, in most cases, defined by the political opportunities that 
could be obtained from the policy itself. Many of the decisions were based on the policy 
analysis taking place and how this analysis slotted in with the imperatives through the 
political networks within government. Bluntly, the UK executive actors did not have to 
take a lot of notice of anyone apart from themselves. In contrast the French process was 
often characterised by the constraints inherent in operating within an environment that 
was about risk avoidance and concerned with getting on board non-governmental actors 
in order to produce a convincing body of support. The nitty-gritty of the policy in France 
was less important than that of the politics. This means that reflections on the direction 
the process took in the UK necessarily contains more detail on the policy than the French 
case and is often less concerned with personalities and their positions.
21
UK pension policy
Case study timeslice: a brief sketch
The British Labour party is one of the most streamlined political machines outside the 
USA. As part of its electoral strategy it is intensely aware of the power of the grey vote. 
New Labour has sought to woo the elderly and in the run up to the 2001 election it knew 
that this constituency was a key one to win. Although it was already looking towards a 
historic landslide, vote-winning policies had to emerge to capture the grey vote and 
ensure that dissatisfaction on pension issues did not snowball into wider problems. Not 
only were these electoral strategies vital, but for historical party reasons, care of the 
elderly poor was an issue that had to be addressed sensitively.
In early 2000 a new strand of pension policy emerged in the UK and by November 
2001 it was before Parliament in the form of a White Paper. The reform, with a forecast 
cost estimated at considerably over £2 billion per year, or around 0.2% of GDP 
(Department of Work and Pensions 2002), was called ‘the Pensioner Credit’.7 Trailed 
many times by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,8 Gordon Brown, and finally announced 
in the House of Commons by Work and Pensions Secretary, Alistair Darling, in 
November 2000, it was evident even then that it was the work of many hands. The DWP 
was the policy lead,9 but there was a background agenda of an integrated tax and benefit 
system (Brown 2000b; Department of Social Security 2000: chapter 5) from which, 
along with the tight rein on spending usually enforced by the Treasuiy, there emerges a 
mixed governmental interest.
Mr Brown and Mr Darling had several sharp knives to juggle with state-pension
7 For the purposes of consistency, government expenditure will use the UK convention of lbillion = lOOOmillion, 
even when comparisons are being made outside the UK or Europe
8 The UK's finance minister who heads the Treasury (officially titled Her Majesty’s Treasury or HMT) which is the 
UK finance ministry
9 DWP was formerly the Department o f Social Security (DSS).
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policy; pensioner poverty was a key test of the government’s commitment to the poor, 
while concerns over ‘pensioner dignity’ helped to push the perceived level of a decent 
living much higher up the income scale than might be expected from a typical anti­
poverty stance. Nor could spending be seen to get out of control and, in a tense 
atmosphere following mis-selling scandals, the pensions industry was ready to react 
badly to any moves in state-pension policy that might introduce further confused 
incentives for private provision. Poverty lobbies, trade unions, pensioner groups, 
industry representatives and advocates of alternative spending plans were all watching 
the game and waiting for the right moment to play their best cards. In addition to these 
pressures were the ever present dangers of another media bandwagon and, undoubtedly 
slightly less worrying, the opposition parties.
Throughout the whole period covered in this case study the strongest and most 
frequently recurring demand was, as mentioned above, for the Basic State Pension (BSP) 
to be linked to an earnings measure. This route had been rejected on the grounds of 
affordability and its lack of targeting in that ‘to plan for the future based on a flat rate 
eamings-linked rise paid to all ... would mean that less would be available for the 
middle and lower income pensioners in greatest need, who are our first priority’ (Brown 
2000b: col 325). However, the earnings link still ended up as a benchmark policy for 
spending, poverty reduction and, perhaps more importantly in terms of rhetoric, dignity. 
This situation is reflected in the cautious form of words used by Gordon Brown in the 
2000 Pre-Budget Report (PBR):10 ‘our aim for pensions reform is both to end pensioner 
poverty and to ensure that all pensioners share in the rising prosperity of the nation’ 
(Brown 2000b: col 325). The earnings link was portrayed as being what pensioners
10 The PBR is, along with the budget, one of the major set pieces o f the parliamentaiy year.
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wanted something that was admitted by Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the Labour party 
conference in September 2000 (BBC online 2000). However, future pensioners, or 
current taxpayers as they ought to also be termed, had interests strongly opposed to the 
existing pensioner population. From the factors outlined above, it is not difficult to 
construct the scenario facing the Government - they had to appear as if it was caring and 
sharing, but being prudent with the budget. However, the government also had to give 
pensioners back their dignity and lift them out of poverty, without allowing even one 
hard-working, but modestly well-off, pensioner to look over the fence at his apparently 
feckless neighbour being given a handout. In the more subtle and diplomatic words of 
the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions:
All of us are familiar with pensioners who feel let down by a system that has not 
rewarded their thrift. A pensioner with £20 of occupational pension on top of her 
state pension can sometimes find herself just a pound or two better off than 
someone who had saved nothing. That is unfair and unjust.
(Darling 2000: col 453)
The importance and relatively strong voice of these ‘just above the MIG’ pensioners,11 
that is those who just miss out on the income support benefit targeted at pensioners, is 
key in securing an acceptable reform, Brown outlines their plight in his 2000 PBR and he 
then highlights their importance in a hearteningly democratic way: ‘these are people 
whom we meet every week in our constituencies’ (Brown 2000b: col 326). There was, 
however, one further twist to the tale: the government had to give more pensioners relief 
from poverty, but without subjecting them to the indignity of the standard means-test that 
holds the embarrassment of having to fill in a lengthy and complex form asking them 
about their often negligible resources. This point is central to the policy questions of 
pensioner dignity.
11 The MIG is the Minimum Income Guarantee. This is the name given to Income Support for those of pensionable 
age. It is explained in more detail later in the chapter.
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To find a way to remove the gulf between the poorest pensioners and their richer 
neighbours and to make an impact on the incomes of the poorest required a redistributive 
policy at a time when the concept of redistribution was a taboo (Guardian 2002). Not 
only did all these constraints have to be faced but, thanks to the electoral politics, 
someone had to do all this whilst satisfying as many of the disparate interests as possible 
on the level of political appearances. This introduction has outlined the circumstances in 
which the pension credit was being devised, the case study will look at the policy 
network that created a policy within this complex environment.
General UK political environment
The UK system of first-past-the-post elections means many governments find that they 
can usually count on getting policies through Parliament with few, if any, undesired 
amendments. Data on commons votes (Boothroyd 2000) shows that between the 
Thatcher government’s election in 1979 and the end of 2000, for example, there were 
only 13 occasions when the government was defeated in a Commons division. The 
Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan from 1974 were somewhat exceptional in 
having a much higher number of defeats and governing with a minority for some of the 
time. Apart from this period and a few troubled months for Macdonald in 1924 it is rare 
for governments to face any entrenched parliamentary difficulties on the vast majority of 
legislation. It could be imagined that this parliamentary arrangement would mean a 
smooth ride for the government of the day in formulating policy, legislating and then 
implementing it. On the contrary, there is an even greater incentive for all kinds of 
interests to have their voice heard by government as they can be confident that if they 
gain the ‘ear’ of the policy makers they will see their point of view reflected in
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legislation. As the means of persuading governments become more sophisticated with 
continuing advances in technology and the tighter integration of society, these greater 
incentives come along with better and better probabilities of succeeding (Richardson and 
Jordan 1979: 14). The UK petrol price protests of 2001 provide an example of how, as 
the media become more immediate and expand with more time to fill, a well-organised 
protest using an effective public relations strategy and a few mobile phones can force a 
voice onto government (Dilley 2000). Not all voices clamouring to be heard by 
government are so dramatic; many have a solid methodical day-to-day strategy and have 
a longer lasting impact than flash in the pan media-hyped protesters.
The internal dynamics, as well as the more frequently cited external relations, of the 
UK political system are based on consultation and consensus even when the heart of the 
political executive in power is seen as dictatorial or strongly ideological. This 
characteristic stems from ‘departmental pluralism’ (Richardson and Jordan 1979: 26) 
whereby all policies, and especially budgetary allocations, become a matter for alliances 
between powerful cabinet ministers with their fiefdoms. They defend to a greater or less 
extent their perceived ‘client group’ and their own territory, and promote their own 
image by pushing suitable policies. Despite the trumpeting of ‘joined-up government’ 
and the spawning of ‘cross-cutting policy units’ under the Blair government over the last 
few years there is still an underlying structure of a divided whole when it comes to policy 
making within Whitehall. Yet, despite all the jousting going on, everyone is still happy 
to gossip around the Whitehall village pump. The Treasury, for example, is described as 
a village with actors ‘sometimes in conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and 
operating within a shared framework.’12 The ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, whereby
12 Heclo and Wildavsky 1974 quoted in Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 8)
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civil servants, pressure groups and political advisers to private concerns are in free 
exchange, exists (as we will see in Chapter 6) but has not thoroughly taken hold in 
Whitehall. There is, however, a great deal to be said for the ‘strength of weak links’13 
whereby relationships built up, for example, at university or in a previous posting can 
knit networks together and take the place of ‘political’ loyalties that exist in other 
countries. The lack of party ‘political’ loyalties amongst civil servants, who as we will 
see are in many cases the glue of policy making, is something peculiar to the UK and 
suggests that a key characteristic observable for most actors, that of political alliance, is 
lacking for this important group. Both the ‘revolving door’ and the political affiliation of 
civil servants gives an interesting comparison between the France and the UK case 
studies and leads to somewhat contradictory findings about the differences in the 
institutions and the effect on roles in policy-making. The groups into which the actors 
can be seen to naturally split emerge from the case studies, but it becomes clear that to 
assess the cohesiveness of these groups with any rigour requires the techniques of 
network analysis. This is a good example of the scientific 'exploration - hypothesis -  
verification' process described in the introduction: groups can be deduced from the case 
study material, a hypothesis can be stated about the policy process and tested with the 
network techniques or, conversely, network techniques can be run to extract the most 
cohesive groups and these can be examined to see if they show similar or differing 
patterns by using the case study data about the actors and the process.
In the UK system where civil servants are not politically appointed at any level,14 
special advisers (SpAds) are an unusual feature of the landscape. The SpAds have,
13 Interpretations abound o f the work o f Granovetter (1973). One o f the main implications is that ties that are not 
explicitly connected to the work in hand can be more important than those which are.
14 But see the later comments on Ed Balls
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theoretically, the same role as civil servants but they are appointed by the minister and 
their contracts end on the departure of their minister. As a result of their rarity, usually 
one or two in a department,15 closeness to the Minister and ability to behave in an 
ostensibly political fashion they tend to have a hand in any high profile policy. They also 
pay special attention to anything that has inter-departmental aspects or is likely to be 
controversial or attract media attention. In certain areas that require prolonged 
concentration on a technical issue special advisers will not take such a full part. 
Potentially covering all issues within a department they tend to be very busy but, unlike 
the minister responsible, do not have the weight of duty on them to understand 
everything that may be pronounced in the House of Commons or written in a 
Parliamentary Question. However, that said, they will tend to pick on issues that the civil 
servants (and indeed sometimes the ministers) would rather be left in the background. In 
this sense, even on highly technical issues in policy making, they will play the ‘reality 
check’ card. The other key actors in the department are the minister’s private office; they 
deal with all issues that pass over the minister’s desk although their role in terms of 
policy making is something that is even more difficult to establish than with the normal 
civil servant. The final judgement must rest with the empirical evidence perhaps not 
from the case study, where a lack of mention (or decision to include or not in the 
narrative) is unconvincing, but from the network analysis in later chapters where the 
systematic questioning elicits a mention of anyone that actors feel is important and the 
network analysis methods can then sensitively assess actors against each other. One other 
politically affiliated civil servant case exists: that of Ed Balls, the Chief Economic 
Advisor to the Treasury and closest advisor to the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. When
15 In July 2000 there were 79 in total (Hansard 2000).
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Balls was appointed to this role it was the first time ever that a known political adviser 
had taken on a top ‘neutral’ policy post but the evidence from interviews seems to 
suggest that the way Balls worked within the policy making context was little different to 
a career civil servant and the appointment did not seem to cause any visible polarisation 
between ‘political’ and ‘neutral’ advisers. Personality, of course, plays a part as can be 
seen in the insurmountable problems caused by friction between the political and neutral 
advisers in Stephen Byers time at the Department of Transport (BBC online 2002).16 
There seems to be no fundamental reason though why relations should be improved or 
worsened by such appointments.
So far, all the discussion has focused on the government and their civil servants. It is 
important to also consider the opposition, free-spirited MPs of the government’s own 
party in the House of Commons and the even more troublesome characters sitting in the 
House of Lords. The key to understanding their roles lies, as with so many aspects of 
policy making now, in the sheer scope of government involvement in national life. 
Parliamentarians cannot hope to cover all aspects of government; instead they rely on 
representing constituencies. MPs have their local constituencies and if they wish to be re­
elected this is an unavoidable responsibility. However, virtually all parliamentarians also 
have other interests that they pursue. It is usual to find that in a Commons debate the 
Speaker will have a strong idea about who should be called from the floor on any
16 A story that illustrated how quickly disaster can ensue when things go wrong in the interface between political and 
neutral servants of a minister. The first problem that occurred in the Byers affair was that his political adviser wanted 
to push out the department's own ‘bad news’ stories in the wake of the September 11th attacks in the US. A similar 
approach was taken to a story on the day that Princess Margaret died, but the neutral civil servants were not 
impressed by this and events came to a head when the adviser seemed to obtain the ‘resignation’ (which was in fact 
never offered) of a career civil servant as a quid pro quo for resigning herself. The course of events collapsed into a 
shambles which culminated in the Permanent Secretary repeatedly using four-letter words to describe the situation in 
the department. The press had a field day and eventually Byers resigned. An interesting aside for this case study is 
that Alastair Darling, who career civil servants in DWP spoke well o f  was sent to replace Byers and took his own 
Permanent Secretary with him to have provide complete change o f senior personnel providing a ‘safe pair o f hands.’ 
We can assume that had Byers been the minister in DWP during the period of this case study and not Darling we 
may have seen some very different interviews.
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particular subject and civil servants will also have a good idea about who will ask good, 
or troublesome, Parliamentary Questions (PQs).17 The departmental Select Committees 
of the House of Commons are another parliamentary influence on policy, but despite 
their strong reputations, they focus on even more narrowly defined slices of government 
business. Even in the time that it takes for the gestation of a single policy statement it is 
unlikely that a select committee will have more than a passing interest in that area and, 
when they do, unless the departmental response is particularly sloppy or the report 
happens to come in tandem with another such as an National Audit Office report that is 
also critical and gains publicity, although the committee report may add to the troubles of 
the policy makers or help out their opponents, it is unlikely to alter seriously the balance 
of power. This is even more the case because such interventions tend to be after the 
event and so, unless there is the rare occurrence of similar policy processes following on 
from each other in a short space of time, there is nothing much in terms of policy making 
(as we are defining it) for the reports to influence.
These general points about the political environment also illuminate why the pensions 
sector is especially interesting to study for NFPs in the UK. It is a policy area that crosses 
departmental boundaries, it is highly politicised with a clear distinction between the 
policies of left and right and it is often in the public and media spotlight. There is a 
strong impact on the wider economic position because of the high levels of spending 
associated with state pension provision and there is a need for sound pension policy in 
ensuring a stable macro-economy over time.
Pension policy environment
In the UK pension policy is the responsibility of the DWP but there is also interest
17 To a Civil Servant ‘good’ and ‘troublesome’ PQs are often synonymous.
30
Chapter II
from HMT, the Inland Revenue and, occasionally from the social policy section of the 
Number 10 policy unit.18 Within the DWP three ministers are involved in pension 
policies: a Minister of State has responsibility for pensions; the Secretary of State has 
overall responsibility for all departmental issues and, when business is in the House of 
Lords, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Lords) is charged with pensions 
issues. The policy considered in this case study was originally announced by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the April 2000 Budget Statement (Brown 2000a) and 
thereafter referred to in every Budget and PBR as a key plank of pensioner policy. 
Within the Treasury it was predominantly the Chancellor, Gordon Brown that dealt with 
the policy as it was an issue that involved what is known as Annually Managed 
Expenditure (AME), as opposed to the departmental spending. Since this involves the 
macro-level decisions about tax-raising and benefit distribution decisions stay with the 
Chancellor. As befitting its status as a ‘big ticket policy’19 and reflecting the Chancellor’s 
involvement the Minister who took the lead in the DWP was the Secretary of State, 
Alastair Darling. In addition to these two Cabinet Ministers working on this policy with 
potentially something around £3bn annually of discretionary expenditure, possibly 
substantially more (see table 2.1), and an ostensibly redistributive development, it can be 
safely assumed that the Prime Minister would be expecting his own No. 10 team to keep 
a close eye on the progress of the policy. Of course the involvement and relative 
importance of these actors and the departments within which they work can only be 
inferred from institutional details and aggregated impressions formed from the 
interviews when using the case study techniques, however we will see in the later 
chapters definitive rankings for the centrality of actors can be calculated from the NFP.
18 Number 10 consists of staff attached to the Prime Minister.
19 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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Table 2.1: Cost o f the Pension Credit reform package under alternative J
policy scenarios
Scenario 2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
1 £2bn £4bn £8bn £14bn £20bn £26bn
2 £2bn £3bn £4bn £6bn £8bn £9bn
3 £2bn £3bn £3bn £3bn £2bn £lbn
Notes:
Figures expressed in Ebillion
2004 is the first full year of the Pension Credit reform package.
All figures in 2001/02 prices.
All figures rounded to nearest £ billion.
For the purposes of this paper, take-up is assumed to be 67 per cent in 2004 as entitlement to the Pension Credit is 
gradually established. (This is consistent with the 2001 Pre-Budget Report forecast.) Take-up for the subsequent years 
shown is assumed to be 100 per cent.
Source: Departm ent o f  W ork and Pensions (2002)
Preferred interlocutors
Notions of the hierarchical nature of the British Civil Service and too many repeats of 
‘Yes Minister’ have led to the widespread misbelief that the preferred interlocutors of 
Ministers are permanent secretaries and the two levels below. However the same 
pressures discussed as leading to the impotence of parliamentarians, that is the sheer 
scope of governmental activity, as well as the rise in managerialism in the higher ranks 
of the civil service and the fashion for evidence based policy making all have led towards 
a drift down the hierarchy when Ministers are looking for policy advice.20 The 
Chancellor’s special adviser said: ‘we worked with officials closely and this is a follow 
on from Gordon [Brown] who is interested in the people who know about the policy and 
that’s what we are interested in and it’s a good management thing -  what’s the point in 
having people who know about the policy not being in meetings. And now I think about 
it, Charlie Pate was working for Emma below Grade 7.’21 The Chancellor’s special 
adviser, has a range of responsibilities across a considerable proportion of governmental 
activity: that he is able to recall the name of the official who comes sixth or seventh
20 See interview evidence later and for a fascinating discussion of the current roles and activities o f civil servants below 
the top levels. See Page and Jenkins (2005 forthcoming).
21 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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down in the hierarchy from the permanent secretary is indeed significant in terms of the 
policy-making process. This is of course an isolated example of such an experience but it 
the sort of information that leads us to make valuable use of the NFP that we will build 
in later chapters. From the NFP and the derived analyses we can confirm that this 
practice of talking to lower graded staff is indeed a feature of the UK network.
Outsiders
So far everyone considered has been inside government, but we have to also consider 
outsiders. In the time-slice sketch above we heard about the power of the grey vote and 
the jumpiness of the pensions industry following the mis-selling scandals. Where, 
institutionally, can the many voices that speak and wish to be taken account of be seen to 
fit into the environment? Alas in this particular sub-world of the pensions debate there is 
little to be seen directly of outsider groups. They do not come to any official liaison body 
and they are only involved in ad-hoc consultation exercises. Various think-tanks write 
reports: sometimes they take different sides of the debate, sometimes they give a 
balanced criticism of government policy on behalf of all points of the interest group 
compass. These are all filtered upward through the system in the department but none of 
them have a clear status beyond that of their individual representatives reputation. Some 
will be read by the lowest management grade and never be seen or commented on again, 
some will arrive at the Private Office of the minister, some may come straight to the 
minister’s desk thanks to a good marketing strategy of a think tank -  although the 
implications of such a fortuitous landing are still far from clear. Under the New Labour 
regime there were a good many policies, this being one of them, that were instigated and 
committed to even before the Blair-led government took office. This means that because 
of the lack of resources that marks opposition, interest groups that had researchers,
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organisation and or policies that were of interest to the Labour Party would have found a 
good deal of influence early on. It seems that, for example, while child poverty groups 
have a foothold in the close knit inner circle of New Labour, the pensioner groups are a 
step removed. While this has not lessened the Labour Party’s movement on pensioner 
poverty it has meant that once a commitment was made, encouraged by the groups, there 
was then less access at the post-commitment policy development stage. It is also 
interesting that at the policy development stage there was little academic involvement, as 
there are ‘more academics on child poverty, a lot more, working on both policy 
prescriptions and analysis than there are working on today’s pensioners [but] plenty of 
academics who work on tomorrows pensioners.’22 
The key phrase in understanding the position of outsiders in the policy process is 
‘selling the policy’. This is not quite as Machiavellian as it sounds and, quite 
surprisingly, has some considerable element of give and take. When those involved on 
the government side talk of selling the policy they seem often to be a little ashamed, 
perhaps thinking of themselves as some kind of dodgy market stall holder trying to palm 
off shabby goods on an unsuspecting buyer. However, when looked at with the benefit of 
distance it is clear that they have already taken pains to make their product acceptable to 
the other side -  it is only the use of the word ‘selling’ that makes them feel an overtone 
of seediness in the procedure. What is occurring is selling in a way that is more akin to a 
medieval market than a supermarket. The government is selling the policy in the sense 
that they are buying the (often tacit) support of interested parties and government’s side 
of the bargain has to be acceptable if the barter process is to succeed. The discussion 
above may seem to be a diversion from the institutional environment of pension policy
22 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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formation but in fact it is necessary as in the UK there is no formal encounter equivalent 
to the ‘negotiations between social partners’ that we will see in the French case study. 
What is striking in comparative perspective is that ‘selling the policy’ is just as much an 
issue for the French government even though they have several institutionalised forms of 
contact on the formal-informal continuum. The French government came to those from 
whom they needed support with a set of proposals that was just as set as the UK 
government version -  what is interesting is that the UK appears to perhaps be even more 
aware of their pressure groups in the formation of policy even though they never meet 
with them in even the thinnest guise of ‘concertation’23 or anything like it.24 If the 
outsiders in the UK case informed the policy process it was by making known the terms 
on which they would ‘buy’ the policy through the media, commentaries and published 
reports. This can be verified by the complete lack of non-governmental actors that we see 
in the final version of the NFP that is constructed in Chapter 8.
UK pensions policy context
The prevailing atmosphere at the time of this case study concerned pressure mainly as 
a result of a badly received increase in the Basic State Pension (BSP): Labour was 
‘ambushed at its party conference ... by pensioners protesting against the 75p increase in 
the state pension in April 2000’ (Schifferes 2001). Although this rise accurately reflected 
the practice of the time -  to increase the BSP by inflation -  it was still a purely 
discretionary move and in no way unavoidable. Given the context of continued calls 
from players such as the National Pensioners Convention (NPC), various trades unions 
and other interested parties (BBC online 1999) to link the BSP to an earnings indicator,
23 See the next chapter for a discussion on the debatable meaning of this word.
24 This emerged from many of the interviews conducted for the case study.
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this small absolute rise was a move that caused avoidable friction. At the time the 
income distributions did not show the picture that the government was looking for: more 
and more pensioners were retiring on very good incomes but many were left languishing 
far away from the comfort zone enjoyed by their elderly peers.
In essence, the problem is one of limits on spending combined with managing the 
transition inherent in giving extensive help to the poor and nothing to the richer 
pensioners.
Behind this bald analysis though there was, according to Ed Balls, a set of policy 
decisions that were coherent and leading towards the pension credit. While they were 
waiting for the window to introduce the pension credit policy they did not wish to make 
major moves on the BSP: the introduction and commitment to the Minimum Income 
Guarantee (MIG), the Winter Fuel Allowance, the free television licences for over-75s 
and the BSP rises were a set of policies intended to leave the system itself as much as 
possible in neutral, but getting no worse until the time came when the pension credit 
could be instigated.25
Take the 75p increase. At the same time as that went through we put winter fuel 
allowance up to £200 which was equivalent to about £3 per week. We could 
have chosen to do this on BSP, but we didn't want the BSP to be the focus of 
policy. The over inflation rises in BSP were only announced at the same time as 
and after we announced the pension credit. Our strategy was not ever to do 
anything to BSP until it was a transition to the Pension Credit coming in. All those 
other things were filling. So the 75p and winter fuel was basically because we 
don't want to pre-empt the pension credit.
Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
The complex interactions of the benefit world manifests itself in a multiplicity of 
checks and balances which can quickly take on the appearance of banana skins, three of 
the key issues are:
1) BSP increases are of no benefit to the poorest as their income related benefits are
25 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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taken away pound for pound unless the Income Related Benefit (IRB) is increased by 
the same amount as the BSP;
2) across the board BSP increases are expensive and benefit the very rich. Even a tiny 
increase in the BSP ends up costing many billions of pounds that is all ‘deadweight’ 
to a pure political mind in the sense that it has no high political value by introducing 
anyone to something they did not have before, but merely gives them a small increase 
to an existing entitlement;
3) extension of poverty relief or any income related payments means, by definition, an 
increase in the number of pensioners being means tested leading to accusations of 
robbing the elderly of their dignity by having to rely on ‘the social’ or ‘handouts from 
the state’
4) many pensioners who start out reasonably well off at retirement see the value of their 
pension decline relative to the standard of living of the country as a whole (this issue 
is picked up on below in the short discussion on indexation) until, at an age when they 
feel they should be respected, they find themselves in a queue with those from ‘the 
margins of society’ waiting for their weekly payment.
The desire was for an instrument that was more targetable than BSP but with more 
flexibility than changes to the MIG could offer by themselves; such an instrument would 
be able to focus on poorer pensioners, with a broader or wider definition as desired, 
whilst being responsive to spending concerns.26 This implies problems which boil down, 
as briefly touched on in the first section of this chapter, to satisfying those ‘Just Above 
the MIG’ or ‘the JAMs’. These people miss out on being entitled to the MIG by a veiy 
small amount of money and not only do they therefore lose out on automatic entitlement
26 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004 and Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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to other benefits (such as some healthcare cost exemptions) but, as will be explained in 
more detail below, they are only a few pounds better off than some who have 
considerably less pre-benefit income. This group are exactly those whom Gordon Brown 
was unable to avoid in his constituency; furthermore those who tend to feel aggrieved in 
some way at this level are not the ‘excluded’ but have considerable resources to be seen 
and heard. If the poor are helped and the number of JAMs is limited then the amount 
going to each beneficiary will be much larger for the same amount of spending. This 
arrangement allowed the government to predict that they can ‘give recipients of the 
pension credit more than even the earnings link in the basic state pension would give 
them’ (Brown 2000b: col 326). Once the amount of expenditure is decided upon what is 
needed is a policy that can allow the number of beneficiaries to be played off against the 
level of benefit until the political equation looks right. The Secretaiy of State settled for a 
balance, but the iterations to arrive at this point needed a complex mix of political, 
administrative and economic knowledge. If the calculations are right it can mean that the 
money stretches as far as to ensure that ‘not only will the minimum income guarantee 
rise in line with earnings, but so will the new pension credit’ (Darling 2000:453).
The UK has 10.3 million pensioners, of whom 7.3 million received a flat rate, minimal 
BSP that is expected to be supplemented by either a state second pension or private 
resources. The rest get their BSP (virtually all UK citizens are in receipt) along with 
either a disability benefit or the income safety net which, by 2000, had come to be known 
as the MIG, although it is in fact simply income support with higher support levels for 
pensioners.27
27 All figures in this paragraph are for 2000 from Department o f Work and Pensions (2001b).
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Dignity
Virtually a whole thesis could be written on the topic of ‘dignity’ as it influences 
thinking about policy in this area. Unfortunately there are, as Ed Miliband says above, 
very few academics working on ‘today’s pensioners’ and so a brief summary of the 
issues is laid out here in the absence of any good references on the subject. Lack of 
dignity is mentioned regularly in debates by politicians, academics and other interested 
groups but it is usually thrown in as a fait accompli and assumed to be either a bad thing 
in itself or a bad thing because of its perceived effect on the levels of take-up of the 
associated benefit. So, for example, we read in the Labour Party manifesto that ‘everyone 
is entitled to dignity in retirement’ (Labour Party 1997), we are told by the Conservative 
Party Shadow spokesman on work and pensions that ‘We will treat you with respect... 
we will free you from means testing... we will restore your dignity’ (Willets 2004) and 
even the academic commentators when discussing the Pensioner Credit suggest without 
further explanation that ‘this further extension of means-testing has important 
implications for the dignity of claimants’ (Falkingham and Rake 2001). There is some 
confounding of the issues in the debate on dignity; the roots of the debate seem to 
emerge from a neo-liberal idea which equates dependency to a lack of dignity. However, 
this basic standpoint has, become slightly less pure and appears to have reached the point 
where the lack of dignity is not about being given money, but about having to ask for it 
or, alternatively and additionally, having to reveal anything about your personal 
circumstances in order to become entitled. That is to say, being given money by the state 
can be seen by some to be demeaning in itself but if you have to prove that you are poor 
first then that is doubly undignified. There is a comparative perspective here between the 
continental systems of ‘social insurance’ and the post-Thatcherite ‘poverty safety net’
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that exists in the UK. There are two clearly different rhetorical threads associated with 
these where one side is considered a legitimate and non-shameful lifetime smoothing of 
income stream and the other is considered to be a demeaning state handout. Nonetheless 
it is a self-validating truth that if both sides of the political spectrum announce that they 
wish to end the ‘indignity’ of the means-test then the means-test is something which 
takes away the dignity of those subjected to it. There are, using a very broad brush, two 
solutions proposed for the dignity issue, one can say that the Conservatives wish to end 
the problem by moving the issue out of the state and into the individuals’ own hands, 
while Labour decided they could ‘break out of the means test debate through.... tax 
benefit integration for pensioners.’28 Labour’s strategy puts benefits in the same mental 
pigeon-hole as taxation thus allowing a resource based allocation of benefits whilst 
making the collection of the information that is needed to do this as close to the similar 
exercise done for taxation as possible. The ultimate end of this process is what is called 
‘tax-benefit integration’ which is an administrative as well as economic goal.
One of the central points pushed by the industry is also a key requirement of the 
governments economic juggling: the requirement to encourage saving. According to 
Darling, ‘there is a fundamental fault in the system we inherited, saving should be 
rewarded, not punished [and] so the pension credit will, for the first time, reward the 
thrift of millions of people who have worked hard to save for their retirement’ 
Furthermore, Labour intends to achieve this despite the microeconomic reality of 
muddled incentives with a tapered means test (described later). Darling also claims that 
‘the message is clear: whatever one can afford to put by, it will always pay to save’ 
(Darling 2000: col 452). In fact there has been some criticism of the stance taken on this
28 interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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issue by the industry who are still not convinced that in the atmosphere of mistrust 
surrounding the previous mis-selling accusations that they can sell pensions safely under 
current policies.
The pension credit policy
Different views of the sam e animal
In contrast to the simplicity of an earnings link for BSP, the Pensioner Credit is an 
unusual policy that straddles the upper boundary of income support (MIG). The range 
over which the pension credit operates takes in those on non- or barely-supplemented 
BSP and extends up to those who are comfortably off.
I said in the Budget that we wanted the beneficiaries of the new credit to be 
single pensioners with incomes of up to £100 and pensioner couples with 
incomes up to £150. I can now say to the House that pensioner couples with 
incomes below £200, and single pensioners with incomes below £135 -  many 
millions of pensioners -  will now receive this new pension credit when it is 
introduced. I can also tell the House that, while the pension will rise in line with 
inflation, the new pension credit will also rise in line with earnings every year.
(Brown 2000b)
This indexing decision means that because the Pension Credit, in the sense of a 
modified MIG, is higher than the BSP, everyone who is on it will get the mythical 
‘earnings link’ referred to earlier.
It will be seen that the Pensioner Credit is many things to many people, but in its driest 
most technical incarnation it is an adjustment to the MIG which, above a certain point, 
removes benefit at less than £1 for each £1 of additional income. It is a tapered income- 
related benefit and consequently, as well as putting money straight into the pockets of 
pensioners over a fairly wide income band, it also affects incentives to save in a variety 
of ways. As the policy affects today’s pensioners, this makes a complicated scenario the 
effects of which will be covered below, however, the implications do not stop there. The
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Figure 2.2: Illustrative gains from  the Pension Credit in 2003/04fo r  a single
pensioner
■  Chart 4; Illustrative gains from the Pension Credit in 2003/04 for a single pensioner
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pensioner credit cannot affect current pensioner’s incentives to save (it is assumed that 
pensioners are dis-savers), but it affects, through the message that it sends about the 
perceived direction of pensioner policy, the incentives to save for tomorrow’s 
pensioners.
Many have tried to explain or understand Pensioner Credit and many have failed to 
give the answer that satisfied their questioner; there are a multitude of ways to present 
the fundamental issues each of which suits a different audience. The best description was 
from the assistant economist in the DSS working on the charts for the consultation 
document, who suggested that the pension credit could be seen as ‘a MIG with a tail.’29
29 Conversation with J. Phipps, October 2000
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Figure 2.1: Total post benefit income broken down by source (the Pension 
Credit is the MIG plus the *.savings reward ’ constituting the Mig-with-a-tail)
■ Own income
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Note: based on figures from Department of Social Security (2000)
The chart that he finally prepared resembled Figure 2.1. Instead of those who have an 
income at the level of the income support cut-off (i.e. the MIG) and everyone above that 
point getting zero benefit, it tails off more gradually. The other way of looking at the 
policy (and the way that is preferred by the political actors) is that, rather than enhancing 
income support with a taper, it is a bolt-on ‘savings reward’ that goes to some already on 
income support, but is also payable to many who are not. This approach has the 
advantage of, rhetorically if not actually, keeping the pensioners further up the income 
distribution off the traditional income support benefit, which had become the MIG, as 
this kind of benefit is, as discussed above, often seen as demeaning. Figure 2.2 shows 
this perspective, with the original MIG and the pension credit shown in different colours.
Presented in this way the policy looks like good news. The point at which the pension 
credit starts to look like trouble is when it is seen not as how much is being given to 
people, but as how much is being taken away. In the analysis of IRBs there is a measure 
called the ‘marginal deduction rate’ (MDR). This measure shows how much benefit is 
withdrawn for every pound of additional income. With a simple non-tapered income
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support benefit, such as the MIG, there is a 100% MDR, meaning that for every pound of 
additional income the benefit is taken away pound for pound. Other IRBs have different 
MDRs; housing benefit (HB) and council tax benefit (CTB) have MDRs of 65% and 
20% respectively, meaning for CTB, for example, that if you increase your income by 
£10 you will only lose £2 of your benefit. Often these MDRs are represented by 
opponents of means-testing as being ‘tax rates’, these arguments imply that recipients of 
IRBs are being ‘taxed’ as they increase their incomes. Pensioners on income support 
(using the above Chart 2.1 as reference) whose pension was raised from £72 to £82 
could claim they had been ‘taxed’ at 100%. Before the rise they had an income of £90; 
after the rise they had an income of £90 -  their £10 has been ‘taken off them’ by the 
government.
That it was given in the first place by the government is presumably of little comfort. 
The problem with the pensioner credit is that while it reduces the MDR for many already 
on income support (those between the start point of the taper and the income support 
level) it means that many who used to face an MDR of zero will face a significant level 
of deduction on any additional income. The reason that this is perceived as a problem is 
not only that people feel this is unfair, or looked at more from a politicians point of view, 
that people may find this a something that they hold against a government that introduces 
it. There is also a problem with this approach in that it confuses, at best, mid reduces, at 
worst, the incentive to save for a pension; calculations of future returns on current 
savings are complex enough, but with an MDR that extends up the income distribution 
to (in the chart) £140 per week for a single pensioner the decision faced by many would 
be, if they were to get only 40% of the benefit from any additional saving, whether they
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are better off consuming in the present and living off the government in their 
retirement.30
Table 2.2: ‘How the Pension Credit will work -gains for pensioners9
Single pensioners £ per week, 2003-4
Your original 
income
Your Pension Credit
Guaranteed income
top up Savings credit
Your post-Credit ir
77.00 23.00 100.00
78.00 22.00 0.60 100.60
79.00 21.00 1.20 101.20
80.00 20.00 1.80 101.80
81.00 19.00 2.40 102.40
82.00 18.00 3.00 103.00
83.00 17.00 3.60 103.60
84.00 16.00 4.20 104.20
85.00 15.00 4.80 104.80
86.00 - 14.00 5.40 105.40
87.00 13.00 6.00 106.00
88.00 12.00 6.60 106.60
89.00 11.00 7.20 107.20
90.00 10.00 7.80 107.80
91.00 9.00 8.40 108.40
92.00 8.00 9.00 109.00
93.00 7.00 9.60 109.60
94.00 6.00 10.20 110.20
95.00 5.00 10.80 110.80
96.00 4.00 11.40 111.40
97.00 3.00 12.00 112.00
98.00 2.00 12.60 112.60
99.00 1.00 13.20 113.20
100.00 13.80 113.80
101.00 13.40 114.40
102.00 13.00 115.00
103.00 12.60 115.60
104.00 12.20 116.20
105.00 11.80 116.80
106.00 11.40 117.40
107.00 11.00 118.00
108.00 10.60 118.60
109.00 10.20 119.20
110.00 9.80 119.80
111.00 9.40 120.40
112.00 9.00 121.00
113.00 8.60 121.60
114.00 8.20 122.20
115.00 7.80 122.80
116.00 7.40 123.40
117.00 7.00 124.00
118.00 6.60 124.60
119.00 6.20 125.20
120.00 5.80 125.80
121.00 5.40 126.40
122.00 5.00 127.00
123.00 4.60 127.60
124.00 4.20 128.20
125.00 3.80 128.80
126.00 3.40 129.40
127.00 3.00 130.00
128.00 2.60 130.60
129.00 2.20 131.20
130.00 1.80 131.80
131.00 1.40 132.40
132.00 1.00 133.00
133.00 0.60 133.60
134.00 0.20 134.20
135.00 - 135.00
Source: Department o f  W ork and Pensions (2001a)
30 This £140 ceiling could be higher if  they have additional income support entitlement for, say, reasons of disability 
or caring responsibility
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From a dry and strictly logical point of view such a decision on the part of a worker 
saving for retirement would be folly, given that the Secretaiy of State for Work and 
Pensions has the authority to amend the levels of income support and the pension credit 
taper at any time through secondary legislation. However, no politician could ever risk 
using this expose of their power to intervene as an argument and in any case the taper 
still adds to the uncertainty of pension planning.
The presentation twists go even further, for example in the Pension Credit White 
Paper (Department of Work and Pensions 2001a) the tapered benefit is split into the 
‘guaranteed income top up’ and the ‘savings credit’, which emphasises the generosity of 
the new policy and focuses the attention on the ‘savings credit’ element as, by a happy 
mathematical necessity, the old part ‘guaranteed income to up’ only decreases whereas 
the ‘savings credit’ starts off modestly, peaks and then drops off quite slowly as seen in 
Table 2.2.
In strict legislative terms, of course, this is as fictional as splitting the single amount of 
the tapered benefit in any other way for political presentational advantage. However, 
with a historical perspective over the reasoning and development of the policy it does 
have some moral foundation.
Alongside these economic issues there was also a parallel development on the 
administrative side which was intended to deal with the questions surrounding ‘dignity’ 
and also to improve the service to pensioners for its own sake. Led by Alastair Darling at 
the DWP31 the purpose was to transform the entire range of contacts that those of 
pensionable age have with the DWP into a new and separate ‘Pensioner Service’ to 
enable a clean break from the link with poverty and handouts that were seen to taint
31 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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DWP’s work with the elderly as well as transforming in some way the means test to be a 
more acceptable form of information gathering.
The second change is that we will make it easier for pensioners to get the 
money to which they are entitled, and get rid of the weekly means test. Now, 
there are some who weep crocodile tears at means testing for pensioners, but 
who did nothing about it for 18 years. We will.
At present, we ask all taxpaying pensioners to tell us about their income just 
once a year, if that. However, we ask poorer pensioners to tell the benefits 
system about changes every week. There is no good reason for that. The credit 
will be based on an income assessment that is more like the tax system.
When one retires, a calculation has to be made about one’s basic state pension, 
based on the contributions that one has paid. In the future we will be able to 
work out at the same time how much a pensioner is entitled to under the 
minimum income guarantee and the pension credit. We know that most 
pensioners have stable incomes, so after the initial award at retirement, 
adjustments will need to be made only when circumstances change significantly.
We are making it easier for pensioners to claim their entitlements, by introducing 
a dedicated new service for pensioners. People will be able to claim by phone, 
which will give pensioners the better service that they want.
(Darling 2000: col 454)
The policy process
From 1997 onwards we were saying ‘at what point can we do the pension 
credit?’ And the fact was we couldn’t until the second parliament... [when] the 
system could deal with it.
Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February2004
Personnel
The process broke down into at least two phases; the ‘what will achieve our aims?’ 
phase and the ‘how are we going to make that thing happen?’ phase. A quasi-phase 
straddled these two which is referred to by many interviewees as ‘setting the parameters’, 
which leads from a specification period towards the end of phase one into an early high- 
level version of phase two. The personnel involved in these phases are somewhat distinct 
for two reasons. Firstly there was an unconnected changeover in staff that happened 
coincidentally in several places within a short space of time. Secondly there was the 
intentional engagement and disengagement of certain actors due to the nature of the 
work changing: the policy director in charge of pensions at DWP, Paul Gray, for
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example, was ‘more involved in the early stages... what are the big issues, how are we 
going to go about it [followed by] lesser engagement as the policy matures.’32 Certain 
characters also played unexpected roles. We have already mentioned that in the top 
policy advice job at the Treasury there was, unprecedentedly, a political adviser, but on 
the other hand, after the election the Secretary of State at DWP did not have any Special 
Advisers at all for the period from June to October 200land even after October none 
explicitly involved with this policy33 so we see career officials supporting the Minister in 
the absence of such advisers. They go to meetings to perform all the functions that the 
SpAds might normally be expected to carry out except one: the Private Secretary of 
Alastair Darling explains that ‘when it got party political I just absented myself from the 
discussions.’34 Career civil servants are bound by convention and code not to carry out 
any party political acts and therefore this is one key way in which they cannot substitute 
wholly for a SpAd. In addition it is worth noting that the DWP is one of the largest 
administrative departments in government and the Permanent Secretaiy is supported by 
senior officers who have responsibilities that are easily the equal of some of Permanent 
Secretary rank; in this case Paul Gray, who was at the time in the Grade below 
Permanent Secretaiy, was the policy chief in this area. The involvement of the 
Permanent Secretaiy was that her policy chief went to her for ‘reporting on progress... 
bilaterals’35 but that she had no explicit hand in policy development.
The ministers also displayed particular patterns of involvement that are not always 
typical or need further explanation. As already mentioned above, this ‘big ticket’ policy 
was being led in Treasury by the Chancellor due to its AME component and the fact that
32 Interview with Paul Gray, 27 November 2002
33 Interview with Neil Couling, 20 November 2003
34 Interview with Neil Couling, 20 November 2003
35 Interview with Paul Gray, 27 November 2002
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it made an important line in the budget calculations, but one might have expected that 
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Andrew Smith, would have had some more 
involvement on the issues that surrounded the expenditure on the proposed Pensions 
Service, which clearly came under ‘Departmental Expenditure’ and therefore within his 
remit. The situation, though, was different from the usual pattern of Treasury -  
Department relations. The Treasury were happy to spend money for the reasons outlined 
below and so the Chief Secretary was not required to play the usual ‘bad cop’ role. In the 
DWP the ministerial pattern was determined by the Treasury configuration: it was 
known that in the end-game Alastair Darling would be agreeing the policy strands with 
Gordon Brown and so, as these two worked together very well, Darling led the policy.36 
Consequently, it would only be Darling who went to Ministerial level meetings with 
Treasury, as Brown is famed for working well in small groups. The other Ministers were 
sometimes asked to reflect on some detail of the policy, but their involvement was not 
great. Of course, all of these statements are a broad brush aggregation of what was 
discovered from the interview data. To list all the individual recollections of contacts 
between ministers and others would be both tedious and uninformative, it is in this kind 
of arena that we will seethe advantage of the NFP representation that allows us to 
produce the pattern of relations for any actor in the network and also sophisticated 
aggregate statistics that measure their centrality and potentially other measures. For 
example we will see that while Gordon Brown is far from having the most extensive set 
of contacts he is extremely central in the UK network; in structural terms being ranked 3 
(see Chapter 9).
36 Darling was a former Chief Secretary and, interestingly, Andrew Smith the Chief Secretary at the time went on to 
follow Darling into the Secretary o f State role at DWP when Darling was sent to calm the waters at the Department 
of Transport after the Stephen Byers fiasco.
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Prehistory
The inception of the policy, or at least the reasons behind the policy took place before 
the Labour party came to power in 1997. After the Social Justice Commission report in 
1994, the ideas started to take shape and Gordon Brown, then the Shadow Chancellor, 
made a speech at the party conference in 1994 that talked about the tax-benefit 
integration for pensioners.37 From then on the strategy was to move on the poorest 
pensioners. When the Labour party was elected it became clear to them very quickly that 
the system did not have the capacity to cope simultaneously with the reforms they 
wished to make on families and children and those for pensioners so they made a 
sequencing decision to tackle the families and children policies first.38 On pensioners 
there was the introduction of the MIG, which did something for the veiy poorest (see 
above), but ‘only as a route towards the pension credit.’39 
The process
While considering the pension credit policy process we also have to keep in mind that 
this was a high-spending policy and in competition with a widely popular alternative, 
that of linking the BSP to earnings. In fact, at the time of the 1992 General Election, the 
Labour party had made a £5bn commitment to such an earnings uprating policy but had 
found it wanting in terms of the outcomes they desired.40 We have seen above that many 
of the changes made to BSP and other pensioner benefits in Labour’s first term were, 
although not evident to anyone without a direct line to Brown’s inner circle, part of a 
wider strategy that had the pensioner credit at its heart.
37 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004 and Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
38 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
39 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
40 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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Despite a massive amount of work and political engagement in the pension credit, the 
policy process was fairly logical mid calm. This is probably a reflection of the wait that 
had been endured by the Brown, Balls and Miliband trio41: they had been looking for the 
moment to get the policy process into action and they were to a large extent working to 
get everyone to play their part to ensure that what emerged was a complete, workable 
and affordable policy that met their aims. The question was kept live both around 
Treasury and through the channels to Number 10. They admit to having kept a 
determined grip on the process42 but there is no suggestion that this was control-ffeakeiy 
as the interviews show that some of the busiest and most influential actors were ignorant 
of this hidden hand and tended to play their part as they did in any one of innumerable 
policy making vignettes: it emerges from many of the interviews and from my own 
observations of the policy process that the determination of Brown’s political team and 
the timing issues were not generally known, or if they were suspected, the way that 
things fell together and the history that caused this to happen were not evident. It also 
appears that Darling’s thrust on his43 idea for the ‘Pensions Service’ and the general tax- 
benefit integration steps that formed the administrative and operational side of the policy 
were being considered independently.
The coming together of the Pension Credit in its economic sense and the Pension 
Service, which made the means testing aspects politically acceptable, opened the door to 
the Treasury and the DWP having interests that were aligned. Consequently, while DWP 
were happy to get things done, even though they were partly at the behest of the 
Treasury, the Treasury for their part were happy to part with money allowing DWP to
41 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
42 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
43 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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make the changes needed. The process, for the above reasons, was relatively closed and 
coherent and people worked together (for the most part) in effective formation. The 
process has been described by several of the actors as having had two phases with 
somewhat distinct personnel due in part to normal changeovers of staff responsibilities 
occurring by chance at the same time but also as a result of the differing nature of the 
work as the process progressed. The first phase had its initial steps before 2000,44 even 
though the November 1999 PBR did not reveal any of the work. A broad shape for the 
policy was by this time beginning to emerge from a core team of special advisers, a small 
number of civil servants, some analytical input and a steering input from ministerial 
level. This grouping examined the policy objectives and potential mechanisms. A good 
deal of policy analysis was going on; the number of recipients that would be affected by 
different potential policies, the ways in which an instrument might be based on, or 
exclude, different kinds of income, and, on the political and operational side, how and 
when given policies could be introduced and what the potential arguments could be 
against certain implementations. Many of these factors that in the later stage would be 
‘the parameters’ but at this early stage were merely a way, frequently rough and ready, of 
trying to find out was was realistic and what was impossible. All through this process it 
was borne in mind that the counter proposal always waiting to be thrown at any potential 
measure was that of linking the BSP to an earnings measure.
Even among the fairly small group of people that had been working for several months 
looking at issues surrounding an instrument that would meet the objectives of what was 
to become the Pension Credit, there was still some element of surprise when, with little
44 Interview with Edward Miliband, 1 May 2004
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flesh on the bones, the Chancellor of the Exchequer revealed in the March 2000 Budget 
speech few details but a considerable intention:
A strong civic society takes seriously its obligations to our elderly: to the very 
poor pensioners whom we must help out of poverty; to those just above benefit 
levels whose lifetime savings should not -  as in the past -  be a barrier to 
securing a better retirement income; and to those who, while better off, are on 
fixed incomes.
The Secretary of State for Social Security is to launch a consultation on how, for 
the next Parliament, we can develop a new pensioners credit designed not only 
to lift the poorest out of poverty, but also to do more for those with modest 
occupational pensions and those with savings who should not be penalised for 
having worked hard all their lives and saved for their retirement.
Under the framework on which we will consult, an older pensioner with income, 
for example, of less than £100 a week, or a couple with less than £150 a week, 
would qualify for a credit to raise their income.
(Brown 2000a)
The parameters showed, with hindsight,45 as Ed Balls is quoted as saying above, the 
Government were now free under their own rules and reasoning to put up the level of 
BSP, making what were, at the time, somewhat surprising parameters of £100 and £150 
entirely feasible.
The work continued after this in a similar vein of exploring the potential shape that a 
policy would have, whilst leaving the specific details vague. Some tricky problems were 
encountered during this phase as policies became more solid and consideration started 
about how they might mesh in with the existing, already complex,, set of benefits that 
pensioners may be entitled to. Civil Servants in the DWP operational teams involved in 
the policy formation for pensions comprised of the ‘policy team’ and the ‘analytical 
services’. The analytical services cover both the strict economics and policy analysis. 
The economic side includes aspects such as the technical efficiency and social insurance 
elements of pensions, as well as cost forecasting. The policy analysis side relates to 
issues such as the potential redistributive impact and the numbers that would be affected
45 This was not so clear to me when 1 was working on this policy as an analyst at the time.
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by the policy, i.e. gainers and losers.46 The policy team look at the broader issues 
including implementation practicalities, the legislative aspects of the policy and the 
broader political issues. It is rare, however, that anyone working in the policy team 
would not be capable of appreciating the economic aspects of such a policy, since those 
that could not would be likely to end up being sidelined. One of the key jobs of analysts 
is to be able to explain complex technical issues to generalist civil servants and to 
ministers who are, more often than not, lawyers by training. In the same way, if not more 
so, that generalists have to be economically literate, economic advisers and policy 
analysts (mostly the same people) do not retain a place at the Minister’s table, or more 
importantly the sofa, if they do not have finely tuned antennae for political concerns.
By November 2000 the Treasury were starting to be happy with the shape of the policy 
and, for the political end, ‘the question was at what point the system could deal with it.’47 
A policy outline that looked very much like the final Pension Credit had emerged and 
was presented in the consultation document (Department of Social Security 2000) that 
came out on the day after the pre-Budget report. In the pre-Budget report by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on 8 November 2000 the policy was trailed, but no thunder 
was stolen:
It is now tim e,... to raise pensioner incomes by a tax and benefit reform that will 
have as its foundation the basic state pension, and will have as its building block 
-  like the working families tax credit -  a new and generous pension credit.
(Brown 2000b)
The next day, on the 9 November 2000, the consultation on Pension Credit was 
announced in the Secretary of State for Social Security’s annual uprating statement and 
the framework policy saw the light of day in public for the first time.
46 Although it is rarely that any policy admits to having losers
47 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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Today, I am also publishing a consultation paper on the new pension credit.
Copies will be available from the Vote Office following my statement.... Our aim 
is both to end pensioner poverty and to ensure that all pensioners share in the 
rising prosperity of the nation.
... For those who come within the scope of the tax system, we are determined to 
give them a fairer deal. ... As a result, more than 3 million pensioners will gain 
from that.
Secondly, we inherited a situation in Britain—the fourth largest economy in the 
world— in which there were too many pensioners living in poverty. Poverty has 
no place in a civilised society. That is why the Government were right to make 
ending pensioner poverty their first priority. It is also why we introduced the 
minimum income guarantee, which is already helping nearly 2 million 
pensioners.
... The next stage of our reforms, however, is to help the millions of pensioners 
who worked hard all their lives, saved for their retirement and rightly believe that 
they are being punished, not rewarded, for their thrift.
... There is therefore a clear choice for the future. We are increasing the winter 
fuel payment, not abolishing it. We are building on the basic state pension, not 
undermining or privatising it. We are tackling pensioner poverty, not ignoring it, 
and we are rewarding saving, not penalising it.
(Darling 2000: cols 451-455) 
In the Secretary of State’s speech, despite some good figure quoting, few parameters 
were even hinted at being fixed for the new policy, the only promise is that saving will 
be rewarded and there was some hint at the political direction for getting the balance of 
benefits and numbers: ‘5.5 million pensioners—that is, half the pensioner households in 
this country—will be better off as a result of the new credit’ (Darling 2000:453).
There were still many problems left to be considered about meshing with the existing 
system which threw up technical problems such as how to treat those having additions 
for elements such as disability allowances or carer’s allowances, the interface with HB 
and CTB (which if unaltered would for many have taken back up to 85% of gains) and 
the issues around how capital should be converted into income for the purposes of 
assessment. As well as these issues to be ‘solved’, which were often of little concern to 
the politicians except in that they wanted to hear that they had been fixed, there was the 
much more sensitive issue of parameters. These parameters would be what defined the 
policy, not in detail, but in its relative effect on the recipients, and as the recipients are
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also the voters, this was an important area. The key parameters were, in technical terms, 
the level at which the standard MIG would be set, the level at which the ‘savings credit’ 
would start and the deduction rate, i.e. how quickly the benefit would be taken away for 
each pound above the MIG level. The whole understanding become complicated 
because, as described above, there are various ways of describing the Pension Credit and 
for each of these ways there are several direct transforms of the parameters that can be 
used. Not only this, but there are also derivative measures that may well be more 
important in policy terms which can be used as parameters leaving the analysts to work 
back to the actual parameters, which, if they turned out to not look good, suddenly turned 
back in to the important parameters again. Darling’s ‘half the pensioners’ promise above, 
for example, still leaves considerable scope for the amount that the last pensioner will 
get, the maximum extra any pensioner will get and the scope for helping the poorest (via 
the MIG) relative to the least poor. In fact, this control over parameters comprises 
exactly what the political team at the Treasury had been wanting all these years. 
Unfortunately with such an interdependent system there were still trade-offs to be made 
and the working through of all these possibilities and downsides was not a quick process. 
However the political pressure was still considerable, especially with the General 
Election coming, the 2001 Budget was to be the platform for re-election promises. Much 
internal and interdepartmental technical work went on and parameters started to be made 
solid as the potential for fitting them within the Budget envelope became clearer.48
The Budget statement by the Chancellor, Gordon Brown was on 7 March 2001 and he 
reiterated the commitment, having made some hikes in the MIG already, with higher 
guarantees than his previous Budget statement and a promise of the earnings link
48 Interview with Ed Balls, 10 February 2004
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(although not specifying quite which parameter or parameters this would refer to) along 
with a good piece of analysis that, due to the features of the taper and the fixed points 
chosen, gives anyone that is on the Pension Credit a bigger annual cash increase than the 
BSP earnings link would have:
Since November, we have been consulting on our new pension credit. It will be 
introduced in 2003. Pensioner couples with incomes below £200 and single 
pensioners with incomes below £135 a week-many millions of pensioners in our 
country-will receive the new pension credit, which will reward rather than 
penalise their saving. It will rise in line with earnings every year and in this way, it 
will give recipients more than even the earnings link in the basic state pension 
would have given them.
(Brown 2001)
Following the General Election on 7 June 2001when the Labour Party was once again 
returned to power, the preparations went into a different gear. The parameters had to be 
finally fixed -  something that was becoming essential so that the message could be 
broadcast accurately to the party ahead of the Parliamentary phase. The Pension Service 
aspects had to be made watertight to fix the political defence for what would otherwise 
be portrayed by opposition as a weakly disguised extension of means-testing and the nuts 
and bolts of the policy had to be fixed for feeding through to lawyers and, eventually, 
through to Parliamentary draughtsmen. It was at this stage that the personnel changes 
started to happen; the more senior officers and those that had worked on the big picture 
policy started to drift away and there were coincidental changes in the involved 
personnel at both Treasury and DWP. Meanwhile, a new raft of actors came in who were 
needed to go through the detailed but essential aspects of everything from the 
exportability of the benefits under European law through to the implications of the 
interface with long-term hospital care for the elderly. This was the start of the ‘bill team’ 
configuration. Decisions continued to be made, but rather then questions about 
architecture, it was about interior decoration. The political end continued to be involved
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as they were aware that when you show your construction to someone, they do not see 
the solid foundations, they only like or dislike the colour of the paint. The ‘bill team’, 
which still needed to interface with analysts to ensure that small changes to the 
mechanisms did not cause major problems with the economics, worked through the 
summer to produce this case study’s final output.
For completeness it is interesting to see the stages that the policy took after the final 
‘policy output’: on the 28 November 2001 the White Paper was published outlining the 
Government’s proposals for the Pension Credit and the State Pension Credit Bill was 
introduced to Parliament (House of Lords, 1st reading), followed the Legislation 2nd 
reading House of Lords on 18 December 2000. On the 16 January 2002 there was a 
somewhat unprecedented (in this writer’s experience) publication of costs and more 
detail on the policy in ‘The Pension Credit: long-term projections’. This unusual step 
showed a veiy wide range of potential costs ranging over 50 years from £lbn to £26bn. 
The 12 February 2002 -  23 April 2002 saw the legislation go through further 
parliamentary stages and finally on 25 June 2002 there was the Royal Assent for State 
Pension Credit Act 2002.
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III. French pension policy case study___________
This chapter consists of a narrative account of the French policy process. The case 
study examines the long development of the Loi Fillon on pension reform, which took 
its concrete form when adopted by the Conseil des Ministres. This agreement allowed it 
to go forward for debate by the legislature. The period covered runs from early 1999, a 
nominal starting point being the publication of the Charpin Report (Charpin 1999), 
through to May 2003. Although this chapter follows the same broad format as the UK 
case study there are some differences in emphasis due to the differing natures of the 
policy process and the policy itself.
Case study timeslice: a brief sketch
Pension reform in France could be easily dismissed as the typical story of 
retrenchment of welfare provision under pressures that are to be seen all around Europe 
and further afield: in extremely brief summary there is increasing demand for welfare, 
shrinking resources to provide it and a widespread disinclination to maintain current 
levels of support due to either spreading neo-liberalism or commitments to fiscal 
promises at the European level.50 This picture is true to a large extent in our specific case 
but there is a subtly French flavour to the usual recipe in the pension reform pressure 
cooker.
At the point where the case-study timeslice starts, March 1999, expectations are 
running high and the Charpin Report, commissioned by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin of 
the Parti Socialiste (PS), is widely expected to be a key step in the policy process. The 
Jospin government had been elected in 1997 and were working under the conditions of
50 See, amongst others, various chapters in Pierson (2001).
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cohabitation with Right wing President Chirac. To some extent, Charpin cannot succeed 
because all the actors have their own ideas about how the report will affect their 
strategies and some are bound to be disappointed. The risks are also high as, in economic 
and fiscal terms, doing nothing is seen by most51 as not being an option and half- 
measures would simply mean another painful reopening of the debate. For the opposition 
(at this point the Right) to cause too much trouble would also be odd, firstly as they may 
then have to deal with the problem themselves and secondly, because politically 
speaking they should support reform more than the socialists. Furthermore, at this time 
the recent memory of the fall of the Juppe Government in December 1995 over the same 
subject served as a superlatively clear warning about how the wrong handling of such a 
sensitive topic could lead quickly and directly to electoral disaster (Natali and Rhodes 
forthcoming 2004: 12; Palier 2002: 7). There is a clear difference here between the UK 
and the French cases. In the UK the Government is trying to implement a policy strand 
that they have been wanting to introduce since before their 1997 election and hence 
avoid the tricky and expensive ‘earnings link’ discussed in Chapter 2. Overall, the UK 
Labour party is hoping for an electoral bonus. In the French case, by contrast, the 
government is looking for a way to implement a policy that cannot be avoided, but can 
only be managed as well as possible to avert disasters both in fiscal and electoral terms. 
The French socialists are looking to avoid a slip-up.
On publication of the Charpin Report it became clear that, while supporting the 
preferred positions of a few actors by offering proposals around which general 
resentments could be focussed, the report was to prove more of a stumbling block than a 
stepping stone. The common ground to be found between the key actors of Government,
51 Notable dissenters include Jacques Rigaudiat, the social policy adviser of Jospin, and the Teulade Report (referred to 
below): both question the gravity of the fiscal situation.
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the employers body (MEDEF) and the unions was very small and in the context of the 
Charpin proposals, most notably the increase in the contribution period, the possibility 
for direct progress was minimal. The next visible step in March 2000, after some 
relatively invisible (at least in term of the contemporary accounts -  the contact was more 
clearly visible when linking the interviews to the constructed NFP representation) 
‘dialogue with the social partners’52 and a considerable amount of internal political 
activity within the Jospin government,53 was the establishment of the Conseil 
d'Orientation des Retraites (COR) an independent body under the aegis of Prime 
Minister Jospin who was relying on this body to pave the way for him to put pension 
reform at the top of his political agenda assuming his re-election in 2002.54 The work of 
the COR was very public, broad-based and, apart from MEDEF, the employers 
representative body who refused to take part (Sterdyniak, 2002),55 brought all the parties 
concerned to some kind of agreement. The other side of this coin is that the COR was 
politically toothless and, being charged with finding consensus, could be said to have 
avoided some of the essential issues concentrating merely on producing documentation 
and watching what happened elsewhere.56 The COR finally produced its report in 
December 2001 leaving little time until the run-up to the legislative elections got under 
way for July the following year. Both of the main political contenders in these elections 
then promised that pension reform would be a priority for them (Leparmentier and 
Malingre 2002). When the Raffarin government was appointed after the Right’s strong 
showing in the elections the incoming PM made clear almost straight away that he was
52 Principally the unions and MEDEF.
53 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004. Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
54 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
55 They later got involved after the law discussed in this case study had been adopted (Jolivet 2003b).
56 Interview with Florence Legros 6 April 2004.
61
French pension reform
in a hurry to deal with the pension reform dossier. His appointed Minister in Social 
Affairs, Francis Fillon, had to take the policy on while he was still finding his way 
around the Ministry and this haste affected the policy process and perhaps even the 
outcome of the process, due to the inflexibility in the Government’s bargaining position 
that resulted from a self-imposed deadline and from the unavoidable immaturity of the 
work on the dossier by new actors on the Raffarin Government side.
The Raffarin government pulled together their reform package using much of the 
groundwork and shared understanding that had come from the Jospin years and they 
maintained the COR. The policy that they adopted was in many ways following the 
direction proposed in the Charpin report. They also launched an intensive 
communications strategy, with a budget reckoned to allow up to €15 million using 
outside consultants and actors from the pinnacle of the French business world to 
underpin the political message both within the NFP, to the Government’s own 
employees and in the wider public domain through various media (Aeschimann 2003; 
Balbastre 2003).57 Whilst not making the mistake that Juppe had, that is to say 
developing an entire proposal behind closed doors and presenting it as a fait accompli 
(Natali and Rhodes forthcoming 2004: 13), Francis Fillon did come to the table with a 
complete proposal and, with his communications strategy already in full swing, 
attempted to ‘sell the policy’ to the social partners. He did not marginalise the unions as 
Juppe had, but he still managed to rub them up the wrong way by being ambivalent 
about exactly what the process was that he was asking the social partners to join in with 
and by keeping his cards close to his chest. Not only did this key government player not 
fully explain the rules that he was playing by but, at two minutes to midnight just as the
57 Interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003
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game was about to finish, there was an extra player that came into the reckoning. The 
Prime Minister, undermining to some extent his minister or, from another point of view, 
exercising his right to arbitrate, called in the leader of the union that was known to be 
ready to agree to the proposals and made concessions that he, the PM, had not authorised 
his minister to make (Algalarrondo 2003). The Government was happy now to go 
forward even with three of the five main unions still not backing the plan. However the 
broader repercussions are still unclear. The question still remains whether Raffarin 
managed to win enough of the hearts and minds in France to be able to follow similar 
lightly-played yet strong-arm tactics again. Future reform either on pensions or other 
policies in the French public’s beloved area of social protection could now completely 
jeopardise the Right’s electoral chances or, what may be worse in the French political 
arena, ruin their chances of any unions ever coming on board in the future.
General political environment
President and Prime Minister
President Jacques Chirac was in office during both of the governments that had a hand 
in the direct policy development leading to the Loi Fillon. As. such it would seem to be 
important to assess the impact of the President during these two governments and to 
what extent he was involved in the process. The relative powers of the President and the 
Prime Minister in France have been shown to vary depending on whether there is 
cohabitation or not (Hayward and Wright 2002): under cohabitation, the President has 
the Prime Minister forced upon him as the leader of the biggest block in Parliament 
because this is not his party. It is generally accepted that the Prime Minister would be 
much less powerful when he has an opposition President breathing down his neck and 
this is especially true when that President is one of the Fifth Republic variety who has
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relatively strong powers and, until 2000 had seven years in power with a possible seven 
to follow if re-elected.58 However there is also a corresponding lack of control on the 
President’s part as, unlike with his own party, his power when dealing with an 
opposition Prime Minister cannot be asserted through alternative channels and he is 
forced to follow a restricted set of institutional interactions and then only in the areas 
prescribed by the constitution, which excludes pension policy. When not under 
cohabitation conditions the President notably has de facto as well as de jure powers to 
hire and fire Ministers. There are exceptions to this, however, as Michel Rocard was 
proud to have become Prime Minister not because he was ‘chosen’ by Francois 
Mitterand, his own party’s President, during the period when the PS had both the 
Presidency and majority in the Assemblee, but because Mitterand ‘was forced to accept’ 
Rocard as the party leader. For the first Government in this case study, which was the 
Lionel Jospin government of the PS (‘Socialists’ or ‘the Left’), the Gaullist (‘Right’) 
President Chirac was in the position of cohabitation. For the second government, being 
the first incarnation with Jean-Pierre Raffarin as PM and labelling itself UMP (thus 
putting itself within the Gaullist tradition),59 Chirac was in a very different position as 
this party, his party, had the majority in the legislature. In this situation he asserted his 
powers and appointed as PM someone who was not substantially involved in national 
politics previously (Republique Fran9aise 2002) and is veiy much seen as Chirac’s man 
(Bronnec 2004; Schneider 2005). He continues to keep Raffarin in the top position 
although gradually he finds himself in a ‘Rocardian’ trap as the party starts to produce a
58 In September 2000 a reform to limit the Presidential term to five years was introduced, partly to limit the 
possibilities for cohabitation (Buckman 2004 ).
59 The politics of the right wing in France is over-complicated by the fact that on a regular basis it reinvents itself in 
name, often due to personality politics. Currently the main party is the Union pour tin mouvementpopulaire (UMP), 
which consists of the former Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), most o f the Union pour la democratic 
ffancaise (UDF), although there are still around 30 seats of the Assemblee held in this name, and Democratic 
liberale (DL) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005).
64
Chapter III
groundswell of support in favour of rising star Nicolas Sarkozy. Despite Chirac’s famed 
animosity towards Sarkozy60 he cannot ignore him and, after the period of the case study 
in this thesis, he appointed him to be Minister of Economy and Finance.61 It would be 
interesting to speculate on how much stronger the role of Bercy (the Ministry of Finance) 
might have been in the policy process we are considering if this pressure had already 
produced such a result. Aside from hinting at the effect of internal balance of power 
issues outside cohabitation situations, what emerges from this case study is that the 
Jospin government had considerable freedom to approach the pensions question in terms 
of political will, at least in terms of constraints from the President, while the Raffarin 
government was tied into the agenda set by the powerful President upon whose 
patronage they were reliant.
The ‘cabinet’ system 
In terms of policy formation, especially on a topic such as pension reform that is both 
technically complex and politically charged, the role of the cabinet62 is more vital than 
ever in the development of policy. The French cabinet is a group of civil servants who, 
usually, have some publicly asserted political conviction or other attachment and who 
‘make the link between the two worlds of policy and technocracy.’63 The cabinets differ 
in size depending on the demands or prestige of the Minister involved, for the immediate 
period preceding the adoption of the Loi Fillon the PM’s cabinet consisted of some 60
60 Which started when Nicolas Sarkozy supported Bahadur, one of Chirac’s competitors, in the Presidential Elections.
61 Later he made Sarkozy choose between this post and being head of the UMP -  a strictly party based post -  Sarkozy 
chose die UMP as his powerbase.
62 The general usage of the word cabinet in the French language illuminates the concept in politics to be not be as 
special as it may seem. The practice of a lawyer, a dentist or a consultancy company does not have a bureau as 
would a car hire company, they have a cabinet. In politics it is basically the office surrounding a Minister. It does 
not carry any of the meaning of the UK term in politics. This chapter will not use italics any more for this word, as 
although it is French it is too common to italicise yet makes no sense if it is translated. The reader is advised to 
pronounce it in their head in the French way.
63 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
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advisers, that of Fillon in ‘Social Affairs, Work and Solidarity’ had around 24 and, as a 
comparison, the Minster for Transport at that time had twelve (Les Cabinets Ministeriels 
2003). The presence of a closely knit team of politically committed64 advisers makes an 
interesting contrast to the UK where the majority of advisers are neutral civil servants 
with a very small number of political advisers, although, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the neutral civil servants cannot operate effectively without political antennae 
any more than could a member of a French Minister’s cabinet. Furthermore, in France 
the situation is not without shades of subtlety as the title Conseiller aupres du Ministre 
corresponds roughly to the post of special adviser in the UK while the rest of the army of 
advisers in the cabinet are more concerned with their individual dossiers in a similar way 
to a UK civil servant who finds themselves, for a variety of non-political reasons, in the 
ministers office on a regular basis.65 The ministers and cabinets hold a strong symbolic 
value in terms of power and influence which is lacked by the administrations (the 
permanent staff of the ministries).66 However the cabinet is seen in general as less 
competent than the administration,67 which is probably due to the element of personal 
attachment which means that they circulate more through policy fields and do not gain 
the same depth of experience as members of the administration. In this case study the 
fact that everyone was new to their roles, if not indeed to the whole sector, contributed to 
some weakening of the Governmental hand.68 There is another linked problem in the 
cabinet based system and that is the problem of duplication of work. Each increasing
64 This could read ‘more or less politically committed’. I learnt during the interviews for this case study that there is a 
great range in the political commitment of those who work in the cabinets and this is true all the way up to the 
highest posts.
65 Interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003
66 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003 and also hinted at in interview with Stephane Brimont, 2004
67 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
68 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
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level of ‘political authority’ redoes the work of the level before; the minister’s cabinet 
redoes the administration’s work, the PM’s cabinet redoes the work of the ministerial 
cabinet and then the Elysee69 redoes everybody's work (Baumgartner 1989: 90).7° The 
result is that the final document has been reworked by people at each level who have 
increasingly lower levels of expertise in the subject. This compares and contrasts 
interestingly with the ‘traditional’ view of the UK as a hierarchically based system of 
policy advice and the system that is now seen under New Labour as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This description is verifiable from several sources, but we can go 
further and compare accurately the size of the subnetworks and the multiplicity of 
interactions and linkages by using the network analysis techniques.
Unions and ‘manifestations’
The importance of les manifestations (protests or demonstrations) and les mouvements 
sociaux (literally ‘social movements’ but generally a euphemism for les greves or 
strikes) means that we must consider carefully the role of the unions in the French 
system. The unions are important in this context for two reasons. First because the 
percentage of employees still covered by public sector agreements in France is high and 
so the government is in a position of not only being the pension provider to 
‘constituents’ or ‘citizens’ but also to a much large number of employees, furthermore 
their pensions are more intrinsically linked to the mainstream system.71 The other 
important factor in terms of the unions in France is their apparent ability to bring out 
large numbers of people in demonstrations and shut-downs in order to preserve the
69 The Elys6e is the office o f the President
70 This was expressed in a more dignified and diplomatic manner in my interview with Franck le Morvan. The 
implications of this are picked up again in the conclusion. Baumgartner also has an interviewee in the 
administration who verifies exactly the same points.
71 In the UK the majority of civil servants rely for the majority o f their pension income on a pension scheme that is 
entirely separate from any scheme that non civil servants would be concerned with.
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status quo. Although the Spring 2003 protests engineered by the unions did not have as 
clear an impact on the policy process as they did for the Juppe government they were still 
of considerable importance in the campaign against the pension reform and there were 
allegedly more people in the streets at any time since the May ‘68 protests.72 This 
activity, combined with the evidence of the enormous mark that the Juppe affair left on 
the conciousness of both Right and Left, means that street protest must indeed carry 
some weight.73 This seeming strength of the unions though needs to be looked into more 
deeply. The number of union members in France is very low at 9.1% compared to 32.9% 
in the UK (International Labour Office 1997).74 This makes it clear that a high 
percentage of those who come out onto the streets are not actually connected directly 
with the unions and so they are not controlled by the unions. This can start out looking 
like a good thing for the unions as they can call for a protest against some government 
policy and they can expect to have their ranks swelled, but under the circumstances 
where there is a highly symbolic issue such as pensions and the strike is not a union call, 
the result is that the unions have no platform for negotiation because as they did not call 
it, neither can they call it off. This was the case in 1995 when Juppe made a speech 
which brought people out on the streets. The unions were well aware that it was not their 
doing and they were afraid of their lack of control.75
To understand the power of protest in France the history of the country as a political 
entity must be understood because the roots of France are in the tiny centre of the lie de 
France around Paris and the state was militarily constructed by destroying five or six
72 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
73 This emerges from many of the interviews conducted during the research
74 1995 figures are given. There are some disputes about calculating French figures due to the lack of a single 
confederal body.
75 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
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cultures. The result is a state that is afraid of its own people.76 Despite a string of reforms 
against over centralisation the highly centralised state control remains and the state is 
historically in fear of uprisings. The population are therefore prepared to protest as they 
understand the state’s fear (Hayward and Wright 2002). This fear was evident in a 
section of the PM’s speech to the Assemblee (Raffarin 2003) when he presented the 
reform. Three paragraphs of this speech are given over to exhorting a non-violent 
approach to overcoming the tensions and divisions and respecting the elected 
representatives decisions.
The fractured union movement 
The history of France, as it impacts specifically on the history of the Left and its 
seeming addiction to schism and inter-fraternal conflict, prevents the Unions from 
playing their full role as social partners that one would expect in a system that is, or at 
least often aspires to be, broadly ‘corporatist’ in its governance style.77 The hand history 
has dealt today’s French unions is one of multiplicity. There is no overarching French
confederal body for the trade union (syndicaliste) movement and the French Government
lists eleven bodies, although the list is not exhaustive, who comprise the ‘social partners’ 
(Republique Fran?aise 2003c). Of these eleven there are six that are predominant in the 
pension policy reform of which five are the key unions (in order of size at the time): 
CFDT, CGT, CGT-FO, CTFC and CFE-CGC.78 Having five confederal union bodies 
obviously creates problems for a movement that relies on the unity and solidarity of the 
workers to get results. Rocard also points out that the schism that split the nascent union
76 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
77 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
78 Exactly what these acronyms stand for is not important (they can be found in the glossary) but what is interesting is 
that the history of schism in the French union movement has made many o f these bodies have very similar names. 
Comprehensible information in English can be found on the French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs website (Ministere 
des Affaires dtrangeres 1998).
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movement from the Socialist party in the Charte d'Amiens in 1906 means that, not being 
aligned with any political party, the unions feel forced to adopt a political position on 
almost any topic hence alienating each other and potential members even away from the 
relevant policies of the moment.79 The structural repercussions of this situation can be 
seen more clearly in the NFP constructed in later chapters.
Pension policy environment
In 1990 negotiations on retirement pensions started and I knew very well that 
this was explosive... because France is malheureux for sociological and 
historical reasons.
Interview with Michel Rocard, former Socialist Prime Minister, 19 December 2003
There are two legitimate holders of power in this story ... in feet, associations, 
unions, the press all have their own legitimacy. That’s what makes democracy.
That’s what makes society.
Interview with Jean-Marie Toulisse, negotiator for CFDT, 2 October 2003
Before embarking on the description of the institutional environment of the pension
policy it is worth reflecting on the flux that exists in relations within and between
government and groups. Introducing dynamism into such a brief account is difficult so it
must be borne in mind that the descriptions given below, and indeed throughout this
work, often try to capture the prevailing situation and may therefore exclude the full
continuum of reality: a continuum that started well before the case study time-slice and
finished well after. For example, the cadres80 union, CFE-CGC, were traditionally seen
as being close to MEDEF and perhaps even ‘collaborators’ because back in the 1990s
the level of management that was comprised of cadres was seen (primarily by
themselves) as being close to the patrons, that is the big bosses or owners, of the
79 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
80 This can only really translated as ‘management’; the concept has no equivalent in English. It seems to be a hangover 
from the days of the shop-floor blue-collar and the managerial white-collar distinction that has been dragged on 
beyond usefulness. The meaning becomes clear through the usage.
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businesses. As times changed, even in France, and companies started to become more 
and more financially led rather then production focused, this perceived link became 
weaker and eventually the cadres started to get a taste of their own medicine in the form 
of being laid-off, when in the past they had always been the ones to do the laying-off. 
This resulted in a gradual drift away from MEDEF by the CFE-CGC as they came closer 
to the other unions realising they were all essentially ‘workers’.81 This is just one 
illustration of the kind of dynamic frame that, if there was space, could be put around 
each situation that is being represented in what tends to have to be a more static 
description.
In the section above there was mention made of the fact that the fractured unions 
caused problems in a movement that ought to rely on solidarity and unity of the workers. 
This has very practical repercussions in terms of dealing with the government 
particularly on pensions but also on other social policy issues. The minister in charge of 
a negotiation will usually wish to see enough of these unions that the resulting statement 
will be broadly seen as legitimate. However, when bringing together the various unions 
the situation often arises where those brought together around a table will feel more 
pressure from the others than they do from the government and therefore none will be 
prepared to make the (often necessary) concession. This results either in stalemate or in 
deals being done in private which can reflect badly on all concerned. There is in fact, 
between the unions, the suggestion of an elaborate ‘chicken game’ where no-one wishes 
to chicken out of their tough stance first, despite the fact that for none of them to do so is 
the worst possible outcome for all concerned. However some attempts are made to 
overcome this situation: according to Solange Morgenstem, the five main union bodies
81 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
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tried to have a single platform. It is clear from interviews that they did not have the same 
opinions, even on strategic direction but they often worked together within and outside 
the COR in an attempt to find a minimal common base.82 During the reign of vice- 
president Denis Kessler at MEDEF he decided that the way to deal with the unions was 
to choose one (which happened to be the CFDT) and virtually cut off the others, 
effectively saying ‘there are too many unions in France, I will not work like that.’83 The 
end of this particular continuum is not clear, but it illustrates the evolution in relations 
and institutions that is very difficult to capture without drowning in detail. At the time of 
the reforms Guillaume Sarkozy,84 the new vice-president of MEDEF, was starting to 
reassure some of the unions a little with a slightly less hard line than Kessler,85 but the 
evidence in this case shows that the major deals were still being cut with CFDT.
One key factor in the environment that surfaced particularly on pension reform was 
how the relative tightness of the majority in the Assemblee weighed on Matignon under 
the socialists.86 This was very important in the way the policy process unfolded; there 
was a real fear that if the subject was approached wrongly the Communists could vote 
with the opposition against the government’s plans.87 The influence of the parliamentary 
situation (although not, from the evidence, parliamentarians)88 in the process is also 
mentioned by Rocard when he is being astounded by the hurry of the Right to plunge 
into reform:
82 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
83 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
84 The brother of Nicolas: when Sarkozy is mentioned from now on in this work without a first name it is Guillaume 
that is intended, not his more famous brother.
85 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
86 Hotel de Matignon is where the Prime Minister’s office is located.
87 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
88 Parliament does not appear to figure veiy much in the policy process covered by this case study a finding that is 
given credence by Baumgartner (1989: 91).
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[The Raffarin] government is the first in 25 years which has [had] trust between 
the head of state and the head of government (that's rare - there was 
cohabitation and the cases like mine where it's worse than cohabitation), ... 
practically a single party government, ... an absolute majority in the 
Assemble, ...an absolute majority in Senat, ... majority in the conseil 
constitutionelle... and they've got four years to go before the next election.
Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003 
While the Socialists had suffered problems with the legislative politics, for the Right 
there were still difficulties but of a very different kind. There was a surface of unity, 
which was undoubtedly real, but the depth of this sometimes appears questionable. 
Although the PM and the President were seen to be pursuing a single line there is some 
evidence that, while not amounting to fragmentation, was definitely a somewhat clumsy 
apportioning of the role within the government between Raffarin and Fillon. At the start 
of the process it seems that there was some competition over who would lead the policy 
between Fillon and Delevoye, the Minister for la Fonction Publique, for Fillon to have 
won this battle he had to build some kind of an effective working partnership with 
Raffarin.89 Fillon was clearly inexperienced in the policy field and although no-one 
seems to doubt his general ministerial competence he was criticised as lacking breadth of 
view90 and towards the end of the process particularly, though not exclusively, the PM 
made pronouncements that might have been expected to have come from his Minister. 
At the conclusion of the policy process it was the PM who tied-up the loose ends of the 
negotiation in what could be seen either as a reasonable course of action, because the 
authority he had given his Minister was expired, or alternatively as treading on 
ministerial toes. The lack of clearly defined ministerial responsibility and the unusually 
close relationship between PM and President caused some confusion and affected the 
outcome of the policy. There are also structural causes of internal government friction
89 From private information.
90 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
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due to the role of the Ministere de la Fonction Publique: this ministry has responsibility 
for the civil service, which is a massive force in France. The consequence of such 
responsibility is that, despite the pressure that may come from other parts of government 
and however much an individual minister in this ministry may see reforms as necessary, 
they will always take into account the fact that they are the ones that will have to deal 
with the public servants during and, more pertinently, after any reforms. This situation is 
understandably more sensitive for Socialist ministers and so Sapin, the Socialist minister 
of the Fonction Publique, was to be found somewhat in the background and allowed the 
Finance Ministry to push forward events that might reasonably have been expected to 
come from him.91 
MEDEF’s veto?
In France the involvement of business representatives in the pensions debate implies 
something very different from the UK. In the UK business is primarily involved when 
bodies that run pension funds and sell private pensions are concerned about levels of 
regulation and about their ability to (honestly) sell pension solutions.92 In France the 
involvement of business is about the effects of the compulsory schemes on the 
contributions of employers in all sectors and their concerns over schemes in which they 
are partners in the shared ownership/administration model. What MEDEF were looking 
for was to increase the contribution period and for the regime public to be aligned with 
the regime prive.93
The French pensions system is dual in nature consisting of the public and the prive; 
reforms to one half of the system must be mirrored in the other half. For changes to the
91 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
92 For some unexplained reason the business interests in pensions in the UK are referred to as the pensions industry.
93 Interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
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regime prive the agreement of MEDEF is vital as they are the proprietors of the mutual 
schemes, their signature binds all their members and once this signature is granted the 
government then goes ahead to create / ’extension an administrative act that makes the 
agreement obligatory for all, even those who are not members of this professional 
organisation. This can be contrasted with unemployment insurance where the regime is 
state run and the government is directly implicated. So although MEDEF did technically 
not have a veto in the negotiations covered in this case study their agreement was 
essential if the whole system was to continue to hold together and make sense. In reality, 
Jacques Creyssel, the director of MEDEF, is able to say, ‘we had a veto over the whole 
thing.’94
MEDEF, however, are not on a free rein either. Solange Morgenstem states that ‘they 
can’t do anything without the agreement or understanding of one union. Often this is 
CFDT then it is our job, the other four, to pull [the CFDT] back to us saying “we can do 
better.’”95
The multiple roles of Unions
The unions in France also have a very large role in the management of the caisses (the 
bodies that run the pension schemes on behalf of the state). Solange Morgenstem, for 
example, the negotiator responsible for pensions in the CFE-CGC is an administrator of 
various scheme authorities and sits on the COR as much in this respect as a straight 
union representative.96 This makes the union officers almost internal actors of pension 
policy in many ways; they have similar conflicting interests to those of a departmental 
minister in the UK. On the one hand they may wish to ensure that everyone has access to
94 Interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
95 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
96 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
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understandable and up-to-date information on their pension situation,97 while on the 
other hand, they will be the very people who have to implement the policy, which means 
a great deal of work, organisation and cost. So while they may be politically committed 
to such moves they will be anxious to ensure that a suitable budget is put in place to 
implement them and will be wary of making rash promises for political gain that turn 
into administrative and management nightmares later. In France this situation can lead to 
political manoeuvring and possible conflicts where ministers have the potential to set a 
union responsible for a specific management issue against others who have no 
responsibility in the given area. Even so this duality is not only a bad thing as, despite the 
conflict of carrying out the role of ‘defenders of the workers’ and ‘managers of the 
system’ they have a privileged inside view.98 We will be able to see from the NFP 
analysis in the later chapters that the unions are consistently not only involved in the 
Tiigh politics' but in talking to the technocrats as well. If we wished to pursue this point 
further the case study would not be able to offer us much more precise information but 
the information exists in the NFP to determine exactly the intensity of contact in these 
two fields of interest to the unions and, for example, whether they are substitution or 
complementary modes of contact and if they are carried out by differently ranking 
officers.
French pensions policy context
A long hard road, involving pot-holes for many, had been travelled since the 
widespread acceptance of the need for considerable reform in the French pension system 
that crystallised around a diagnosis in the Livre blanc sur les retraites (Commissariat
97 This is a move that was part of pension reform packages both in the UK and France (Jolivet 2003b).
98 Interview with Jean-Marie Toulisse, 2 October 2003
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General du Plan 1991) endorsed by Prime Minister Rocard in 1991. There had been 
reports before this but this was the first public report under the authority of the Prime 
Minister." There had been no broad engagement with the social partners and civil 
society since the Teulade report in 1983, the following report being the livre blanc - an 
internal job by technocrats, then an update written by Eric Aubry who was a magistrate 
in the Cour des Comptes100 and the internal Charpin Report.101
Continuing pressures
The pressures in terms of demography and life expectancy affecting France are those 
that affect most of Europe. The problem is that the elderly are living longer and they are 
also a bulge in terms of their proportion in the population: the baby-boomers are coming 
to retirement age and they are going to enjoy a long retirement. In some countries this is 
not a critical problem. In France, however, the pension system is predominantly a 
compulsory, although much fragmented, pay- as-you-go (PAYG called repartition in 
French) and, assuming that this continues (see discussion below), there is a clear 
implication resulting from the demographic changes. PAYG operates on a simple 
principle that the contributions of the current active work-force pay the current retirees 
pensions. On one side of the equation there are workers making contributions at a given 
proportion of their current salary, while on the other side there are retirees getting a 
certain level of pension paid to them. If the system is to be in equilibrium then, 
unsurprisingly, the two sides have to be equal. The demographic bulge and life 
expectancy increases clearly affect this equilibrium and to bring back the balance there 
are various solutions. In terms of political pressure, the most unacceptable possibility is 
that of reducing the pension rights in straight terms. Levels of pensions are often
interview withiMerre-Louis Bras. 6,April 2004 ,, ..., ,The C our aes Compies is tnerrehch government s supreme audit body.
101 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
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characterised by a measure called the replacement rate, which expresses pension income 
as a proportion of pre-retirement salary level. In France these replacement levels are high 
being typically 70-75% (Palier 2002). Within the social insurance model that is used in 
France pension rights are not a privilege, they are earned directly by contributions and 
the years of working life and so any moves that reduce these earned rights are highly 
unpopular. This feeling of ownership for those currently in receipt of pensions, or even 
partly entitled, has understandable spillover into a resistance to change for future cohorts. 
However, one can change the pension rights by various round about methods which look 
more or less reasonable depending on their presentation. Measures such as these were 
adopted by the Balludur reforms in 1993. One measure was that of changing the basis on 
which the pension rights are calculated. Previously the system had, quite generously, 
allowed the average of the best 10 years of salary in the working life to be taken as the 
basis. The Balladur reform made this instead the best 25 years which for most workers 
brings in a lot more lower value years. Another measure which the Balladur reforms 
adopted, also the preferred solution of the Loi Fillon, was to change the number of 
periods of contributions needed to qualify for the full pension rights (Mayeur 2003).102 
This ‘lengthening of contribution years’ is discussed in more detail below in the context 
of the reforms covered by the case study but it is worth noting at this point that even 
measures two or three times removed from a straightforward reduction of pensions 
create massively strong opposition as seen in the reforms either attempted or considered 
in the past (Palier 2003). Since the start of the Socialist’s reforms there had been ‘on the 
lengthening of contribution years... a strong, frank and open opposition from the
102 Note that the source by Mayeur is somewhat disingenuously attributed to the byline o f ‘Maitre de conference a 
Science-Po’ which is true, but the information in the article is more pertinent in relation to the unstated fact that the 
author was in fact the expert on pension reform within the cabinet of Fran?ois Fillon the minister in charge of the 
reform.
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FO/CGT therefore nobody ever thought that, globally, there could be agreement on 
pensions.’103
The lengthening of contribution years brings us to the other side of the equation. 
While the measures discussed above are inherently on the ‘take’ side -  trying to reduce 
expenditure -  there are also measures available on the ‘give’ side that can, like their 
‘take’ counterparts be more or less direct and more or less contentious. ‘Work more’ is a 
valid solution that operates even if the additional contribution years are not required to 
get a full pension. The longer a worker can be kept from retiring they not only prevent 
the ‘take’ from increasing but they continue (hopefully) to contribute to the ‘give’ side. 
Unfortunately, for reformers, there is a huge amount of pressure to maintain the 
sometimes stunningly low ages at which pensions can be, and are, taken in the French 
system (Leparmentier and Malingre 2002). This is often a case of vested interests being 
protected within the fractured and complex French system. More reasonably for most 
observers there is the trade unions’ often raised point that trying to fix the pensions 
system when the labour market and unemployment situation are as dire as they were in 
France at the time of the reforms, and still are at the time of writing, can only be 
sustainable if it goes hand in hand with a tailored labour market policy.104 Indeed one of 
the remaining issues that will be taken on with formal discussions in the wake of the Loi 
Fillon is the issue of keeping older workers in the workforce (Jolivet 2003b).
Solidarity between generations
We have discussed the manoeuvrings within the PAYG system of pensions. It is worth 
exploring the attachment to this system in France and what moves have been suggested 
towards other alternatives. The expression ‘solidarity between generations’ is a
103 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
,04 For further discussion see Palier (2003) and Moreau (2002).
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peculiarly French formulation of total protection of the PAYG character of pension 
provision. Many of the reports and movements towards reform produced under both 
colours of Government have suggested some measure of retreat from the PAYG model 
including an explicit indication from Chirac during the 2002 electoral campaign (Palier 
2002: 5). In the end the Raffarin government came up with a set of proposals that made 
no significant change in the status quo in terms of the centrality and exclusivity of the 
PAYG nature of the French pension system (Mayeur 2003). Was this purely a victory for 
the anti-reformists that succeeded on playing the terminology of ‘solidarity’ and the 
widely perceived evil of ‘pension funds’? This seems like a likely explanation as the 
phrase ‘pension funds’ has strong overtones in anti-American left-wing circles (and 
presumably in nationalist right-wing circles) as when problems occur in France with 
foreign control of what were previously seen as French industries the guilty party in the 
takeover is often found out to be a large foreign ‘pension fund’. When the prospect of 
introducing pension funds as part of the French system was considered it was purposely 
given a different name (‘pension savings’). Not only were there the inherent negative 
connotations above but also in developing the argument in favour of French pension 
funds the tactic had been used that they would be able to counteract to some extent the 
investment, and therefore control, power within France of the British and American 
equivalents and so the term ‘pension funds’ itself had been given further negative 
connotations in the act of promoting the concept (Palier 2002: 13). However despite the 
accepted truth about the need for multiple pillars there is also a groundswell of 
technocrat,105 union106 and academic opinion that recognises that there is no long term 
advantage of the funded pension model over that of PAYG and that wider economic
105 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
106 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
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issues such as the labour market (particularly unemployment and especially for older 
workers) are central to solving the real problems with pensions in France (Barr 2000; 
Legros 2001). In any case there is an equally strong reason that PAYG will remain: in 
order to switch from PAYG to funded schemes there has to be a generation that will not 
only pay for the currently retired but for their own future at the same time. To attempt to 
do this when the demographic pressure is already burdening the current workforce would 
be highly dangerous politically and potentially damaging to the economy as a whole.
The policy
The subject of pension reform is, as is emphasised throughout this thesis, an intense 
mixture of both technical and political issues. On the technical side the views cannot be 
that different even across parties although the political objections to the technical views 
may differ greatly between Left and Right.
Contrary to what the opposition are suggesting today, there are not a million and 
one ways to overcome the demographic revolution. There are a few parameters 
-  some structural, others financial, others cultural -  on these we have to work 
according to the social and economic situation that we face now.
Speech by Frangois Fillon to the Assemblee Nationale, 10 June 2003
Despite this broad technical consensus there is still scope for variation around the
margins, however small differences in the margins can result in potentially large
differences over thirty years.107
The views of the FO and CGT mean that there could not be an agreement on 
any solution that makes pensions lower; they fundamentally believe that the 
solution is raising pr§l£vements and they suggest that these could be on capital, 
financial products and so on -  thus evading the question.
Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
The socialist direction
There were differing views on policy direction, emphasis and process within the
107 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
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Socialist camp. Jacques Rigaudiat, the social affairs adviser of Jospin, saw the pensions 
issue as not being an intensely major financial problem, at around a maximum 2% of 
GDP, but rather something that had to be dealt with firmly due to the demographic 
imperatives, with adequate reflection and with respect for a wide consensus.108 Within 
the Socialist camp there were clearly some that held it was imperative for the 
contribution years issue to be faced up to: these were the voices that Charpin represented 
in his report. Other voices held out for a longer period of exploration and widespread 
sounding out, not much of a policy in itself but seen by many to be the wisest strategy to 
pursue in the political climate. What the Left would have brought to the table if they had 
been re-elected and decided to go ahead, as Jospin had made clear he would wish to, we 
shall never know, but the only thread of policy that had been clearly laid out and not 
broadly discredited was in essence very similar to that which the Right would eventually 
pursue. However, the actual line that was carried out by the Left was that of caution, or, 
perhaps, prudence (Palier 2002), and, in concrete terms, the establishment of the COR. 
It could be said that by taking these steps Jospin was defending the system against 
untimely and ill-considered reform or it could be said that he was avoiding the issue so 
as to decrease his chances of a fata pas before the election. Which of these explanations 
rings true is more a matter of opinion than a matter of fact. Either one implies the other 
as a side benefit.
The Right: Prime Minster’s outline 
At the time of the election of the Right there was a clear need for the pensions 
question to be tackled; they could benefit from a good deal of preparatory work by the 
Socialists and they had a financing problem of some €43billion (Republique Fran9aise
108 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
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2003b). Once the Right came to power there was very little delay in outlining the aims of 
the government regarding pension reform and then coming out with an almost complete 
projet de loi.109 The Prime Minister’s speech outlining the general policy to be pursued 
by the government made some clear points:
The principle of solidarity between generations demands the protection of 
repartition to assure a decent income to all pensioners... [the reform] should 
result in improved equity between citizens, taking into account all special cases 
and different statuts and obviously the diversity of situations, notably 
demographics... freedom of choice must be assured: retirement at 60, which is 
an aquis social, must not be put into question, but those that wish to prolong 
their working life should be able to do this and increase their rights.
(Raffarin 2002)
The first point that is notable in the speech is the immediate defence of the system of 
repartition (pay-as-you-go). As discussed above this is something that has specific 
resonance in France. Commentators and protesters had assumed that one of the major 
threads of the Right’s policy on pension reform would be to try to rescue the financial 
situation by making moves towards provision for funded pensions110 (Leparmentier and 
Malingre 2002; Palier 2002). In fact the policy was true to the PM’s word and only four 
out of 81 articles in the projet de loi are concerned with a minimal extension of the 
provisions for funded pensions. These four articles reiterate the principles of pensions- 
savings, in essence putting forward two new instruments for savings plans for retirement 
and establishing pensions versions of the plans partenariaux d ’epargne salariale 
volontaire (PPESV) (Jolivet 2003b; Republique Fran9aise 2003d). Ironically the 
PPESVs referred to here were introduced originally by the socialists under the insistence 
that they were not a step towards funded pensions as they were limited to a period of ten 
years. Even at that point, however, they were recognised as a forerunner albeit with the
109 The projet de loi is the draft legislation, equivalent more or less to the White Paper in the UK or the new ‘draft bills’ 
that are becoming part of the UK’s parliamentary and consultation process. Curiously there can also be a draft projet 
de loi.
110 Called capitalisation in French.
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problems that they were over generous and could neither be left alongside similar 
pension instruments nor turned into them without implications for other instruments or 
inequity due to the non-universal availability (Sterdyniak 2002). The conversion, 
allowing them to be kept up to retirement, into falsely profitable, generous aid non- 
universal instruments explicitly for retirement, is criticised in the same way by 
Comilleau and Sterdyniak (2003). The other instrument basically extends a type of 
saving that is already available to certain groups; although there is some doubt as to 
whether it is an attractive vehicle as it is an insurance product and annuity based 
(Comilleau and Sterdyniak 2003; Jolivet 2003b; Mayeur 2003).
The remaining statements in the speech concerning the equity across schemes, the 
(neatly played down) concerns about demographics and the question of choice in 
retirement age make up the meat of the reform and are summarised below.
General content of the reform
Considering the problems that the socialist government had, consisting of veiled and 
unveiled threats from the likes of SNCF (Sauviat 1999), it is not surprising to find that 
the Loi Fillon restricts its scope and excludes the regimes speciaux which cover 
employees in such sensitive areas as SNCF, RATP, EDF and GDF (Mayeur 2003: 5).111 
The question of demographics is tackled head-on as it is the main motivator for a reform 
which is presented as a way of not ‘leaving as a legacy to future generations the burden 
of financing pensions’ (Mayeur 2003: 3).
The mechanism for bringing the system to equilibrium that was given overwhelming 
priority in the reform was that of changing the contribution years. This is admitted even 
by the supporters of the Government as having engendered widespread criticism,
1,1 This list of acronyms basically comprises the major public utilities in France.
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however they see justification in the importance of having a measure that can be applied 
across all regimes and support the stated aim of equity at the same time as attacking the 
financial problem (Mayeur 2003). This emphasis on a flexible and practical instrument 
being a key driver in the direction the policy takes is very similar to that seen in the UK 
for the pension credit.
What is perhaps most surprising, although from the point of view of some Socialists 
opposed to the Charpin report perhaps not, is that the proposed change in contribution 
years is to put everyone to 40 years, compared to the 42 XA proposed by Charpin, although 
the 40 years is to be increased gradually to 42 years by 2020. This area of the rules also 
links into another contested issue that reduces or increases by a multiplication factor the 
final liquidation terms of the pension depending on the distance above or below a pivot 
age that retirement is taken. This is a trick not entirely unlike the Pension Credit in the 
UK case study in that it allows the Minister to have control over an extra parameter to 
harshen or lighten the conditions around the main parameter, in this case the years of 
contribution. According to Pierre-Louis Bras, former Cabinet adviser of Martine Aubry, 
the Socialist Minister for Social Security, the Left were concerned with guarantees about 
replacement rates while the Right played with the contribution years but were not 
concerned about not making a similar guarantee.112
One of the main arguments against the use of the contribution years mechanism is that 
of the state of the wider labour market situation. The Taddei Report published under the 
Socialists in 1999, for example, ‘highlighted the contradiction between increasing the 
length of contributions and the continuing use of early retirement’ (Palier 2002: 9), and 
the fact that the older worker has been targeted during times of high unemployment to be
112 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
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eased into alternative welfare benefits such as disability benefits to encourage them to 
abandon the labour market (Legros 2001: 28). The reform does address some of these 
concerns however with a ‘mobilisation nationale'> to encourage a longer active life in the 
labour market (Mayeur 2003) although the policy consists of a smattering of incentive 
and disincentive measures which show willing rather than radicalism.
In the final phase of the policy’s construction the unions met and negotiated the 
proposals and while there were some minor changes, mainly concerning those who start 
work at a young age, ‘dirty and difficult’ (penible) jobs and dealing with the differing 
remuneration structures of the public and private, the proposals stayed effectively as the 
government presented them (Jolivet 2003a; Republique Fran?aise 2003a).
The policy process
... the point at which the maturation occurs is not necessarily the time at which 
the most competent people are in charge to deal with the subject.
Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
Togetherness
The European tour that Francois Fillon carried out to look at pension reform in other 
countries was mentioned by many of the interviewees as a good thing in that it allowed a 
relationship to form that did not have to be bound entirely by the dictates of immediate 
work. Jean-Marie Toulisse, the pensions expert and officer charged with external 
relations at CFDT, found that it created something rare in France; a chance to get away 
from institutional and formal contacts in order to get to know the others that one sits 
around the table with. It offered an opportunity to create a semblance of a network 
between the various unions and even MEDEF and, says Toulisse, ‘when Fillon asked the 
Swedish PM a question I was there to hear it and when I asked, he heard, so now we
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know each other better.’113 The other major aspect of togetherness in the process was the 
COR. The benefit of the COR seemed not to lie in any substantive work that it did but in 
the background effect of bringing people together, that is to say that ‘the book was not 
important... it was fundamental to have this sort of .. agreement on recognising the 
problem, determining eventual solutions, without choosing.’114 
The tortoises and the hares
... the reform wasn't done [by the Left] -  no reform -  reports exist saying there is 
a problem and they created a more or less consensual diagnosis and created 
the COR. There was no consensus on a solution. We took the consensus on the 
problem but we had to find the right solution and get the law through. So there is 
a rupture -  they didn't have the courage to take it forward for six, seven years.
OK, I understand that. They made a consensus on the problem but they never 
had a consensus on the solution. Their work was important though -  it took 10 
years!
Interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003 
The simplest interpretation of the policy process from a Left against Right comparison 
is that the Left did not instigate reform and the Right did. The next most obvious 
comparison is that the Socialists took their time to do a qualified nothing while the Right 
dived straight into a fairly weighty reform law. In June 1997 the Left gained power to 
some extent on the back of the rejection of the Plan Juppe.115 By 1998 the PM wanted a 
report ‘to have a wide dialogue with social partners..., for raising collective awareness..., 
[to have] a diagnosis on a shared view’116 and gave responsibility for this process to Jean- 
Michel Charpin, who was the Commissariat General du Plan, a PS insider that had 
worked with many of the government’s key advisers and was trusted to deliver.117 
However what happened in the event when the report was published in March 1999 was
113 Interview with Jean-Marie Toulisse, 2 October 2003
114 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
1,5 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
116 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
1,7 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
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that Charpin went ‘beyond his mission’1,8 and came up unexpectedly with some specific 
policy measures instigating ‘a barrage of criticism’ (Sauviat 1999) rather than producing 
a non-specific framework document as the basis for a consensus as was hoped for by 
many in the government. It must be made clear that the Charpin report does not seem to 
contradict the policy line that Jospin could have been expected to take and that which 
was finally adopted by the Right, but whilst being spot-on in policy terms, in political 
terms the criticism was that it radically shrank Jospin’s political manoeuvring space: he 
would now have to either implicitly agree or implicitly disagree with the 
recommendations. As a result of the outcry the Socialists had to try and start again gently 
to build the atmosphere they had hoped for and this was not to be a speedy process. The 
social partners were taken in for informal talks and they were either brought round or 
sounded out on the idea of setting up the COR and the prospects of reform. It was not an 
easy time for the Socialists. As mentioned above they did not have a strong majority in 
the legislature and relied on the Communist vote. In discussions of the regime speciaux, 
which takes in the rail workers, the Communist element of the Government was 
explicitly linked to the subject, through the Transport Minister Gayssot. However, the 
problems continued to surface, at one meeting in December 1999 Jacques Rigaudiat 
brought together representatives from Bercy,119 Social Security and Transport but 
Gayssot was still of the opinion that if reform was attempted there could be ‘three 
months of blockage on the rails.’120 The Ministry of Social Affairs particularly wanted to 
see some action on the public sector, but the Minister for the Fonction Publique was 
hesitant to engage with the problems. The private sector scheme required 40 years of
118 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
119 Bercy is the familiar name for the Ministry of Finance.
120 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004. Also confirmed by Sauviat (1999).
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working life to obtain the maximum liquidation terms at retirement while the public side 
required only 37/4 and so nothing could be done to the private until the public had been 
dealt with.'21
Meanwhile the Teulade Report L ’avenir des systemes de retraite (Teulade 2000) was 
published in January 2000: a report coming not from the PS’s technocracy but from the 
Conseil Economique et Sociale. This report was ‘a retreat’ from122 or a ‘contre-rapport’ 
to123 Charpin that contained, depending on your point of view, considerably more 
optimistic or realistic projections of the size and immediacy of the problem. This report 
helped to calm the atmosphere and, resulting from the informal talks and an inter- 
ministerial reflection, the next milestone was the PM’s speech of 21 March 2000 written 
by Christophe Devys, his economic adviser in the Cabinet. This speech extended in no 
uncertain terms the existing hiatus by calling for the setting up of the Conseil 
d ’Orientation des Retraites (COR), which was to be a non-aligned, independent body of 
wide membership charged with doing what Charpin had not done.124 When the COR was 
established in May 2000, the employers body, MEDEF, had seen what they wanted in 
the Charpin report and they refused to take part in the COR,125 but all the other key actors 
played their part. Over time, the COR achieved its aim by not only bringing together the 
main players and finding the common ground but also by extending the range of 
understanding of some complex issues to shift that common ground if it had been before 
based on incomplete or false knowledge. In concrete policy terms nothing happened until 
6 December 2001 when the COR presented its first report to the Prime Minister Jospin.
12' Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004
122 Interview with Pierre-Louis Bras, 6 April 2004.
123 Interview with Florence Legros.
124 The Prime Minsiter’s speech (Jospin 2000) does not say this in so many words but the implication is clear in the 
context.
125 Private information
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Unsurprisingly, when everyone got back to work after the Christmas break, there was 
little inclination to move the issue forward with the legislative elections coming in the 
summer. There was still the problem of the majority, Juppe’s vanquished ghost still 
haunted the corridors of Matignon and there was no path at this point other than to make 
a pension reform, based on the now solid groundwork, the priority for after the election.
In July 2002 the Socialist government fell to a majority Right wing legislature and 
Jean-Pierre Raffarin was appointed to be Prime Minister.
The job of protecting the pension system has been put off for too long... It’s no 
longer the time for creating new commissions, the publishing of new reports.
Today is the time for taking decisions after concertation... we must see that 
everything needed to preserve it is brought together before the first six months of 
2003 are over.
(Raffarin 2002)
This speech no doubt surprised Michel Rocard, quoted above in the section on the 
pensions environment, as he finds the positioning of the Right to make no sense because 
putting yourself under a deadline forces you to make the last concession and in the end 
because of this the power of law, rather than an agreement, was necessary.126
The Right were not the only ones that were in a hurry; Rigaudiat criticised the CFDT 
for being in too much of a huny, he blamed them for pressuring Charpin127 and, 
eventually, it was also this union that was to sign up to the final reform package in the 
Fillon-Raffarin endgame.
One consequence of the hurry of the Right is the way that decisions were taken within 
the policy process. Fillon was personally involved in the decision making in a way that 
would be rare in the UK and even in France under other conditions. He took many 
decisions himself as his team were still mastering the dossier and could not be involved
126 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
'27 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
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in the preparation of decisions to the full extent that might otherwise be the case.128 In 
fact the ministers all saw it as an imperative, under the circumstances, to be fully 
informed and there were over a six month period what amounted to ‘teach-ins’ on 
Saturday mornings with the key Ministers and those in the Cabinet and from elsewhere, 
such as Banquy the assistant director of pensions at Bercy, to present papers.129 The 
momentum could only have been increased by the favourable conditions, described 
above in ‘Context’ and ‘General Environment’, of the strong position of the Right and 
the normal (non-cohabitation) relations between the President and his government.130
True to his word, in February 2003 Prime Minister Raffarin made a speech to to the 
Conseil Economique et Sociale launching the ‘national debate’ on pension reform. The 
four months between this speech and the 28 May 2003, when the legislation was 
presented to the Conseil des Ministres prior to its parliamentary reading was a time of 
considerable activity. No-one, however, doubts that the tortoises had done the footwork 
that made it possible for the hares to speed away: if the Right had been starting from 
scratch they would not have been so swift.131 
Avoiding the steamroller 
It is clear that the technical side of the reform was a difficult job but actually getting 
the reform passed was the vital work,132 something that the Socialists had discovered the 
hard way. The Raffarin government walked a very fine line with their policy making 
between two contrasting positions. The first would be to introduce a policy that was
128 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003
129 interview with Stephane Brimont and interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
130 Interview with Jean-Marie Toulisse, 2 October 2003 also information from interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 
2004
131 Interview with Solange Morgenstem, 5 December 2003. Interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003. Also 
mentioned in several other interviews for the case study.
132 interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003
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necessary and grudgingly accepted as so by the French people. The second would be to 
steamroller through a measure that was not wanted or understood by the citizenry and 
which ignored the concerns of the unions with a negotiation that was basically a sham. 
Rigaudiat, Jospin’s social affairs adviser, is highly critical of the ‘economist... rational’ 
view: implicitly many of his own Left-wing colleagues as well as the Right He accuses 
many of the actors as being contra-politique and emphasises that ‘in a democracy and 
with such key topics we must convince the corps social.’,33 There were, in fact, 
considerable efforts and expenditure to do this on the part of the Right. Paolini, the 
Conseiller aupres de Ministre of Fillon, concentrated on the communications side 
ensuring that the technical work that was being done could be transformed into ‘tools of 
communication facing outwards’ and also that the signals coming form the collective 
political antennae were being fed through to the technical side. It is interesting to 
compare the importance and the high level of expenditure on ‘selling the policy’ in 
France, where there are parallel formal channels, to the UK where this is the only mode 
of contact with outsiders. This selling was seen as a key element by the Fillon camp, 
‘two important external advisers’ who had experience in public policy as well as 
communications were the senior contacts at the two companies contracted to work with 
the Government.134
As early as February 2003, when the PM made the first official noises about pension 
reform in his speech to the Conseil Economique et Social, Francis Fillon was 
equivocal about the role of the unions, saying that ‘they would “have their say” if they 
partook “in a constructive dialogue’” (de Montvalon 2003). Looking back, Michel 
Rocard commented on the process saying that the Raffarin Government ‘talked about
133 Interview with Jacques Rigaudiat, 8 April 2004
134 Interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003
92
Chapter III
consultation, they even spoke about “concertation”, I believe, never the word 
“negotiation”’ and that this was a big mistake as in ‘consultation the atmosphere is 
radically different because when you leave you have to explain what was talked about... 
so it is a proclamation taking place not a constructive process’ compared to a negotiation 
where you are in a process to get results. ‘The mistake was to see the unions three or four 
times without ever saying in which mode everyone was operating.’135
The question that was never clearly answered and can be seen to still muddy the 
waters even with hindsight is the one implied above concerning the mode of engagement 
and the words that are used to describe it. The words and the modes do not necessarily 
coincide in the real world of policy making in the way that they may be understood in the 
literature; concertation (in English) and concertation (in French) may or may not be the 
same thing for Francis Fillon and as the academics who write on neo-corporatist policy 
environments. Negotiation and consultation are clearly at different ends of a scale but 
both are sliding points on a scale rather than fixed and it is very difficult to say what the 
scale is measuring as the observable and quantifiable factor is usually an outcome rather 
than a process. Furthermore, that outcome relates to many more degrees of subtlety than 
merely the mode of operation -  most notably the abilities of the various interlocutors that 
are involved in the process. The recent literature on pension reform policy-making 
unfortunately is thin on the ground and often only tangentially relevant to the issues and 
a deeper examination is outside the scope of this thesis.
Michel Rocard, when outlining his approach to the pension reform and describing his 
approach to the process concentrated two of his four points on, effectively, avoiding the
135 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
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steamroller. He, himself, prioritised negotiation as he believed that to force through a law 
that did not have reasonable agreement behind it was very unwise.136
The internal organisation was influenced by the speed with which the policy process 
moved: there was a specific structure created to try and ensure the swift and co-ordinated 
action needed resulting in the formation of a strategy committee and a steering 
committee. The former addressed the big questions of whose speech, what publicity, 
when would moves be made. This committee was chaired by Raffarin with Fillon, 
Delevoye, the communications advisers, directors of the cabinets and external advisers 
present. The latter, chaired by Paolini, was to feed into the strategy committee by 
managing contact and regular meetings of the political and communications advisers and 
the two external advisers but not the Chefs de cabinets. Both these semi-formal bodies 
were only in place for the duration of the policy process. Paolini’s explanation for the 
existence of these bodies was that the size of the network and the mass of information 
flowing around it demanded that organisation be imposed as otherwise contacts were 
unsatisfactorily piecemeal.137
The period Februaiy to April 2003 saw the engagement of the Raffarin government 
with the ‘social partners’ in a series of meetings at the Ministry of Social Security headed 
by the Chef du Cabinet of Fillon, Jean-Paul Faugere, where those charged with the 
pension dossier in the unions and MEDEF, went through the proposals laid down by the 
Government. At the same time there was a parallel process on a more political level 
concerning a smaller set of points concentrated around the Prime Minister’s cabinet, the 
Elysee, MEDEF’s senior officers and the union that we have seen to be most in favour of
136 Interview with Michel Rocard, 19 December 2003
137 All information on these ad-hoc committees from a interview with Jerome Paolini, 4 December 2003
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the reforms, the CFDT.138 These parallel meetings were not only to find the political 
solution to getting the pension reform agreed but also to shore up political support within 
the Right’s still considerable camp of sceptics: notably the astute and experienced 
Jacques Barrot, the leader of the majority in the Assemblee and Frederic Salat-Barroux, 
‘the grand patron of social affairs’: both of these senior figures had to be brought round 
to the pressing necessity of reform.139 During these meetings Creyssel also said that it 
was the time when MEDEF and CFDT discovered their ability to have some common 
ground.140 Even when these actors had actually come round to the understanding the 
position on contribution years there were still subtle questions to be dealt with, for 
example, in the context of the penibilite of certain types of work, would the system 
assume new contribution years automatically, unless there were reasons against it, or 
would the system have to check to see if the rule could be applied and only do so if there 
was a reason. We can imagine that the discussions that may take place on this sort of 
topic within the UK’s closed system of politicians, civil servants and special advisers 
would be long drawn out and difficult to close. To imagine the process in the 
complicated French arrangement with such a wide range of actors can give us a limited 
idea of how complicated the process was.
The end game
The 7 May 2003 saw Francois Fillon make the first move in the end game as he 
presented the draft legislation for a first agreement to the Conseil des Ministres. The next 
stage of formal meetings with social partners, despite the fact that is was widely covered 
by the press and talked about by all, is very difficult to piece together. An attempt to
138 interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
139 Interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
140 Interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
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highlight key issues follows, but the confusion within the account can be as informative 
about the nature of the policy process as a clear explanation would be. On 13 May 2003, 
the day before the meetings took place there were predictably massive demonstrations 
against the proposals. The meetings took place under circumstances of heightened 
tension, not helped by the fact that it was still not clear which mode talks were being 
held in (see above) and that the room to amend the fait accompli draft legislation was 
obviously very limited.
By the end of the first day no union was ready to sign the documents that were being 
put forward and CGT did not even bother to return the following day. Very soon 
afterwards CGT-FO walked out of the talks as well (Jolivet 2003a). Then, the conclusion 
of the deal came quickly; it was recognised by the Prime Minister that Fillon had arrived 
at a point where he had reached the end of, or according to some overstretched, his 
mandate to negotiate. MEDEF it seems had a hand in letting this be known through 
Cirelli, a member of the PM’s Cabinet.141 The PM then appears to have brought to 
fruition the parallel line of occasional encounters that had been going on by inviting 
round, after the gruelling all night meeting held by Fillon on the night of the 14-15 May, 
the Secretary General of the CFDT, Fran?ois Chereque, who was joined by his pensions 
negotiator Toulisse who had just got out of the overnight Fillon meeting.142 The 
concessions that were needed were made by the PM and then Chereque left to pay a 
‘courtesy visit [to Fillon]’ (Algalarrondo 2003). Later that afternoon Toulisse met with 
the PM’s and Fillon’s cabinet representatives to finalise the details.143 All this culminated 
in two out of the five confederal union bodies signing their agreement.
141 Interview with Jacques Creyssel, 7 April 2004
142 Anecdotal evidence says that he had enough time to take a shower between the two meetings.
143 All the details o f the PM’s involvement are taken from Algalarrondo (2003) but the existence of the involvement 
was also reported by others.
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Following this process a list of amendments to the draft legislation was published: 
effectively the quid pro quos that got the unions onside described above. The outcome 
left many people not happy and on 25 May 2003 the streets of the major French cities 
were again busy as further demonstrations took place demanding the reopening of talks 
with the unions. However, the government now had the agreement of MEDEF and two 
of the unions of which one, the CFDT was the biggest. It was all over. On 28 May the 
proposed legislation, including the amendments, was agreed in its final form by the 
Conseil des Ministres. Parliamentary debate followed and on the 24 July 2003 the Loi 
Fillon was adopted by Parliament.
All over except that there remains much of the legislation that will come through 
decrees (secondary legislation) (Jolivet 2003b) and the work has yet to be started on the 
regimes speciaux. In terms of controversy, the process described above was nothing 
compared to what remains to be done.
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IV. Facts to figures: a bridging chapter__________
As touched on in the introduction, case studies are, in experimental and scientific 
terms, unstructured, poorly defined models with unstated assumptions. However their 
value has been proved by usage (Gerring 2004) and it is clear that much can be learnt 
about how policy is made from the case study that has been presented. The remaining 
chapters of this thesis address the same field of enquiry as the case study but use the NFP 
approach. In order to ascertain how much we learn from the original methods presented 
in this thesis we will summarise here what we have so far learnt from our ‘traditional’ 
investigation in order to give a comparison base.
What we expect to gain from NFPs
It is already stated in the introduction that we expect that NFPs 'can reveal valuable 
information that would not emerge from a traditional case study' but now that we have 
the two case studies to draw examples from we must be more precise about why this 
alternative method is necessary (simply more information is not necessary if we have 
enough already) and how it can be demonstrated that it succeeds. The question of the 
necessity of more information from a method such as NFP analysis is answered in two 
ways: good scientific method and illuminating precision. Good scientific method relies 
on formulating hypotheses and then testing them. There is a popular but understandable 
misconception in both hard and soft sciences that hypotheses will usually be drawn from 
pure theory, in fact this is very rare and normally a great deal of contextual and 
background understanding is needed from experimental or case study evidence in order 
to generate hypotheses. This leaves the scholar with a problem in that it is not generally 
considered good science to test a hypothesis with the same tools that generated it. By
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either exploring the policy process using NFP methods and testing our theories with case 
study evidence, or generating hypotheses about the process from the richness of the case 
studies and testing using the precision of NFP methods we gain credibility and assurance 
about our results. Meanwhile illuminating precision is also something that can be clearly 
added by the NFP method to complement the findings of case studies and to allow us to 
make claims about the policy process from a reproducible and scientifically justifiable 
set of data -  the case study alone would not have allowed such convincing claims and 
conversely it is possible that we would not have discovered the general claim from the 
NFP alone in the absence of extended contextual information. This thesis therefore does 
not suggest that the two case studies that we have presented cannot stand by themselves 
as answering a range of questions about the policy process -  that is to say they are not 
useless if we do not carry out an NFP analysis. It rather proposes that the NFP work has 
the capacity to provide an independent test of hypotheses generated from the case study 
material and that such work offers further precision to make findings from the case study 
more convincing. The NFP method does, of course, also stand alone in producing 
interesting results that answer questions about the two cases.
The second half of this chapter will present the structure of hypotheses that are tested 
in the thesis. Both the summary of what we have learnt from the case-study approach and 
the hypotheses are built around the three broad questions given in Chapter 1:
• What characteristics of the policy process relate to its success or failure?
• Who are the important people and what are the things that make them 
important?
• What are the working methods and how did the process unfold?
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Threads from the case study
Looking across the context of the timing and descriptions of the differing approaches 
that ensure the policy process comes to fruition we see the importance of the executive 
structure and the prevailing parliamentary conditions in the two countries. The size of the 
majority for each of the three governments had a part to play: the two governments that 
emerge more in control, Blair and Raffarin, have confidence in their majority and the one 
that is buffeted by difficulties in timing, Jospin, is nervous of its hold on parliamentary 
power. The clear differences between Blair and Brown as masters of their own game and 
the complexities of cohabitation (and even the simple split executive in non- 
cohabitation France) can also be traced through the two policy processes.
The policy instruments or policy lines that are prioritised impact on the probability of 
the process succeeding; in our study they reflect the characteristics of the policy sector of 
pensions and do not seem to be greatly affected by the different contexts. Technocratic 
solutions are prioritised and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the politicians’ overall 
desire is for a flexible instrument that can be tweaked so as to move closer towards an 
optimal allocation of spending in politico-electoral terms whilst remaining subtle enough 
to be edged along without causing noticeable opposition. None of the governments, left, 
right, French or UK were ready to shift from their existing entrenched positions. We saw 
no major move away from means-testing in the UK and no flight from PAYG for the 
French. The nature of the pensions sector as revealed in the previous two chapters is that 
evidence is often thin on the ground, frequently contested and, when neither of these 
things, suggests that alternative systems suffer from the same problems anyway. Such 
features do not inspire politicians to take risks on major changes if they want to see their 
policies emerge convincingly intact in the final policy output.
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A clear contrast that emerges from the descriptions of the process is the number of 
actors that seem to be involved. In the UK there are only two politicians featured in the 
narrative whilst, even allowing for a change in government in France, there are many 
more political players. We have already mentioned the involvement of outsiders in the 
French case is much higher than that in the English case and the split union movement in 
France, the cabinet system and the institutional arrangement of President and Prime 
Minister serves to exaggerate differences in the two processes.
A major point that defines who the key players are in the two policy processes is that 
the UK Labour party wanted to implement their policy and they had been waiting for 
years to do so, while both French parties view the policy somewhat like going to the 
dentist: it has to be done but if it could be put off without too much pain then that would 
be preferable. As a result of these two different attitudes we can see that the UK has 
fewer players that are important because of their role in gaining external validity or 
public approval; even the key politicians do not appear overly concerned and there is no 
evidence of devices seen on the French side such as quasi-independent reports, 
mobilisation of publicity skills or the drafting in of familiar faces to reassure doubters. 
Some of the key actors we can see on the French side are concerned precisely with this 
type of activity and the reassurance factor, from the establishment of the COR to the act 
of convincing MEDEF, has a major effect on how people work and who is drafted in 
work on the policy.
Apart from the parliamentary context affecting timing, institutional factors also show 
themselves in the study when considering the way that the people work within the 
process. The most obvious is the fact that the UK government does not have to talk to 
anyone but it still likes to ‘sell’ its policy. The UK government tends to anticipate
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reactions, based on their understanding of interested groups, and even if they go out and 
meet them there is not a tendency for this to have direct impact on policy. The policy 
gets modified according to a changed understanding of the political environment as a 
result of external contact. In France the government has to talk to others. It has a duty to 
consult with social partners and they are in some ways internal players through the joint 
management of pension schemes. This necessity to consult means that the government 
tends to have to bring together its own quite firm position, something the UK 
government has no need to do until it wants to. It then see this position modified by 
public or semi-public demands from external actors. The effect of this on the policy 
process is to instil rigidity and formality as a defence mechanism on the government’s 
part.
A very clear thread that can be drawn out of the case studies is that of the timing 
aspect. In the UK the Labour Party was frustrated to some extent that it could not go 
ahead on both child poverty and pension reform at the same time. This was a fact that 
became apparent to key actors very early on and consequently they were forced to be 
patient and implement holding policies that they may well not have chosen to do under 
other circumstances. However, they held their line and awaited their opportunity with an 
impressive level of control. This control was the iron fist in the velvet glove: there was a 
determination to get the policy they wanted with all the inherent advantages promoted 
and the disadvantages suppressed in time for the election but there was very little explicit 
power broking involved as the process was very much kept in the executive family. In 
France we saw the French Left being frustrated in quite a different way: they knew that 
although the time was probably right to move forward they were not confident, given the 
Charpin report, that they could keep the disparate interests in line and so they had to keep
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the process rolling on gently. The timetables for elections and, of course, losing the 
election meant that the right time never arrived for Jospin. Time was also seen to be an 
issue for Raffarin, although quite why this was so is never really uncovered. Certainly it 
puzzled Michel Rocard and given the Juppe background it seems surprising that the 
Right pushed ahead so quickly, but push ahead they did. This defined the shape of the 
policy process, the dual lines of negotiations with the ‘social partners’, MEDEF and 
CFDT behind the scenes and the iron fist, without a velvet glove, that was seen at the 
very end of the process.
Another contrast of rigidity and fluidity that we see is that of the general working 
arrangements within the two governmental set-ups. One difference that arises, the 
hierarchy being much more evident in France, is due to the UK advisers being mostly 
neutral when compared to the mostly political French advisers. We see two reasons for 
this phenomenon first the cabinet/administration hierarchy and second the multiplicity of 
cabinets. These arrangements mean that everyone is distinctly aware of their place and, 
because they may be competing with others in the cabinets to get into a higher ranking 
cabinet or with others in the administration to get a cabinet place, they also care more 
about their place in the pecking order. This leads to the formality and the repetition of the 
work that was seen. In the mostly non-politically aligned UK environment, however, 
there is very little rivalry. When things are going well the political and non-political 
advisers respect each other for their different skills and the evidence shows that from all 
policy actors there was a desire to work in a non-hierarchical arrangement to exploit 
peoples’ skills as effectively as possible. There is of course a qualification to this as 
some departments in the UK government, including the Treasury, have reputations for
103
Chapter IV
being superior144 and this can cause tensions not through personal rivalries but through 
rivalries for departmental recognition and policy-making supremacy.
We can see from this very limited gathering of strands from the case-study that if a 
researcher wished to study one of the areas that we identified above in our three broad 
questions that there is ample evidence emerging from the study to support or reject a 
healthy range of hypotheses.
How will we compare case studies and NFP analysis?
The selection of cases is intended to address two ends: methodological and theoretical. 
The methodological purpose is the central one of this thesis and we are attempting to 
prove that NFP analysis is operable in two very different countries (institutional settings) 
- as will be described in the setup of the hypotheses we hold constant policy sector and 
level of government. With such a central methodological question the demonstrations of 
theory bulidng could only ever be a secondary aim to demonstrate some of the potential 
uses of such analysis. The rigorous setting up of theoretical hypotheses linking NFP 
derived knowledge to the policy process and tests using NFPs must be the focus of work 
that follows this thesis using the methods developed within it. However, in order to 
justify our claim that NFPs are not only operable but valuable in examining the policy 
process we must show some interesting result that could not be found from the case 
studies. To this end we have a conventional 'most similar' case study design where we 
take measures derived from NFPs (the structural aspect) as an independent variable and 
try to show that we can explain differences in the policy process (our dependent 
variables) more effectively by reference to the NFP derived variables than by reference 
to the corresponding structural/institutional variables implicit in the case study. Some
144 The sense of the word is different for those within the Treasury to those outside.
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pointers to where we expect to get leverage from the NFP analysis have already been 
highlighted in the case study chapters. The illustrations of suitable hypotheses below 
show how the limited demonstration of structural features that we examine in this thesis 
can be extended in later work to rigorously test theory. Examples 1-5 show the sort of 
hypotheses that we can test in the limited scope of this thesis while examples 6-8 show 
what we would hope to use NFP analysis for if we could devote adequate research to 
each example individually.
A discussion on hypotheses
The main thrust of this thesis is to discover, through practical application, whether the 
NFP method is valuable in examining the policy process. The paragraphs above on the 
case-study give us a base from which we can look at the ability of NFPs to enlighten us 
on the set of three broad questions. In order to test the value of analysis using NFPs we 
will construct a set of sub-hypotheses that fit within the framework of broad questions. 
The rest of this chapter will discuss this hypothesis structure and later on in Chapter 7, 
when we have explored the technical aspects of NFPs further, we will set out the details 
of the lowest level of hypotheses which we will use NFP analysis to test.
It is important to remember that an overarching decision has been taken to answer 
questions about configurations of policy making in networks before attempting to tie the 
work in to more complex questions about specific policy outcomes or policy 
effectiveness. The hypotheses are not going to address the ideas or policies that are being 
processed and selected in the course of policy making. This comes as a result of both our 
theoretical stance, which follows in the next chapter, and the empirical issues that are 
discussed in Chapter 8. This decision favours certain types of hypotheses but it does not
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mean that the hypothesis tests are restricted only to structural data. It will be necessary to 
compare the structural data to other types of data in order to ascertain the formers’ 
analytical value. This decision does limit the scope of the work within this thesis but it is 
good practice to do work on new developments the right way round. We must 
understand structures before trying to understand how ideas operate within them and 
how outcomes differ because of them the interaction of the ideas and the structures.
The levels of hypothesis
The main hypothesis as stated in Chapter 1 is that ‘the organisation o f observations into 
an NFP model and the analysis with suitable methods can reveal results that would not 
emerge from a traditional case study.' As explained above we will construct layers of 
hypotheses to test this. The first level is, to paraphrase, that of proving the worth of NFP 
analysis. The second level of hypothesis is about the nature and applicability of NFPs: 
the specific hypothesis is that NFP analysis is applicable across countries. The testing of 
this hypothesis relies on the design of the experiment and the selection of units within 
the case study exercise. Future case study work could similarly test hypotheses that die 
conclusions apply across policy sectors, levels of government, etc. The final level of 
hypothesis defines the specific work, largely based on formal network analysis, that will 
be carried out on the two NFPs for France and the UK: there will be several hypotheses 
tested at this level.
Level 1 hypothesis: the value of NFP analysis
We will test the hypothesis that the organisation o f observations into an NFP model 
and the analysis with suitable methods can reveal results that would not emerge from a 
traditional case study.
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The following example shows how such a hypothesis relates to a simple situation. It is 
quite possible that in a case study a high proportion of the interviewees will nominate Mr 
A as the most influential person in the network. Mr A is quite likely a very important 
person and the interviewees would be quite correct to state that he is influential, and even 
though many of them do not have much contact with him, he still, very reasonably, 
comes top of their list. Aggregation is generally used, whether implicitly or explicitly, in 
summarising case study findings and Mr A will be our top dog. Our hypothesis suggests 
that NFP analysis can uncover, where the case study cannot, the importance of elusive 
Ms K who, it transpires, can reach and is reached by everyone in the network and has a 
high quality interaction with, let us say, the Prime Minister; a relation that few in the 
network are aware of. As a single piece of information in a case study, this Prime 
Ministerial connection would be interesting,145 but in the NFP analysis, realising that Ms 
K is in fact a well connected node and a conduit to the PM, we discover that aggregation 
does not give a true picture. Adding up (aggregation) is not a very sophisticated function, 
although it is often a good one and relatively simple. When we examine the level 1 
hypothesis we are primarily looking for the benefit of sophisticated analysis over mere 
aggregation. Through an NFP analysis we are able to find a more subtle mathematical 
function that can be applied to many of the questions we may want to ask about an NFP 
and in this example, there will be functions that explicitly uncover the importance of Ms 
K, when this was only obliquely suggested by the traditional case study and then 
overwhelmed by the aggregated importance of Mr A.
In the more complicated case that is examined in this thesis the first level hypothesis 
will be tested by examining the results from the second and third level hypotheses and
145 Well carried out case studies are good at noting and interpreting exceptions.
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comparing their findings to the summary above of what we learnt from the traditional 
case study material that was collected in parallel with the data for the NFP.
Second level hypothesis: the universality of NFP based analysis 
In future work the universality of NFP analysis could turn out to be either a strong or 
weak prediction. It may be possible to prove a hypothesis suggesting that policy 
networks have the same characteristics for a range of network measures, across all time 
and territory drawing in differing political systems and policy sectors. Alternatively the 
universality may be limited to proving a hypothesis that they can be examined using the 
same methods in a small number of cases. Either way, testing the limitations or breadth 
of applicability is an important part of establishing the NFP construct. Within this thesis 
the case study is constructed to allow the testing of applicability across countries. For 
this hypothesis, which takes the NFP as the unit of observation, ‘country’ has been 
chosen as the variable, implicitly varying economic setting, institutional setting, wider 
polity, cultural aspects, historical influences and other linked characteristics. The design 
reduces the possible sources of variation by holding constant, as far as possible, other 
elements. The policy sector is restricted, broadly, to the fiscal side of pension provision 
and the level of government is always national for pension policy. Whatever the result of 
the hypothesis test on the applicability of NFPs across countries, future work can test a 
similar hypothesis across policy sectors with countries and levels of government fixed or 
test levels of government for a given policy sector eliminating country effects. Such 
future work would enable a rigorous test of sources of differences in results for various 
hypotheses about NFPs. Unfortunately, unless the work in this thesis shows no variation 
across countries, it cannot reduce the number of case studies needed for such an 
experiment. If, however, it can affirm the ‘no variation across country’ hypothesis then it
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reduces future testing by eliminating one of the potential sources of variation. By its 
nature this thesis is restricted in size, but any future test of the applicability of NFPs 
would do well to consider experimental design issues in advance. With an appropriate 
experimental design as few as eight or nine case study units would give full results on 
sources of variation for individual effects, such as level of government, and 
combinations, such as country with policy sector.
Third level hypotheses will be formed around the three broad questions on 
‘how is policy m ade?’
The hypotheses will address systematic and structural questions about how policy is 
made and the configurations of policy makers within the framework of the policy 
process. As mentioned above, questions about ‘policy’ will not be addressed.146 
However, a successful conclusion to this thesis will make available a set of techniques 
that, with more work, can be extended and linked to policy specific questions. This 
should not suggest, however, that the choice of policy sector or the characteristics of the 
sector can be ignored, merely that these aspects will be used in a post-hoc assessment of 
the validity of the conclusions and the method used rather than forming a part of the 
analytical method.
The hypotheses to be tested are based around the same three questions that were 
adressed in the case study and will be drawn from theory or from the case study 
examination and then tested using the NFP analysis methods. There should also be some 
room for exploration using the NFP analysis methods, but this will be mainly avoided. 
Good science avoids forming hypotheses from such exploration as the hypotheses would 
be tested using the same techniques that gave rise to them.
146 Note the similarity with the kinds o f hypotheses tested in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 24)
Chapter IV
Illustrations
Given the sort of policy making contexts that were seen in Chapters 2 and 3 it is useful 
to consider the kinds of hypotheses that might be approached, even though we do not 
want to precisely define the hypotheses until we have considered both the theoretical 
angles and the problems of carrying out the empirical work. Illustrations of suitable 
hypotheses make it easier to visualise the hypothesis structure and they produce a clearer 
overall picture of how NFPs are being used in this thesis. Firstly, some examples of 
possible hypotheses that fit the shape of the thesis (although not necessarily the material 
studied here). In these examples the independent variable is the NFP derived measure 
and the dependent variable is the feature of the policy process.
1. A wide range of measures for structural configurations within NFPs are invariant 
across vastly different political institutional setups and macro-economic 
environments.
2. Elite actors in policy making operate as ‘free agents’: actors exogenously 
identified as ‘elite’ within an NFP have a much lower tendency to belong to a 
‘clique’ than non-elite actors.
3. Policy making does not take place primarily in institutional formats: endogenous 
structural cliques are linked to exogenous ‘functional’ labels (analyst, political 
actor, policy expert) rather than exogenous ‘institutional’ labels (governmental, 
pressure group, industry).
4. NFPs of policy making in an EU intergovernmental setting do not show a 
‘country’ based structure, but rather a ‘functional’ or ‘expert’ based structure: 
endogenous structural cliques are linked to exogenous ‘functional’ labels
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(analyst, political actor, policy expert) rather than exogenous ‘country’ labels 
(UK, Italy, ‘south’, ‘north’).
5. The new theories about ‘small world networks’ is relevant to NFPs: NFPs 
consistently show that all actors have easy reach to all other actors (short path 
lengths) but that actors have a tendency to operate in groups or cluster themselves 
(have marked ‘cliques’) i.e. NFPs are ‘small world networks’.
It can be seen from these examples that within the limited scope of this thesis we are 
not able to address hypotheses that go as far as making statements about policy process 
outcomes. However by proposing and proving hypotheses about the features of the 
policy process, such as those above, we can still demonstrate the value of NFP analysis 
since by using it we can move easily from these, now proved, features of the policy 
process towards conclusions about differing outcomes. This gives us more explanatory 
power than with merely illustrative case study evidence. For example if we were to prove 
example hypothesis 4 above, about some policy process, we would be able to 
convincingly claim that member states who sent technically capable delegates would 
have a greater influence on the policy process output than those who send more political 
delegates. We will see in the conclusion that although this thesis is only able to address 
questions such as examples 1-5 that this brings us enough new information to make 
claims about the policy process outcomes that would not have been possible from the 
case study alone.
The second set of illustrative examples shows how the work that is covered in this 
thesis can form a bedrock upon which questions can be built that use knowledge of the 
structural facets of NFPs to outcomes and policy making procedures. In the cases below 
it can be seen that a quite specific research project could be carried out to address the
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hypotheses, but that it would be reliant on the foundation of knowledge that comes from 
a work such as this. The following are therefore examples of hypotheses that do not fit 
the shape of the thesis but could be later work by researchers examining specific policy 
areas using NFP techniques:
6. Countries with higher tendency to ‘bottlenecks’ in their NFP structures have 
failed to implement effective pension reform.
7. When ‘industry’ is centrally placed in the pension reform NFP, the private/public 
ratio of pension provision is significantly tipped towards the private.
8. Countries with the worst projected support ratios for pensions (i.e. those that will 
encounter the most severe demographic changes) have the most isolated 
government actors within their NFPs.
These examples treat the NFP structural variables as the independent variables and the 
outcomes of the policy process as the dependent variable. This is one step on from the 
dependent variables being features of the policy process as we saw in examples 1-5 
above.
Finally a clear counter example of where NFPs are no help. The only way that the 
following hypothesis could be addressed would be if an intermediate theory linking 
NFPs to other features of policy making is discovered and accepted. This hypothesis 
does not fit NFP theory as used in this thesis:
9. Countries with parliamentary systems tend to have slower reform of pension 
systems
It does, however, seem reasonable to imagine that NFPs could be used to explain, or
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as part of an explanation as to, why a hypothesis of this kind is accepted or rejected -  
thereby creating the grounds for an intermediate theory as alluded to above.
This chapter has now bridged the space between the case study approach and the NFP 
analysis by placing the emerging knowledge in the same frame. The next chapter will 
flesh out the NFP idea by giving it a theoretical justification and lead us on to the 
practical application by outlining the basic assumptions that must be addressed before 
embarking on a NFP study.
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V. Ideas, environment and assumptions
The aim of this chapter is to justify the study of network structure and to lay out a 
‘base set of assumptions’ for use in studies that analyse such structures. Using an ideas- 
based, evolutionary view of the policy formation process I demonstrate the key role 
played by networks that form policy (NFPs) and the importance of network structure is 
shown by an analogy to genetic evolution.147 The base set of assumptions is developed in 
this context but, as a practical foundation for analysis, it is entirely independent of the 
theoretical aspects.
Initially, policy formation is represented as a process defined by outputs, inputs and a 
hidden ‘black box’ mechanism. The outputs are briefly discussed and then the more 
elusive inputs are examined. The mechanism inside the black box is then considered and 
it is deduced that the inputs must be ‘ideas’ as the output is a composite ‘idea’ and the 
black box cannot create anything. The useful definition of a reproducible and 
transmissible ‘idea-element’ or ‘meme’ is adopted.
It is proposed that to get from the mass of input ideas to a distinctive, cohesive output, 
there must be both transmission and selection of ideas and hence the ‘selective 
environment’ is introduced. This concept is then linked to NFPs by extending existing 
work on policy evolution and an alternative to the traditional viewpoint, where actors 
manipulate ideas, is adopted to put memes at the centre of the action. Given the 
evolutionary idea and the selective environment, the importance of the network structure
147 The section o f this chapter that deals with the environment of ideas and evolution was expanded to include a 
discussion on the current debates surrounding use o f the evolutionary concept in the policy process and presented to 
the Political Science Workshop at the University of York in March 2004. If the reader is interested in how these 
debates relate to the formulation used here they are referred to the paper Astill (2004a) available at 
http:/personal.lse.ac.uk/astill/research.html. However, as explained in this chapter, the formulation used here is only 
one way to justify the study of networks and to lead to the setting up o f the base assumptions and so the debate on 
policy evolution and random variation is very much optional.
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to a meme’s evolution is then demonstrated by an analogy to the role of the physical 
environment when studying genetic evolution.
Within this context, I propose a set of base assumptions that define NFPs by 
derivation from first principles and by appealing to the literature. The former route 
makes the step to practical analysis easier and the latter facilitates a deeper understanding 
of the ‘policy networks’ literature. It is extremely important to emphasise here that NFPs 
are not ‘policy networks’148 and not necessarily any other phenomenon seen in the 
existing literature. Rather than attempting to offer a checklist to enable the identification 
and categorisation of an NFP in the real world, in the way that the Marsh/Rhodes 
typology does (Marsh and Rhodes 1992b), the base set is intended to be a tool for 
building well defined models of real world NFPs which can be analysed to test 
hypotheses about policy making. Nor is the NFP an ideal type; the base set of 
assumptions is not intended to set parameters on what should be described as an NFP 
and what should not. The assumptions are intended to be departed from and modified as 
necessary depending on the analytical context -  but always in a documented and justified 
way.
An example of a policy process
From this point onwards there is a great deal of talk about the ‘policy formation 
process’ or ‘policy process’ and it is useful to have a simple example of a policy process 
to which definitions can be related. The example concerns a tribe in a dense jungle area 
that is entirely self subsisting and has had no contact with outsiders. For the first time 
ever this tribe is being attacked by outsiders. The need is established for a defence policy 
detailing how the village should be protected, which once decided can be implemented.
,48 See Chapter 6 for the many references to this variously defined term.
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The tribal elders and the tribal head’s male family get together and decide, after 
discussion and consultation with each other in various combinations, on a policy. This 
resulting policy is announced by the tribal head at a council of the whole tribe, and 
accepted by all concerned. The policy is that the tribe will build a lookout place in a tree 
in the centre of the village, a fence around the village and a group of tribes-people will, 
when instructed by the lookout, go to the area of danger. As the need develops for more 
complexity in the example, more detail will be given.
NFPs and the policy process
Black box
Often in studies of policy networks there is only one assumption made: that a network 
exists and forms part of the policy process. The literature review shows that this 
assumption regularly brings with it a lot of extra baggage which, although usually 
reasonable, is based on unstructured empirical observations (also known as common 
sense). This baggage is generally neither explicitly stated, nor examined for its validity or 
its applicability in the analysis. To avoid such a lack of rigour the first stage must be to 
ask what constitutes ‘the policy process’, to see where the network element fits in, to 
discover its function and, importantly, to find how it relates to other elements of the 
policy process including those that may be lost when we create a model of the process 
centred around the network. To examine the NFP’s part in the policy process we will use 
a ‘black box’ investigation. A black box is traditionally used in complex systems 
analysis where the mathematical function representing an unknown process is 
reconstructed from observed input streams and output streams. The reason we shall use it
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here is that this method ignores the process (for the moment) and concentrates only on 
the inputs and outputs.149
As the black box represents a process it needs, by definition, inputs and outputs; the 
black-box cannot ‘create’ anything, it is only a processing function. By describing the 
policy process in this way we are forced to distinguish between the inputs, the outputs 
and the characteristics of the black box process. Anything that represents a characteristic 
of the process, within our black box, we will ignore until the inputs and outputs are 
defined at which point we can ‘open’ the black box.
Tangible policy output
In studies of public policy the distinction is generally made between policy ‘outputs’ 
and policy ‘outcomes’. What can often be measured when testing a hypothesis about a 
policy process is the ‘outcome’, for example ‘outcomes’ might be a reduction in crime or 
shorter hospital waiting lists. As a simple outcome for the simple example of a policy 
process given at the start of the chapter, ‘no loss or damage to the village due to external 
attacks’ would clearly be a successful policy outcome. A less simple outcome for the 
simple example would be ‘fewer cattle lost’, but this requires more complex 
measurement than the previous measure, firstly as it needs the comparative ‘fewer’ to be 
compared to something and secondly because it opens the possibility that fewer cattle 
may have been lost due to some other reasons than the implemented defence policy. All 
of these phenomena I consider to be post-processed ‘outcomes’ compared to a tangible 
policy statement that is an ‘output’.
For analytical robustness, in an ideal case this tangible policy statement ought to be a 
written document with recognised status, an example of this in the UK government
149 But coincidentally we will see later that the process is indeed a ‘complex system’.
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context would be a White Paper - draft legislation to go before Parliament. It may be the 
case though that the tangible policy statement comes in a speech or in some other 
communication and in our simple example it is the speech that the tribal head makes at 
council.150 Whatever the tangible policy output, it must have validity through some 
means or another as being the agreed definitive version of a final (or possibly 
intermediate) statement from the NFP, otherwise we cannot be confident that we have 
found the output rather than merely an intermediate stage of the process within the black 
box. Such validity and output definition is context driven by the analytical framework 
being used in each case. Sometimes we may find that in order to explore hypotheses 
about a policy process ‘outcomes’ will need to be taken as proxy measures of the policy 
output. If this is the case it is important to be aware of their proxy status and that any 
‘outcomes’ as opposed to ‘outputs’ are affected by stages that take place outside the 
confines of the NFP. This happens because they have been implemented and 
implementation is a process that is outside the consideration of this thesis although it 
could potentially be handled by NFP ideas.
Having worked towards this point it must be noted that the definition of a ‘tangible 
output’ is a working assumption made in order to examine the relationship between 
NFPs and the policy process. The assumption exists only within this chapter and it is not 
an assumption or a defining feature of NFPs. Other alternatives could have been adopted 
within the theoretical construction here and we would have come out with the same 
shape to our conclusion. This ‘tangible policy output’, however, is the simplest 
assumption for the job in hand. In Chapter 7 there will be an examination of the relative 
merits of where to draw the line on outputs and outcomes. There is also a linked
150 It is not ideal that the word ‘tangible’ is used to describe a speech, however, the phrase ‘tangible policy output’ at 
least gets across well the concept of a definitive, crystallised and recognised output.
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discussion on the line between policy formation and implementation as this has 
implications for which actors should be included in an NFP model.
Defining inputs
When looking at the policy process as a black box, although it is immediately apparent 
that there must be a tangible output there do not seem to be at a first look any clear 
inputs. If we are deconstructing a process, the question is about how combinations of 
things (the inputs) are changed into a resultant combination (the output).151 It seems 
reasonable to suggest, since the ‘tangible policy output’ is a complex, (generally) 
compound idea written down or spoken, that the inputs are also ideas.
It is worth emphasising again at this point that the aim of this section is to justify the 
study of network structure and that some of the proposed mechanisms are not part of my 
NFP conception but rather part of a specific logical demonstration of the place of 
networks within the policy process. In this context, the concept of input ideas being 
processed to form an output is worth further consideration as it will give us a strong 
theoretical starting point from where we can ‘open’ the black box.
151 The process can be an 'identity 'process where the output is the same as the input (it is important to remember that 
here we are talking about a black-box -  there could have been intermediate stages in the black box where things had 
changed, but we only observe the inputs and the outputs) or a transformation process where the output is different 
to the input As we do not know what goes on in the black-box, an identity process must also be considered a 
transformation, albeit a trivial one.
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Memes
A theoretical framework exists for dealing with the transmission, mutation, 
reproduction, passing from human to human and storage of ideas. This framework was 
originally proposed as a genetic analogy consisting o f ‘cultural replicators’ or ‘memes’152 
(Dawkins 1989: 189-201). ‘Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes 
fashions, ways of making pots or building arches’ (Dawkins 1989: 192) and also, we can 
assume, fashions in policy-making such as ‘New Public Management’, privatisation or 
unilateral disarmament and, by extension, aggregated or individual policy ‘decisions’. 
Dawkins states that the ‘size’ of a meme is analogous to that of a gene, that is to say the 
size can be as small or large as need be in order that it has ‘sufficient copying-fidelity to 
serve as a viable unit of natural selection’ (Dawkins 1989: 195). Memes can be seen as 
the building blocks of more complex ideas, which are themselves memes if they possess 
the right attributes. Considered in this way memes can be introduced into the description 
of the policy process and, we will see, become more valuable later when we take on 
more of the quasi-genetic aspects of the analogy. In the example of the tribe, meme- 
inputs can be defined as the idea-elements that contributed to (or were excluded from) 
the policy; ‘danger can be seen from up a tree’, ‘welcome them in’, ‘barriers are 
protective’, ‘counter-attack their village’, ‘all defenders should go to the area of 
weaknesses’. Within the black box, input memes, that may or may not be seen in the 
final policy, are processed to form the output tangible policy statement. It is also 
interesting to compare this formulation to the concept of ‘ideas as “policy viruses’” 
(Richardson 2000: 1017) given the mention of a ‘policy soup’153 (bringing to mind the 
evolutionary ‘primal soup’) and the fact that viruses, in biological study, are a hothouse
152 The word ‘meme’ comes from the Greek jj.i(j.oo (mimos -  a mimic) and is pronounced to rhyme with ‘theme’.
153 Quoting Kingdon (1984)
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case of mutation and evolution. In his work though, Richardson unfortunately does not 
extend this further than a short discussion of the analogy.
Inside the policy process -  transmission and selection of ideas
The theoretical construct now encompasses concepts of outputs, inputs, memes and a 
black box. At this point we have established something important: apart from the 
tangible policy output we have not yet encountered any other variables that are normally 
considered when pursuing policy network studies. In such studies even the concept of an 
output is mentioned surprisingly rarely and then it is normally only observed in a post­
processed form or implicitly as an amorphous concept such as various ‘political events’ 
Konig and Brauninger (1998: 456) or ‘local economic development policy issues’ (John 
and Cole 1998: 142). We are now confident, thanks to our breakdown of the policy 
process, that all the other variables normally observed have so far remained hidden in the 
black box. We can next try to open the black box and consider what may be happening 
inside.
We have constructed a view of the policy making process where the only inputs are 
memes and the output is (usually) a more complex, compound meme. We must now 
construct a convincing mechanism of how the input is transformed into the output. A 
useful toolkit of definitions is available from a memetic analysis of policy making in 
Speel (1997). We will not construct an analysis similar to that of Speel but, rather, use 
the concept of memes to decide which are the important mechanisms and variables in the 
policy making process. Note also that everything within Speel’s glossary is built from 
Dawkin’s original, very simple principles of memes (Dawkins 1989: 189-201). It is 
better, however, to reference Speel as he saves us a lot of work by collecting the relevant 
first order definitions and constructing the second stage definitions that have relevance in
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the context of a policy process. For this exercise it is not necessary to agree with all the 
definitions in Speel and I have only adopted those that I consider to be correct and of 
value for the job in hand; these definitions are given as footnotes when the appropriate 
terms arise. The definitions may often seem to be simplistic or tautological, but it is 
important that they are listed as their meanings are quite specific.
Memes have already been described as ‘cultural replicators’154 which can be stored in 
retention systems155 such as written sources or in human minds. The process of 
replication156 involves moving from retention system to retention system. In a policy 
process, replication is when memes pass between human minds or, say, the 
photocopying of a publication whether or not it is read by a human (although this is 
somewhat of a dead end analytically). Our first look inside the black box suggests the 
input memes moving between their respective retention systems, but to model the policy 
process and arrive at the output in addition to pure replication there must also be a 
further process that takes us from a multitude of memes to the final complex output 
meme. We will now make a grand supposition that the ‘selective environment’157 that 
exists within a policy process, having memes as inputs and a (usually larger) meme in 
the form of a tangible policy statement as an output, is a ‘network that forms policy’. 
Random variation and natural selection 
Along with replication, any evolutionary explanation needs an element akin to the
154 ‘Replicator: a piece of data that is copied from retention system to retention system without too much alteration’ 
(Speel 1997) ‘Without too much alteration’ is somewhat unclear as a qualifier, but memes are inherently difficult to 
pin down in this sense as it is intuitively the case that when an idea is transferred it can, despite some slight changes, 
still be to all intents and purposes the same idea. This links in to Dawkin’s definition o f a meme given above where 
sufficient copying fidelity is only that necessary to allow the process o f natural selection to take place. There is 
ongoing discussion in the study of memes surrounding this issue, which arises from the difficulty in identifying the 
nature o f memes in the physical world.
155 ‘Retention system: a kind of memory where replicators are stored.’ (Speel 1997)
156 ‘Replication: the process where replicators are copied from one retention system to another.’ (Speel 1997)
157 ‘Selective Environment: the sum of the factors, or in other words causes, decisive on what memes are weeded out 
in a selective event or in a number of selective events.’ (Speel 1997)
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random mutation of genetic material that produces the competing genes in genetic 
evolution. We must split apart two ideas to examine the selective environment: the 
variation that produces competing ideas and the selection mechanism that allows the 
differential survival of some of these elements. I will deal with variation now and tackle 
selection later.
Anyone with experience of policy making in a political environment, or who has 
studied it in the field, will know that a failure of faith on a few simple points of theory 
takes us from a universe based on the intentional choices of rational actors to apparent 
randomness and arbitrary policies. Two of the main stumbling points that shake the faith 
are, firstly, whether actors are capable of translating their utility maximising aims (e.g. 
re-election or desire for low and stable inflation) to a set of preferences about a specific 
policy (e.g. childcare spending levels or making the Bank of England independent) and 
secondly, supposing that they are able to transfer their general aims to specific policy 
preferences, to what extent they can know how to intentionally adjust the policy to meet 
these preferences. This second point is a question of both mechanisms and extent 
typified by the question of inflation: does some given ‘lever’ change inflation in a given 
direction and if so how much should it be moved and in which direction to achieve the 
desired result? We must be prepared to see these failings in the context of a classic 
‘chaotic system’ where we see a world that is deterministic but unpredictable even for 
the simplest of equations and where tiny errors or slight adjustments will always have the 
potential to produce seemingly random outcomes.158 In other words we can have a 
deterministic mechanism that produces randomness and unpredictability.
It should also be noted that the random changes needed for evolution do not have to be
158 The famous ‘butterfly effect’ of chaos theoiy.
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great. Our theoretical lens focuses on the emergence of outcomes that are successful in 
their environment from a starting point of random variation. This reflects advances in 
mathematics where genetic algorithms are used to solve non-linear problems.
It is also possible to argue that, given the unfixed size/complexity of the meme and the 
fact that smaller memetic elements combine to produce larger policy meme elements, a 
model of random variation becomes even more acceptable.
Given these arguments I believe that variation in policy has a large random element 
and therefore we can justifiably make the assumption of random mutation so allowing us 
to use the evolutionary model.
Focusing on the meme and differential reproductive success
To explore and understand further this conception of selection we must focus on the 
meme and use a trick of evolutionary studies by moving our focus from an arbitrary 
sized unit, say a plant or a human, that is affected by the replicator to the replicator itself 
(be it meme or gene).
Given policy memes as the replicators we will adopt a point of view where they are 
competing to try and get into a policy output by sitting in, being replicated with more or 
less random variation and moving between the minds of actors in NFPs. One thing that is 
vital to understand in this context is the nature of memetic (and genetic) selection and 
evolution, which is that the memes (or genes) are of course not consciously evolving. 
However, we want to examine them as if they ‘mutate’ or ‘try to be successful’ to be the 
best to survive and we can do this because we only get to observe the successful memes 
in the result. In fact there are many mutations that fall by the wayside and only the 
mutations that are successful are observed in the result.
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I cannot put it better than Dawkins who says:
we must not think of genes as conscious, purposeful agents. Blind natural 
selection, however, makes them behave as if they were purposeful, and it has 
been convenient, as shorthand, to refer to genes in the language of purpose.
(Dawkins 1989:196)
Let us consider how an apparently intentional mechanism of policy making ought to 
be viewed in memetic evolution. In the analogous natural world, we can look at the 
success of the gene that affects a seed’s taste and smell, which leads birds to pick up and 
ingest the seed and propagate it elsewhere via excretion thus leading to the success of the 
gene. Given an environment (both living birds with given ‘tastes’ and physical territory 
with various earth and smells), the question of why or how the bird eats variously tasting 
seeds is completely outside our sphere of interest. The environment of intentions within 
the bird’s head is treated as a part of the environment and does not interfere with the 
natural selection argument applied to the seed’s genetic material. The question is one of 
which genetic taste/smell code is successful in being eaten in the prevailing, yet co- 
evolving, environment. Similarly, the intentional mechanism that may or may not exist 
in the human sphere of ideas is not under consideration, we are interested in the survival 
of certain policy memes in the prevailing, also co-evolving, environment including the 
ideas of what looks like a ‘tasty’ policy that rest inside the heads of our fickle policy 
actors who ingest and regurgitate ideas. Of course that is not to say that we are never to 
be interested in such issues; one of the advantages of adopting this view may be that we 
discover new ways of approaching questions of intention and interests, while noting that 
intentions and interests belong exclusively to humans or groups of humans and do not 
map onto the units of analysis that are explored here, which are ideas.
Natural selection of policy means that out of the random mutations occurring in the
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meme-pool, those best suited to survival in the environment of ideas will reproduce, that 
is, be replicated, and those less suited will not be replicated. The replication we are 
interested in is the passing from mind to mind of the actors in an NFP (no different from 
a bacteria passing from patch to patch of more or less ‘friendly’ dirt). The differential 
survival occurs as memes will survive to be replicated again if their ‘acceptability’ in the 
local environment of the receptor node exceeds a certain level. Otherwise the memes 
will be forgotten, rejected and not passed on further.
Two stage policy evolution
In other works discussing policy evolution (Dowding 2000; John 1999), the main 
focus is on alternative policies and their survival in the wider environment (the policy 
environment of the ‘real world’) where, as Dowding convincingly proposes, it would 
take decades or longer to see any true evolutionary effects. To put those discussions in 
the context of NFPs I wish to extend the work to propose a two-stage policy evolution, 
where stage 1 takes place in the NFP and stage 2 is, as with Dowding and John, in the 
real world.
We can theorise an evolutionaiy process taking place within an environment that is 
entirely meme-based, in contrast to the real world where policies exist in an environment 
of, say, escaping prisoners or missile attacks. This meme-based environment is an 
imperfect representation of the real world. It is mediated by the members of the network 
and compresses both physical and temporal dimensions into an environment of ideas. 
Like the real world environment, it evolves and changes with the policy memes but it 
does so in a different way to the real world because some parts of the meme-based 
environment are less sensitive to change than the real world while other parts will be
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more sensitive.159 Such a conception, where ideas have different roles is not unknown in 
literature on policy formation; both the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) in Sabatier 
(1993) and an analytical framework of ideas in foreign policy (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993) make similar classifications of ideas that work well with an environment view. 
The Table 5.1 summarises the types of ideas and the way they can be seen to fit into the 
environment.
159 Those parts o f the environment, for example, that are memes with ideological or dogmatic character will be less 
sensitive to change.
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Table 5.1 Where ideational concepts fit into the enviroment o f ideas
G+K World views Principled beliefs Causal beliefs
ACF (Sabatier 
and Jenkins- 
Smith 1999: 
121)
core: basic ontological 
/  normative beliefs
policy core: basic 
perceptions o f the problem
secondary aspects: 
ways and means, 
causes, evaluations
Very important in the 
mediation by the actor 
that creates the 
environment
May not be as important in 
mediation as they are more 
obvious than world views 
and hence there would be 
more care to avoid partisan 
or obviously biased 
interpretations of reality. 
‘Principled beliefs mediate 
between world views and 
particular policy 
conclusions; they translate 
fundamental doctrines into 
guidance for contemporary 
human action’ (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993: 9)
About cause-effect 
relationships 
‘strategies for the 
attainment of goals’ 
(Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993:10) 
This category is 
probably the mediated 
real world that affects 
the policy meme, 
rather than, like world 
views, determining 
this world.
Part of environment, 
but unlikely to be 
policy-meme-like.
Certainly a major feature 
of the environment. Strong 
possibility of contributing 
material to policy memes
Primary environmental 
factor on the policy 
meme. They are the 
rules that determine 
the simulation of the 
real world.
Veiy slow to co-evolve Will co-evolve along with 
policy memes.
Co-evolve fairly 
rapidly.
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The policy evolves within this simulated, distributed (held in several places) 
environment according to simulated situations foreseen by the actors. Hence, the policy 
is not evolving in the real world, but the effect of the real world is still seen albeit 
modified by the ideological beliefs of the actors, their understanding of the real policy 
world and the possibilities for the replication of memes depending on who has access to 
whom. The short discussion above on outputs and outcomes, for instance, shows a good 
example. The different views held about how outputs will eventually translate into 
outcomes and links that exist between those holding varying views will shape the 
environment.
The meme elements that survive and flourish in the NFP environment become part of 
the output policy meme that has ‘won the right’ to be implemented and so emerges into 
the real world. It now starts to evolve in a real world situation competing with other 
policy memes that are in a position to influence the real world and evolve through 
natural selection in such an environment (this is how Dowding (2000) sees policy 
evolution). If it is to compete again with other potential policies this can only be in the 
NFP environment, but, when another such round occurs, much here will have changed as 
a result of the actors’ observations of the real world stage of the evolution.
The benefits of the environment of ideas approach are not limited to confirming the 
relevance ofNFPs in the policy process; we can jump ahead and see that it will also be 
useful in formulating hypotheses. For instance, we could hypothesise that good policies 
will result from a situation where the NFP environment is a good representation of the 
real world, both in static content and dynamic change. Policy memes that are able to 
survive in an accurate simulation should also fare well in the real world. Another 
possible hypothesis would be that if the environment was rapidly changing and unstable
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then the successful memes that form the policy output would be catch-all, bland memes; 
nothing else could survive in such an environment.
Importance of network structure in the environment 
In addition to providing an interesting lens through which to view policy formation 
and to validate the role of NFPs, the concept of the environment has been introduced to 
show the importance of studying network structure as a prior step to testing more 
complex hypotheses about policy making. How does it show this? The environment is 
analogous to genetic selection on Earth, which operates in an environment that is an 
ever-changing mix of physical non-evolving (mountains, rivers, volcanoes and harsh 
winters) and biological gene-based co-evolutionary phenomena (such as trees, tigers and 
viruses). The evolving policy-meme is in an environment where the equivalent of the 
‘biological’ co-evolving elements are the memes that constitute the mediated real world 
and all the other ‘beliefs’, ‘ideologies’ and ‘ideas’ of the actors. The equivalent of the 
physical non-evolving160 elements, that constrain and lay ‘order’ over evolution, are the 
links, communication channels, isolated subgroups and other structural features of 
networks. Like the rivers, air and oceans that define which genetic types will meet and 
compete on earth, network structures define the dispersal possibilities by which memes 
can potentially interact or forever be kept apart within the environment. The NFP 
analysis that this thesis puts forward is an examination of the ‘physical geography’ of the 
ideas environment that is essential before the complex studies are undertaken on the 
evolution of the flora and fauna of ideas themselves. If Darwin had not comprehended 
the distinction between an ‘island’ and a ‘peninsula’ or if he had not bothered to note 
that the Galapagos were islands, his findings would have been incomplete. Even with the
,60The term non-evolving must be accurately inteipreted here. For something to ‘evolve’ does not merely mean that it 
changes. Therefore ‘non-evolving’ elements can change but they do not change by an evolutionary process, they 
change for non-evolutionary reasons.
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extensive data he collected on the evolving life forms, without understanding and 
analysing the physical constraints on evolution he would not have been able to draw his 
conclusions.
A base set of assumptions
We will now attempt to elaborate on the concept of an NFP, bearing in mind that our 
aims are to ensure that NFP analysis integrates with the existing literature, and to aim 
towards some unifying definitions.
The base set of assumptions is intended to be used as a reference point. The base set 
will unify all studies that use the concept of policy networks: such studies would be seen 
as having built further assumptions onto the base set or having relaxed some of the 
assumptions, always with explicit justification. Additionally it should be made clear in a 
study when the elements in this base set have been followed unchanged. In Chapter 6, 
the existing literature is examined in this way.
The base set of assumptions proposed in this chapter consists of six elements:
Element 1: the nodes in an NFP constitute a finite set (of 
actors) defined by a stated boundary condition
Element 2: a link between two nodes is defined as either a 
binary (1,0) or valued relation, the set of relation- 
types is defined by a stated boundary condition
Element 3: the human individual is the node (called the actor)
Element 4: the node is indivisible
Element 5: actors have no links to themselves (A„=0 for all i)161
161 See below for an explanation of this formal condition.
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Element 6: each actor in an NFP is associated with a set of 
actor attributes
In view of the development of analysis techniques that will be carried out in later 
chapters, this section also introduces some mathematical notation and for completeness 
introduces some formal restrictions.
Element 1: the nodes in an NFP constitute a finite set of actors 
defined by a stated boundary condition
Networks consist of nodes and links. When unpacking the policy process above it was 
stated that replication and selection of memes occurs within a distributed environment 
mediated by ‘actor minds’. Taking on this idea, a starting point in discussing an NFP is 
that nodes represent the actors who possess the conscious minds capable of mediating 
the real world to produce the environment and the links represent a relation of some kind 
between these actors both to create the distributed environment and for the replication of 
the policy memes. In most studies, the notion of attributing actors as nodes in the 
network based analysis of policy making is empirical rather than theoretical; actors are 
observed, they are seen to operate in ‘networks’ and then the definition of a network is 
built from these observations. In contrast, by deconstructing the policy process, it is clear 
that a transmission network with selective nodes must exist and that it is reasonable to 
assume that the nodes in this network are actors, i.e. the nodes are capable of and exhibit 
the ability to ‘act’, as we know the nodes are not merely ‘storage’ (books, or computer 
memory). The definition of what the actors are comes in element 3.
In defining the actors, some formal conditions must be stated as this will make the 
handling and analysis of data easier in due course. The actors constitute a finite set V= 
(1, 2 ,..., «}, but as alluded to in the example of the policy process, where every member
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of the tribe (the universe) is a possible actor, theoretically there is nothing to prevent this 
set comprising every actor in the universe. Unless explicit justification is given, studies 
must state and justify a boundary condition on the membership of V. It is conceivable 
that there is an inherent upper limit on the numbers of actors that can be justifiably seen 
as constituting an NFP due to the ability of actors to meaningfully interact (Marin and 
Mayntz 1991a: 17). I contend that even if this is true then the ‘inherent’ boundaiy 
condition can still be explicitly stated in another way, say on the basis of strength of 
relations, and that in many studies the natural upper limit (if it exists) would be 
impractical as a boundary definition of the actors in the NFP.
The boundary definition for actors 
It is vital that the boundary definition for actors is considered very carefully and 
explicitly stated. Unacceptable treatments include common sense, the availability of data 
(Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983) or trusting to luck. Missing actors in the 
network can invalidate the conclusions of sensitive analysis and this is especially true 
when we take into account the non-linear aspects of networks, but the researcher has to 
find the actor inclusion boundary that will make an analysis manageable whilst retaining 
confidence in the analysis. There may be no satisfactory solution to this as availability of 
data will, of course, force a limit but the important point is that data availability is not an 
ideal boundary condition, rather, it is a practical limitation. Sensitivity considerations are 
more than likely impossible to resolve, but to be forewarned should mean that one can be 
forearmed to some extent even if this only means a better critical evaluation of results. 
As will be seen in Chapter 6 there are many ways of defining the boundary for actors in 
an NFP context, most of which are never clearly stated in the literature, reflecting the 
observation that ‘network analysts have, to date, been relatively mute on the matter of
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boundary definition’ (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983: section 1). The relative 
merits of different approaches to framing the actor inclusion boundary will be discussed 
further in Chapter 8 on applied techniques. What is very clear, even at this theoretical 
stage, is that the actors to be considered must be selected from the universe and the 
boundary condition that is used to achieve this must be stated.
Element 2: a link between two nodes is defined as either a binary (1, 
0) or valued relation, the set of relation-types is defined by a stated 
boundary condition
Once nodes (actors) are defined, the next element in an NFP is the links. This is even 
less of a deductive leap than the definition of nodes, given that actors are the nodes and 
we are talking about transmission of memes it is simple to propose that the links consist 
of relations between the actors. Such links must represent relations clearly associated 
with two specific actors which have the potential to result in the transmission of memes; 
they do not represent such ‘links’ as ‘being in the same club’. They may be directed 
relations such as giving information (comprising direction from giver to receiver), or 
symmetrical relations such as having a telephone conversation with someone (initiating a 
telephone conversation, in contrast, would be directed). For directed relations, we can 
define a simple variable that would represent a link from actor i to an actor j  by setting 
A,y=l and setting the variable to zero for no interaction. For symmetrical relations an 
additional condition must be that A,/=Ay, whatever the value of the variable. Relations 
can also have an associated value; examples are ‘importance of information given on a 
scale from 1 to 5’ or ‘length of telephone conversation’. In such cases A,y would contain 
this value rather than a (1, 0) flag.
134
Ideas, environment and assumptions
Types of relations
Leaving aside the wider issue that all unitary properties can be expressed as relations 
(discussed under element 6 below), if a relation is to fit in with the meme 
conceptualisation then it must have the potential to result in the replication of memes. 
This means for example that ‘having a telephone conversation’ must certainly be an 
allowable relation, but ‘resource dependency’ would not appear to fit into this category. 
Resource dependency, while it undoubtedly associates one actor with another, is not a 
relation in the sense of ‘exchanging information’. However ‘resource dependency’ is a 
major theme within the literature and as such is worthy of further consideration, it is 
certainly a key explanatory factor in testing hypotheses, but it is not, in this definition, a 
relational link. I assert that a network of ‘resource dependency’ links is not a ‘network 
that forms policy’. It is a related method of representation that can explain the constraints 
on the actors within the ‘selective environment’ of an NFP that uses the meme based 
explanation. Resource dependency, in the context of NFPs, can be seen as a conceptual 
synonym for ‘power’, that is to say that if I am ‘resource dependent’ on you then, to the 
extent of that dependency, you have ‘power’ over me. Both of these are dispositional 
properties, taking their reference from things that may not happen. In a similar way that, 
for a cup, ‘fragility’ takes its reference from, but is not related to the event of, breakage 
(Dowding 1995: 4). In order to represent ‘resource dependency’ (at first glance, possibly 
easier than ‘power’) we could try to map the ‘resources’ associated with each actor and 
‘their resource dependencies’, but how would we do this? It is difficult to see how 
resource dependency, as a dispositional phenomenon, can be directly measured and so 
for an empirical investigation, we would have to look at either only the resources of each 
actor (not the dependencies) or the realised exchange of resources. These resources are
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‘information, expertise, trust’ (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 41). All of these, no matter 
how abstract the ‘resource’ (e.g. trust), bring us back to measuring relations that involve 
the transmission of memes. Such an empirical method would still leave the resource 
dependency structure with a measurement problem in that actual dependencies only exist 
in a probabilistic, potential or theoretical scenario whereas in reality, some proportion of 
this potential is realised in exchange. Observing three ‘resource exchanges’ between 
actor A and B while observing six between A and C, does not tell us very much about 
the ‘resource dependency’ -  except for what has been realised of it and as we do not 
know what fraction has been realised we are left with little knowledge. Conversely 
though, it is equally apparent that measuring the exchanges may leave us with a gap in 
our understanding; the National Association of Pension Funds, for example, does not 
have to give a devastating press conference in order to affect policy. Merely the potential 
for holding the conference needs to exist and be transmitted to those who fear such a 
thing. There is clearly theoretical value in ‘resource dependency’, particularly when 
considering options for hypothesis testing and this shadow structure will be dealt with 
further under element 6 below and as it arises later.
Even given the ‘meme replication’ constraint there are a massive number of relations 
that could be used within an NFP analysis and so, again, a boundary definition must 
stated. This restriction and choice for relations is overlooked as an analytical question 
even more than the boundary definition for actors but it is very important if the design of 
a study gives rise to a large set of potential interactions that must be reduced to 
manageable proportions.
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Element 3: the human individual is the node (called the actor)
In element 1 we defined the node as the actor (i.e. the node acts to filter memes) 
leading to the need for an additional assumption about what the node is. From the 
literature we see a great deal of variation in assumptions concerning the actors within an 
NFP. Much like a Russian doll, the possibilities are contained one within the other, the 
largest doll seen is organisations (sometimes confusingly referred to as institutions) and 
within that are the other dolls, described more or less easily; within an organisation such 
as government there are distinct sub-organisations such as ministries or departments, 
interest groups may be split into functional teams and, for individuals, two or three may 
gather together to influence policy. All these different types of ‘group actors’ form the 
ever smaller layers of the Russian doll, at the centre of which is the individual actor. In 
order to create an element for the base assumptions we need to decide which of these 
options is the ‘lowest common denominator’, can be seen as a ‘basic unit’ and requires 
least recourse to context driven justification. It will be seen in Chapter 6 that the existing 
literature shows a predominance of organisations or ‘group actors’, but this often appears 
to be a pragmatic decision taken for analytical or theoretical tidiness. It is frequently the 
case that the description of the theoretical basis of the study tends to suggest an 
assumption that individuals are the actors, but despite this a decision is taken to use 
organisations as the unit of observation, sometimes with reasonable explanation and 
sometimes not. What is needed in this base set of assumptions is a reasonable starting 
point that is justified and, when necessary, can be departed from if strong reasons are 
given from empirical or theoretical evidence. Departures can also be based on an appeal 
to pragmatism and methodological necessity, but if this is the case then studies should 
put forward first of all the theoretical ideal (and whether this follows this base set of
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assumptions or not) only then explaining and justifying the departure on pragmatic 
grounds. The idea that underpins the whole of the base set of assumptions must be 
stressed very strongly here: it is not a prescription or an ideal type. It is a unifying 
framework that can be departed from, but its existence should impose a framework on 
every study and force an explanation of any alternative assumptions that are adopted.
There are only two scenarios where the use of organisations as nodes seems inherently 
justifiable; firstly, if for every institution there is only one conduit for information, 
influence and communication (a ‘gateway’ node) or, the alternative scenario, if the 
replacement of one individual from the institution for another will make no difference to 
the dynamics of the network. Both of these scenarios seem highly unlikely and if they do 
occur they could be stated as justification for an additional assumption that the study will 
neither show nor consider the internal geometry of the organisations but instead take 
them as the nodes. Care is always needed though as it is not certain that individuals from 
the same institution will share interests to the extent that they are, statistically speaking, 
significantly similar.162 Furthermore, whatever interests are variously held in the name of 
the organisation rather than personally, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963: 
126) suggests that there is no guarantee of a consistent aggregation of these interests to 
assign to the group actor. A further justification arises from the complex and nonlinear 
nature of NFPs. One of the main consequences of nonlinearity is that results are highly 
sensitive to initial conditions and a veiy small linear change in local structure (perhaps 
within an organisation) can be proven to have a dramatic impact at a global level, that is 
to say the whole structure of the NFP (Watts 1999: 517). This suggests that, without 
convincing evidence, it would be dangerous to assume that the structure of the network
162 On a similar point see hypothesis 2 set up in Chapter 7 and tested in Chapter 9.
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can be simplified by aggregating the actors within organisations. This view is certainly 
true in the scientific policy making community where individual reputation is important 
and it suggests that considering individuals becomes more important as policy making 
moves more into every area of life, leading to the need for more specialised knowledge 
and increasingly scientific approaches to policy making (Jansen 1991: 142; Kenis and 
Schneider 1991: 36; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 118). Added to this is the view 
that organisations (government, NGOs, corporations) are seen as being ‘plural not 
singular’ (Richardson and Jordan 1979: 25) and that if large organisations need to be 
broken down into parts, we can never be sure that we have stopped in the right place. 
Again, we must have strong empirical or theoretical reasons for stopping anywhere 
above the individual. Given this ‘atomistic’ view, with the individual as the atom, it 
seems justifiable to propose, unless evidence is forthcoming to the contrary, that we must 
base an NFP on individuals and let network analysis show which are the natural groups 
of association within the network.
Element 4: the node is indivisible
Within the complex business of policymaking and politics there is the potential for 
individuals to be divided; several perspectives suggest that different roles can exist for 
each actor. Under element 4 we are rejecting the possibility that each ‘role’ should be a 
separate node in the NFP. There are several reasons that make a scenario where ‘role’ is 
the actor analytically shaky as well as impractical. The practical reasons are the quickest 
to state and accept; supposing that roles are considered as nodes, then measuring 
‘exchanges’, ‘dependencies’ or any relation within a single individual represented as
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separate nodes causes problems. Attempts at asking how regularly someone uses 
information gained in one role within the work of other roles is fraught with difficulty 
and assessing the dependencies of the functioning of one role in relation to another is 
practically impossible. Another reason to reject ‘role’ as the node is that an important 
strand of network analysis is the examination of actors’ ‘role equivalence’ (Knoke and 
Kuklinski 1982: 59; Mitchell 1992). Since using ‘roles’ as nodes requires an a priori 
assumption of the roles an individual plays it invalidates such an approach and hence 
conflicts with some of the general usage of network theory. Other literature on roles 
suggests that subdividing the actor node into constituent roles in some way would mark a 
different level of analysis altogether from that suggested by NFP analysis.163 In a paper 
linking role theory to embeddedness of behaviour in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games 
(Montgomery 1998) it emerges that, at present, role theory suggests the adoption of 
behaviour that constitutes a ‘role’ is a result of the circumstances and history of 
engagement. For example, sometimes an actor may play the ‘diplomat role’ but then as 
relations progress switch into the ‘bully role’ or, during initial rounds of policy making, 
an actors embedded behaviour may reflect the role of ‘party official’ before later starting 
to act and react as a ‘cabinet minister’. In the sense of embedded behaviour, NFPs cannot 
operate on roles in this way; at a micro level every actor will reside in one of their roles 
(in this role-theoretic sense) at the time of each interaction leading to the establishment 
of a measurable relation link. However, the NFP, as a map of network relations is 
aggregated over time and so this distinction of switching between roles is lost. A 
dynamic NFP analysis would be capable of reintroducing such a theoretical approach 
where one of the variables affecting the structures over time is each role that is displayed.
,63 Although this does not preclude such an analysis from being valuable, merely outside the scope of this paper.
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A dynamic view is a different level of analysis outside the scope of this thesis, but it is 
one of the reasons for overturning this element and suggests an interesting line of 
development. The individual should therefore be considered indivisible. Under element 
6, below, and further in the construction of potential hypotheses in Chapter 4, we will 
consider further the network analytic method of ‘structural equivalence’ and the 
possibility that what are commonly thought of as ‘roles’ are in fact ‘labels’ and may be 
aligned with or conflict with the ‘role’ revealed by network analysis.
Element 5: actors have no links to themselves (A/y=0 for all r)
With the individual as the actor, as defined in element 3, and no subdivision of the 
individual, as defined in element 4, element 5 proposes that we should not represent any 
link from the node to the node itself. This means under our notation that A,/=0 for all i. 
Doreian gives a footnote stating that this is ‘by convention’ (Doreian 1992: footnote 4), 
but it is instructive to illustrate what this convention implies. We are saying that what an 
actor knows and does alone need not be represented or considered. Chinese walls within 
the mind of a civil servant or the writing of memos to oneself do not count in our 
analysis.
Element 6: each actor in an NFP is associated with a set of actor 
attributes
At this point, with the five elements, an NFP can be analysed using unadapted 
mathematical graph theory or simple geometrical analogies. As students of Euclid know, 
‘a point is that which has no part’ (Euclides and Todhunter 1882) and in graph theory the
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only quality a node has is its relations with other nodes, essentially the set of links, A. 
The actor members of V are, under the elements so far stated, ordinal and have no 
dimension. In the real world, however, we know that our ‘actors’ are not like graph 
theory nodes. Almost every study that will be discussed in Chapter 6 uses in its analysis 
something more than the set of relations. We can define a variable X« for actor i, where s 
is one of a set of k ‘actor attributes’ we have chosen to measure. Before we discuss the 
possibilities of what these actor attributes may represent and how aspects of the literature 
relate to them it is important to understand how they are additional to the ‘pure network’ 
of elements 1-5 and where they fit into such a scheme.
Distinction between network m easures and actor attributes 
One of the things that can be most confusing when using networks in analysis is if a 
clear distinction is not made between ‘attributes and relations’ (Knoke and Kuklinski 
1982: 10) and, more specifically, between actor attributes, network characteristics and 
the measures that reflect the actors position in the network. These distinctions are 
absolutely essential and hold the key to understanding the significance of what writers 
call the ‘meso-level’ without being entirely clear about what they mean. Understanding 
is rendered more complicated by the fact that, theoretically, ‘all unitaiy properties can be 
defined in binary terms but not vice versa’ (Dowding, 1991: 15) and, hence, we must be 
very careful about why we are treating some observations as unitary ‘attributes’ and 
others as binary ‘relations’. Dowding is right that things appearing at first sight to be 
unitary properties, such as ‘level of education’, ‘ideological position’ or ‘income’ are in 
fact binary in that they only have meaning in relation to other things, especially other 
people in the network that we are analysing and this implies some kind of relation 
between the two actors being compared. What we must do to escape this problem is to
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realise that the structure that we are interested in is limited to particular kinds of binary 
relations that, as discussed under element 2, result in the transmission of memes. Any 
other structure relating actors to each other vis-a-vis, say, income is an entirely different 
entity that does not lend itself to such analysis.164 Rather than using a relational 
expression for such comparisons they are better expressed as unitary attributes which are 
then drawn in alongside the network’s structural variables in a statistical analysis.
The next stage is to appreciate that a network has many measures that belong to itself 
as a whole: the number of nodes, the density, the number of distinct subgroups within the 
network and many other constructed measures. We can define a set of network measures, 
say, G, where a particular measure G/=ft(A), that is to say the network measures are 
functions of A, the set of all relations and functions, and they are a function of this set 
alone. These measures describe the whole network.
As discussed above, an actor has many attributes such as their political views, club 
membership or salary level. These we defined as a set X of actor attributes that stay the 
same for the actor irrespective of network conditions, or even if there is no network. 
What can cause some confusion, but should also be the key to the most fruitful analysis, 
is that there are other things we can say about each individual actor that are dependent on 
the whole network. To put it another way, some network measures can be associated 
with specific actors. Examples of such measures are ‘the subgroups of which the actor is 
a member’ or ‘closeness of the actor’s nearest neighbour’. It is vital not to confuse these 
with ‘actor characteristics’ as they are distinct mid not part of set X. They form another 
set that can be represented by the expression
164 One good reason is that, assuming that everyone is being compared to everyone else, the network structure is trivial. 
A more complex structure destroys the comparative basis; if  some of the, say, income measures are comparable 
within subset^ and others only in subset B, then conventional statistical analysis is ruined.
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Ar=fi(A,/)s
where A is the complete set of relations for all actors in V of which i is a member. Dit 
is measure t for actor z, and f,() is the function to calculate the measure. They are like 
network measures G, in that they are functions solely of the set of links and that set only. 
So, to go back from the formula [Ar=fi(A,z)] to English, as Dit is a function of A and z, it 
is a ‘network measure’, it varies as the network varies, but ‘belongs’ to actor z. It can be 
shown that G is a subset of D because G, are in fact Dit that are invariant over all actor 
members of V. In mathematical notation this means f(A,z)=f(A) for all z. In other words 
we can in fact attribute each ‘whole network’ measure of G to the actors in V but 
invariant for all actors. Knoke indirectly refers to the D set, including G, as ‘relational 
measures’; he defines these along with ‘attributes’ (X) and ‘relations’, (A).
The need for actor attributes
Whether to include the set X in the base set of assumptions or to exclude it is a matter 
of degree. All models simplify the real world and consequently all should state as clearly 
as possible the justification for dropping the elements that lead to the simplification. It 
seems reasonable then to include the existence of the X set of actor attributes as an 
element of the base set of assumptions. This does not mean, in any way, a rejection of 
analysis using models that do not take account of such ‘actor attributes’ but, if a study 
concentrates on the element 2 type ‘relations’ alone allowing pure graph theoretic 
analysis, justification must be given for why the X set is not considered in the modelling. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that actor attributes will be brought in on the basis of 
theory and excluded on the basis of testing. For instance, it could be hypothesised that 
the rank or hierarchical position of each actor is not a significant factor in an NFP
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analysis. This variable can be incorporated into the analysis as an actor characteristic and 
if the same conclusion can be drawn from the model with or without this variable then it 
can safely removed from the actor characteristic set. If it turns out to be significant, then 
it remains and the significance needs to be explained.
Roles: where do they fit in?
As mentioned previously, the question of roles can be approached from a number of 
different angles. Within network analysis there is a line of inquiry called structural 
equivalence which uses an analytical method that groups together actors with similar 
patterns of relationships. The link from this network analytical method to ‘role’ is 
illustrated in a sociological network study of a tailor’s shop (Mitchell 1992) where the 
findings show that the structural equivalence measure correlates most closely to the 
occupation of the worker. This concept, combined with the discussion on roles under 
element 4, suggests that what we might have considered ‘roles’ (‘civil servant’, 
‘lobbyist’, ‘minister’, etc.) are in fact labels. A network study can determine whether 
those actors that share a similar ‘role label’ are structurally equivalent or not. The ‘role 
label’ version of a role is clearly an actor attribute and is often one of the first pieces of 
data that is looked at in an unstructured analysis. To put this actor attribute alongside the 
constructed ‘network measure’ of structural equivalence for an actor is clearly a valuable 
comparison that, given a construct of the NFP according to the elements above, can be 
implemented. The complication of certain actors having multiple labels should not 
confound such an analysis, indeed it is conceivable that given the multiplicity of labels 
likely to be seen that an analysis would not fully enumerate all possible labels, but define
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the major ones and group others, leaving the multiple labelled actors to be assigned 
according to the rules that are used in such a classification.
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VI. Existing literature viewed through the NFP 
lens
No method, framework or theoretical approach should stand distanced from other 
works in the same field. Literature that uses similar techniques, makes similar claims or 
opposes the interpretation of key shared observations must be somehow tied into the 
NFP approach.
There are many examples of ‘policy network’ literature summaries, both those that 
stand alone and within wider works, which give different viewpoints and are carried out 
to different levels of detail. Some of the works, for example a ‘dictionary entry’ (John 
2000) or an ‘intellectual histoiy’ (Thatcher 1998), give a relatively value-free sprint 
through the central literature and the development of the varying strands, but neither 
analysis nor criticism are their main aims, so it is through clarification and summaiy that 
they help to classify or synthesise ideas. Other authors present a literature review that, 
while some are less comprehensive and complete than others, act as a preface to the 
development of a specific viewpoint of where policy network studies have taken us and 
where they should be going next (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Borzel 1998; Dowding 1995; 
2001; Kassim 1994; Pappi and Henning 1998). What comes through from all of these 
examinations is the sheer diversity of the views that have been taken on the subject. In 
the context of the research proposed here a simple literature review is superfluous, 
especially as this has been done effectively, as mentioned above, by others. What is 
needed is to revisit the literature in order to identify explicit or implicit assumptions in 
the works and to summarise the analytical approaches taken.
Networks are both a mathematical and a natural phenomenon. At the very start of any 
treatment it is important to distinguish between the two. The mathematical concept of
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networks is usually very rigorous. Depending on the field (information processing, flow 
analysis, neural networks, communications networks, sociological networks) the 
mathematical method will vaiy and, unbeknown to those who select ‘off the shelf, there 
is a dazzling array of analytical methods available. The natural phenomenon is 
necessarily messier and less well defined than the mathematical and exists in a multitude 
of settings. If any kind of mathematical analysis or modelling is to be done of a naturally 
occurring network, a mathematical network description analogous to the natural network 
must be found. This is a very basic step and not always easy as mathematicians are rarely 
experts in the applications and experts in the applications rarely have the wider overview 
of the mathematics.
We try to remember what almost everyone else seems to forget in ever more refined 
debates over emphasis, usage and value of differing approaches: networks are important 
and we can surely have no reason not to describe them better, know the best ways to 
construct or imagine them and how to best describe the reality or the concept.
Across the whole range of literature, from policy networks merely taken as a vague 
metaphor to where a complex analytical method is built from a mathematical graph- 
theoretic approach, assumptions are explicitly or implicitly, always built on the one idea: 
there is a network here. It is this idea that links together all the studies examined in this 
chapter and we will see that the way in which it is dealt with varies in rigour, fidelity and 
intellectual treatment. Often the network world view is adopted without any explicit 
justification, explanation or discussion of the assumptions that underlie it. What follows 
in this chapter is a brief discussion of some of the wider literature that sets a useful 
context in which my approach to NFPs sits followed by an organised examination of the 
existing literature on policy networks. The former simply relates relevant work on policy
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making to the ideas in this thesis while the latter will extract (when explicit) or construct 
(when implicit) the assumptions on which the various studies are based. One other major 
oversight that is found in much of the literature is the failure to explain why the reality is 
being modelled using a given technique, remembering here the comment made in the 
introduction that ‘traditional case study’ is also being seen as an analytical technique. In 
much of the literature it is not made clear how, and if, the method used relates to the 
network world view and frequently the distinction between variables that are network 
exogenous and network endogenous is lacking. As well as trying to extract the 
underlying assumptions about NFPs, the method of analysis will be summarised and a 
critique will be offered of the appropriateness of the method in relation to the aim of the 
study and the underlying assumptions.
To add structure and an additional dimension to the analysis of the literature, as well 
as facilitating the basic aims of the examination of literature, a simple categorisation of 
the studies is proposed. The categorisation is related to the method of analysis and so 
also facilitates the comparison of methods and their appropriateness. In terms of the 
purpose of this chapter apart from a review, it has already been stated that the set of base 
assumptions, along with descriptions of how studies adopt or diverge with the base set, 
can provide an anchor point and, in doing so, unify the diverse literature. As this chapter 
progresses some key points of major divergence are also addressed to see how they lie 
with the theoretical viewpoint outlined previously.
How can works on policy network theory be classified?
Some of the existing literature reviews have already taken the step of making attempts 
at categorisation. Kenis and Schneider offer a six-way breakdown of ‘applications of 
network analysis in the study of policy networks’:
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*1. A normative or prescriptive use where an “objective need” is expressed in a 
‘prescriptive network’ and this is then compared to an existing network for 
goodness of fit (and implicitly to detect structural failures in the existing network).
2. The creation of network characteristics (the ones mentioned are graph 
theoretic measures) and the cross-network comparison of these between 
nations and or policy domains.
3. The construction and testing of formal models of the policy making, process.
Here network analysis is the “operationalization” of a formal model. The 
information required is collected, and the parameters needed for a model are 
constructed using network analytic methods.
4. To test hypotheses of theories on policy making where they include structural 
propositions. Also to discover other empirical, especially hybrid, forms of 
governance
5. To construct environments for applying game theoretic techniques and for 
measurement in game theoretic models.
6. To examine over time the dynamics of policy formation in terms of structural 
transformation or stability.’
(Kenis and Schneider 1991: 44-46)
Borzel (1997) defines two two-way splits. She identifies both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis and suggests that they do not compete, but are complementary. She 
also identifies use of policy networks as ‘a typology of interest intermediation’ and as ‘a 
specific form of governance’. Within the first main group she sub-classifies those studies 
that use the networks as an analytical tool and those who go for a ‘more ambitious’ route 
of their typology system having an explanatory power. The second main group is broken 
down into those, again, who use networks as an analytical concept to highlight 
governance structure and those who are prepared to take the view that the underlying 
social structures of the network are more important than the characteristics of individual 
actors.
Borzel (1998), also adopted by Bevir and Rhodes (2003), distinguishes between 
studies that interpret networks as a form of governance, which are subdivided into power 
dependence types and rational choice types, and networks as interest intermediation 
which leads often to typologising.
For the purposes of this paper, I propose a classification that fits my purposes better 
than these views, although it does not contradict them. In the context of the research
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proposed here a suitable framework emerges identifying three streams in the literature. 
The three streams are:
(a) describing or looking at the world in network terms,
(b) networks used as an organisational framework for pursuing an analytical question 
and
(c) the use of a network ‘world view’ as the basis of an analytical method.
Typical type (a) studies would be based on descriptions using network terms, but 
would not use networks to organise their observations. Under categorisation (b) come 
numerous chapters in edited books that use the pattern of seeing a network and then 
building a case study around this, referring only to the network again in the conclusion. 
Type (b) work also includes what might be statistical or other mathematical analysis 
where the network has been used to arrange the data rather than the network structure 
being a source of the data. Type (c) work essentially promotes networks from the level of 
a framework that organises observations to an inherently essential part of the analysis. 
Thus, type (c) studies identify a network and from this build up an analytical technique 
often, but not always, using graph theory ideas. The key factor is that if the network view 
had not been adopted the analysis technique would not have existed. Note the subtle 
differentiation between the use of networks as a framework to pursue another analytical 
method and building up from the basis of the network world view towards an analytical 
method. Any papers that deal exclusively with the theoretical aspects of debates about 
networks in political science are excluded unless they come packaged with some analysis 
of cases or are exceptionally relevant in some other way.
Note that the three-way classification ignores the qualitative-quantitative distinction 
(as does Borzel, once she has proposed it) and on the other classifications that she gives,
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the ‘typology of interest intermediation’ implies more than simply an assumption of a 
network world view -  it implies that the network must at least have been used as the 
organisational basis for an analysis (typologising) but, dependent on the strength of the 
link between the typology and network characteristics, there may not be the requirements 
for a type (c) study. This is true even in her subsection where the typology is seen to have 
explanatory power. The second group of ‘a specific form of governance’ tends to suggest 
more of a type (a) study, this is especially true of her first sub-category where networks 
are used as an analytical concept to highlight governance structures, they are unlikely to 
go further, whereas if the governance aspect is coming from a belief that network 
structures are more important than actor characteristics it is quite possible that we will be 
dealing with a type (b) or (c) study.
The first section of literature, as already mentioned above, is not classified in this way. 
It looks at context setting literature for NFPs that is vital to the ideas that were used to 
develop the concept.
Context setting literature
Richardson and Jordan
In Richardson and Jordan (1979), R+J hereafter, policy making in Britain in the 
immediate period up to the book’s completion in 1978 is examined. It is a tribute to the 
quality of the work and an affirmation of the wider view of networks that so much of the 
text is relevant to this study. R+J put forward the importance of groups in policy making 
as a vital phenomenon that can be seen to impede the development of policies in ‘a 
purely “constitutional” manner’ (R+J: 4). Early on, the importance both of individuals, 
suggesting a broad indication of the Element 3 assumption, and an understanding of the 
Element 6 endogenous variables is seen in the explanation of ‘overlapping membership’
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(R+J: 9). This concept suggests built in checks exist on group’s behaviour resulting from 
the fact that the individuals within groups are also likely to be members of other groups 
and bring these interests with them (the example given is that a Parent Teacher 
Association will have members who are Catholics or members of the local chamber of 
commerce) or that group pressure can be intensified by such overlapping members. 
When discussing the splits within groups R+J state that ‘it is important to note the 
considerable importance of internal group politics.’ The first sign in their analysis of the 
importance of network relations or positions, as opposed to the generally accepted 
narrative language model, is a reference to Latham’s idea that the ‘officiality’ of 
government actors, compared to interest groups, may be no more than a label and hence 
not instrumentally different (R+J: 15).165 They also make an interesting reference to 
studies of pressure group politics in the Soviet Union where most of the groups were in 
some way official. This supports the view of this thesis that NFPs exist everywhere, it is 
the typologising of networks followed by the attachment of the term ‘policy network’ (or 
some similar expression) that has led to the narrower view that we will see in other 
literature. Reference is made to governments, pressure groups, etc. being ‘group actors’ 
(R+J: 17) but this is done to align them with other more typical pressure groups rather 
than to suggest that in an analysis we should consider groups as the units of observation 
under Element 3. In an analysis of policy making models, R+J come to the conclusion 
that from Lindblom’s incremental theory of the policy process the idea of ‘mutual 
adjustment’ of policies to satisfy the various group actors is a plausible view of reality. 
This corresponds well with the policy evolution model put forward in the previous 
chapter.
R+J argue for the view that ‘government is plural and not singular’ (R+J: 25). They
165 See Chapter 7 for a hypothesis that tackles a similar theme.
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back this up with many examples of British cabinet and interdepartmental competition 
for budget resources; sometimes this is characterised by Departments fighting alongside 
their ‘sponsoring groups’ and the Minister becoming a spokesman for the Department 
and their ‘clients’, sometimes a Minister’s political scruples forcing an attitude of 
opposition towards some of the Department and their sponsoring groups. Again this 
suggest that the Element 6 ‘actor labels’ are something to be tested for their actual effect 
in policy outputs rather than them being unquestionably seen as part and parcel of a 
narrative based model. This direction is reinforced by R+J’s position against the policy 
making process being ‘a process played out between the electorate, parliament and 
cabinet’ (R+J: 41). It is shown that many of the highest level policy decisions are taken 
by tight networks of key senior actors and the institutional settings of electoral wishes 
and parliamentary will, expressed through a party majority, often have little impact on 
the policy making process. ‘Ongoing problems and constraints force successive 
governments into very similar policy positions... agreement will be sought within the 
community of groups’ (R+J: 43). An osmosis and breaking down of barriers between 
government, politics and groups is observed, with former civil servants turning up in the 
groups (and, nowadays with the Blair government, party and group figures turning up in 
the higher echelons of the British civil service). R+J usefully point out that consultation 
is not only a process of inclusion, but value driven. These values emerge in the rating of 
outside groups, some having intimate meetings with ministers and civil servants, some 
being consulted occasionally at lower levels and others who may just be copied in on 
documents and perhaps invited to comment in writing. R+J also note that the civil 
servants often play a key role in these processes due to their being charged with day to 
day operations in detailed legislative matters and, hence, the need to obtain technical
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assistance from outsiders when breaking new ground in policy making. The particular 
exclusion of parliament is highlighted when examining the 1973 introduction of VAT to 
Britain (R+J: 46). These early views on the inapplicability of the Westminster model 
support the views of this thesis that NFPs are not a new or limited phenomenon. A view 
on network relations appears in the distinctions between ‘group sub-government’ and 
‘clientelism’, where the former involves conflicts within the group populations and the 
latter implies departments or agencies that identify with their lobby. A reference to 
Suleiman’s study of French administration shows that in certain situations ‘attributes’ of 
actors, the Element 6 considerations, such as their institutional membership, are 
misleading; ‘some civil servants allow themselves to become lawyers for groups”66 and 
also government is shown in many cases to be bargaining as much with various 
manifestations of itself as it is with other bodies. R+J also point out that ‘they [former 
civil servants] know that the cry, “go to the man at the top” is fallacious, and that it is 
often better to go to the chap who drafts the letter rather than the chap who signs it.’167 
What this implies is that, once again, the generally accepted narrative language and 
labels can cover a multitude of network structure patterns and that we cannot assume that 
a typical case study language of seniority of actors will reveal the pattern of policy­
making.
R+J note that pressure groups often go out of their way to affect decisions that will 
avoid legislation and seek a result in such things as ‘undertakings’ or moves specifically 
through powers other than legislation. This emphasises the importance, alluded to in the 
previous chapter, of focusing on the correct policy output. For the purposes of the 
theoretical development ‘proposed legislation’ was used as the output, but it was noted
166 Richardson and Jordan (1979: 56) quoting Suleiman (1974)
167 Richardson and Jordan (1979: 67) quoting an ex-Civil Servant (UK)
155
Existing literature
that this was only a working convention. Here we see that the output must be carefully 
considered on a case by case basis. R+J emphasise that from government’s position 
groups are seen as ‘the public interest’ which means that the unorganised world, 
although it may be highly significant in numbers, is highly insignificant in real decision 
making and hence we have a hint at the Element 1 boundary condition considerations. 
The compartmentalisation of policy making that becomes evident from studying group 
influence exacerbates this exclusion of disorganised public, but encourages organisation 
on the narrow issues as the possibility of influencing decisions becomes clear to those 
with interests in a particular sector. A tentative shot at R+J’s boundary condition could 
therefore be that those who can possibly influence policy would be considered to be the 
members of the NFP.
Sabatier (1993) is impressive not only in its attempt to place the work that is being 
done within the context of advancing political science, but, for once, the authors are 
often clear about their assumptions. One of the first messages that is picked up from 
Sabatier is that, as our theoretical formulation in the previous chapter suggested, the 
policy making process uses information exchange and new information arising from 
analysis to allow actors to jointly filter policy elements on a cost benefit basis. This 
procedure when carried out within what we referred to as a network ‘environment’, 
rather than in real world situation, imposes low immediate costs. Sabatier sees, however, 
the whole cycle of formulation, implementation and reformulation as being vital in 
taking a view (Sabatier 1993: 118-119) and they soon start to make statements that 
correspond to the six base assumptions. Firstly they address the issue of boundaries, 
referring explicitly to policy subsystems and they also indicate that they see boundaries 
as being broader than the old ‘iron triangle’ conception by taking in journalists,
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researchers, policy analysts and actors at all levels of government including the 
EU/intemational levels (Sabatier 1993: 119). The ACF assumes that within a policy 
subsystem actors aggregate into ‘advocacy coalitions’ that share normative or causal 
beliefs and that engage in non-trivial co-ordinated activity over time (Sabatier 1993: 
120). The former of these criteria is an element 6 exogenous variable, while the latter 
implies an element 2 link of ‘participation in co-ordinated activity’ and an element 1 
boundary condition that this activity should be ‘non-trivial’ for the actor to be a member 
of the NFP. Sabatier also assume that some actors may rest outside these coalitions but 
will eventually join a group or leave out of frustration. This framework immediately 
conjures up a mental image of what the NFP that contain advocacy coalitions will look 
like. The allied conceptions of hierarchical ideas that exist within the ACF are discussed 
in the previous chapter.
Marin and Mayntz (1991b) is an early work collecting together many different views 
and analyses on the subject of networks in policy formation. The introduction to the 
book, Marin and Mayntz (1991a), hereafter M+M, sets out the ground for the chapters to 
come but also gives some pointers to what the prevailing attitude is on the underlying 
assumptions at the time of publication. As with almost all work on NFPs there is an 
admission of a vast ‘taxonomic and methodological pluralism’ (M+M) that is borne out 
by the differing treatments within various chapters of the work. M+M, however, state 
that in recent studies:
‘Policy networks do not refer any longer to “networking” of individual 
personalities, to group collusions* to the interlocking of cliques, elites, party or 
class factions, as in older traditions, but to the collective action of organized, 
corporate actors and consequently to interorganizational relations in public 
policy making.’
(Marin and Mayntz 1991a) original italics 
This is a clear statement of the Element 3 assumption that group actors, rather than
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individuals are the way forward, however, even within the edited chapters to come there 
are questions about this. The boundary specification issue of element 1 is addressed at a 
very broad level: for M+M, a key element of NFP analysis depends on the actor 
boundary being within a policy domain, no matter what level of government is being 
discussed, and this assumption is widely adopted. The other assumption relating to 
boundary specification is that NFPs are defined by their function, this being ‘the 
formulation and implementation of policy’, and that ‘actors who do not in one way or 
another participate in the collective decision process generating a policy are not included 
in the network’ (M+M). Here, policy is always taken to be public policy, and so a 
criterion is implied for boundary specification that includes actors taking part in not only 
the development of policy, but also the implementation. How practical this is within an 
actual study is not discussed and we will see below, on several occasions, that a strong 
idea in NFPs is that those involved in the implementation phase are drawn into the policy 
formation phase to ensure compliance later. Another boundary specification point arises 
in that ‘only a few or not too many actors can actually inter-act with each other -  instead 
of simply reacting more or less uniformly’ (M+M).168 This implies that there is some, 
undefined, absolute limit on numbers which can have implications for the need for 
boundary specification; it may be, if this is true, that every network is self-limiting in size 
if it fulfils its function as a network that forms policy and that any other restriction upon 
the membership of the network is false. On element 2 M+M do not proscribe how they 
expect the actors in NFPs to operate. They accept that a full range of relationships 
covering a continuum from antagonistic to cooperation is possible. It is clear that they 
are leaving the detail of this subject until the chapters that follow.
The first of the chapters in Marin and Mayntz (1991b), Kenis and Schneider (1991),
168 original italics
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sits alongside the introduction in that it is an overview of the ‘policy network’ arena 
where the previous literature is examined. This chapter will be seen to fit in quite well 
with the conception of the NFP as the view of policy networks as ‘a new analytical 
toolbox’ is entirely in tune with and, to some extent, informs the development of NFPs. 
However, in the paper the conclusion is drawn that, due to the fact that everything can be 
a network and we require an ‘analytical surplus,’ the term is reserved for ‘a specific class 
of policy making structures with specific attributes’ (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 40) and 
the concept is placed in a continuum between policy markets, being essentially situations 
where policy is treated as a good, and policy hierarchies. Despite this notably different 
conception we can still extract some of the key assumptions behind the analysis as in 
order to classify a ‘specific class’ of networks it must be the case that they are described 
to some extent in NFP terms. Indeed, part of the list defining the policy network covers 
exactly some of the elements we are interested in. Element 1 is agreed, and the boundary 
is considered to be dependent on mutual recognition based on functional relevance and 
structural embededness. Element 2 is defined with links being communication and 
exchange of ‘information, expertise, trust and other policy resources’ (Kenis and 
Schneider 1991: 42). The predominance of informal, decentralized and horizontal 
relations is noted; this suggests, a priori, that individual actors may well be the 
assumption behind this -  the concept of informal relations between institutions suggests 
another, vital, level of personal interaction but in fact element 3 is overturned and the 
nodes are taken as public and private corporate actors (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 42). 
Elements 4 and 5 are not clearly addressed as the definitions are approached in the 
manner of a ‘toolkit’ and not a specific empirical investigation, although due to the 
definition under element 3 of corporate actors, this is a question that may have been
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usefully considered, in many other areas the value of leaving questions to empirical 
verification is supported, this advice is missing for the corporate/individual question. 
This work cannot be placed in the categorisation of the literature as the toolkit concept 
allows for any of the approaches to be used although network thinking is seen as a 
mainly metaphorical illumination of empirical work, meaning that the greater part of 
thought in this chapter should fit into the type (a) thinking. The conclusion shows the 
sympathy between Kenis and Schneider and this thesis as it is suggested that while 
empirical results often only confirm intuitive (or soft) observations that a proliferation of 
actors leads to difficulties in such intuitive conclusions (Kenis and Schneider 1991: 48).
Five other chapters in Marin and Mayntz (1991b) rack up three type (a) analysis, one 
type (c) and a tentative (b), suggesting both that the categorisation has some sense and 
that the book contains some reasonable variation.
Type (a) studies
Pappi and Knoke (1991) is a type (a) study using a network world view combining 
element 2 aspects of agent-based dependency and influence exchange. Overturning 
element 3, the study assumes corporate actors and further on element 1, assumes that 
they are connected to each other if they share interests. Not being a mathematical graph- 
theory study, these multiple links do not appear to cause major upsets, but setting the 
ideas against the set of base assumptions is enlightening. The study shows matrices that 
represent ‘interest in events’ and ‘control over events and results’ but there is no 
reference to actual existing networks, all the exchanges are potential and there may be, in 
fact, no actualised link between actors. What is suggested is that the results of this 
analysis give an indication of the real exchange processes. Unfortunately this 
interpretation seems to ignore more complex ‘paths’ round a network and ignores the
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major reason for utilising network constructs. Referring to the base assumptions in such 
a study could help to clarify the link between claiming a network conception and 
carrying out an analysis that ignores basic network ideas.
Dohler (1991) raises the idea of resource dependency, referred to previously as being 
more of a shadow network of NFPs, although the conception of such resource 
dependencies being represented as links, let alone being actualised or measured, is 
glossed over. There is no other manifestation of the element 2 definitions. On the 
element 3 definitions the actors are defined as being ‘corporate’ but there is also some 
looseness in this definition when government is taken to exist of multiple sub-corporate 
actors. In terms of analysis this is very much a type (a) based study with the network 
being a very long way from an analytically framed concept. One of the hypotheses being 
tested is on a question of whether overall numbers in the network can be an influential 
factor in policy making, which leaves unanswered some very important questions 
concerning the lack of element 1 boundary setting.
Jansen (1991) is a purely type (a) qualitative study. The ‘links, actors and boundaries’ 
are accepted but actors {element 3) are considered to be individuals, this is justified by 
the scientific nature of the policy area as in scientific matters it is personal expertise and 
reputation that distinguish contributions to policy. This approach supports the idea that 
the individual actor is the lowest level, to be departed from if the empirical evidence is 
convincing. The explanatory variables used in the analysis are intentions and resources; 
while resources could justifiably be seen as an element 6 factor, it is clear that intentions 
would be difficult to slot into this framework and so, apart from a type (a) network world 
view the analysis takes place in an entirely different methodological field.
Schneider and Werle (1991) causes a little difficulty in the classification as the paper
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uses conceptions of exchange and bargaining in a network, which one would assume 
would be followed by some kind of network based game-theory, but in fact the analysis 
turns out to be based on a method that maps circles, sized on influence and reputation, on 
an x-y scatterplot chart of similarity of interests. The actual links are therefore neither 
defined nor used. Once again we have what seems to be a network study that does not 
use a network method where one would normally thought to be indicated. It is tempting 
to imagine the influence as being an link that creates the network with reputation 
somehow determining the strength or importance of these links. The interests could then 
be grouped and each actor being assigned a group label as the element 6 variable. This 
process, however, is not the analysis given and so we have a hybrid analysis classified 
here as (a) but may be considered (c).
Marsh and Rhodes (1992), hereafter M+R, is often taken as a key text in the 
development of policy networks and, hence, it is important to examine how, or if, the 
references relate to the six base assumptions. Chapter 1 offers a ‘critique of existing 
approaches’ that is equally informative on the approaches of M+R as on those that they 
examine. Partly due to the chapter presenting the history of policy networks more as a 
‘struggle of ideas’ rather than ‘a histoiy of thought’. The over-riding impression is that 
throughout the chapter there is confusion about exactly what is being discussed and 
pinning down anything that corresponds to any of the six, very important, base 
assumptions is difficult. The terms ‘policy networks’, ‘policy network analysis’, ‘policy 
network approach’, ‘policy network model’ and ‘policy community’ with other similar 
terms are bandied around without being defined in relation to a fixed point. In the second 
paragraph we are told that the introduction ‘deals briefly with the relationship between 
the policy networks approach and the pluralist and corporatist model’ and hence, we are
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confused. If the words here had been ‘the policy network model’ we could have been 
sure that the term ‘model’ is being used in the sense of a style, pattern [or mode?]: ‘the 
European model of town planning” or “the French new-wave model for film-making.’ 
However, the use of the word ‘approach’ here tends to signify that it is the broader field 
of ‘policy network analysis’ under discussion. Even at its weakest this must mean an 
analytical approach to examining policy formation based on the idea that we can use at 
least some of the ideas of network analysis methods within our discussion. If this is so, 
then the relationship between this approach and the pluralist and corporatist models is 
clear. We can look at these two models using this approach in order to i) see how useful 
it is to do so and, ii) try and get some new information by doing so.
It very soon becomes clear that this is not what is intended. The words ‘approach’ and 
‘model’ are confused with ‘type’. ‘Analytical method’ is never mentioned, while 
sometimes ‘approach’ takes this meaning and sometimes ‘model’ does as well. Regally 
standing atop the list of terms is ‘policy network’, only ever once defined, via a direct 
quotation, as ‘a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource 
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the 
structure of resource dependencies’ (Benson 1982). This definition, for me, confirms that 
any and every policy formulation process must have a policy network attached to it. The 
neglect of M+R here is to recognise anything akin to element 1 and the accompanying 
implication that by accepting this definition we must recognise the need to discuss the 
boundary definition problem and understand it before we start typologising.
Considering whether there is ‘broad agreement that it is a meso-level concept’ (M+R: 
1), we can to some extent agree with Dowding (2001) that the term meso-level is a 
redundancy, however, it is possible to look at the way that network analysis produces
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functions of both node and network that lead towards this ‘meso-’ descriptor (Knoke and 
Kuklinski 1982). The use of the term by M+R in this chapter does not lead us any closer 
to understanding if they conceive of the network in a similar way to Knoke and 
Kuklinski, which would lead us into the base assumptions, and despite a lot of power 
being assigned to the term, it is not clearly explained.
Network analysis emphasizes continuity in the relations between interest groups 
and government departments.... The existence of a policy network both has an 
influence on ... and reflects the relative status of the particular interests in a 
broad policy area.
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992:1)
Forgetting that the term ‘policy network’ used in this sense could be taken as a misuse 
of such a term, this extract gives us some first clues about the true network elements in 
M+R’s analysis. We can surmise from the quotation that M+R are considering contact 
between actors as being the essential element 2 style link in a policy network, although 
they seem to value strong links that persist, suggesting an element 1 style boundary 
condition for membership of such a network.
Smith (1992) discusses the agricultural policy community and in questioning the 
traditional corporatist account of the sector he sees network ideas as offering a more 
satisfying explanation. He starts of with the assumption that it is a ‘closed policy 
community’ and then looks at the chances of it being opened. Some of the work later in 
this thesis is presaged as he shows an understanding, related to element 6, of the ability 
of network structural features to contradict actor properties when he suggests that there is 
a blurring of the distinction between those governed and the governors. He starts to 
move some way towards an element 2 definition of links in his criticism of Jordan 
(1981) by suggesting that the pluralist account confuses large numbers in the arena and 
large numbers with power, thus making the implication that the policy network’s links
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have something more than the existence of actors in the arena and furthermore 
suggesting that influence (why else would we gather power?) is a valid link definition. In 
his description of the network Smith also extends this understanding of link relations in 
discussing the distinction between inner circle, which consists of intimate day-to-day 
contact, and outer circle, which consists of issue-occasion groups. This suggests that 
frequency of contact and contact on multiple sub-issues in a policy domain constitutes 
strong-linkage in a policy network definition. The chapter displays a quite sophisticated 
use of networks but puts this within a case-study type framework.
Wistow (1992) talks about values and interests in the context of influence and uses 
terms such as ‘opening up’ and ‘vertical interdependence’ while making no real network 
points that can be related to our analytical framework. This chapter qualifies barely as a 
type (a) study.
Saward (1992) on the civil nuclear network seems to understand the need for clarity if 
there is to be any explanatory power from networks and that this is possible only if ‘we 
start with the network image as such rather than this or that type of network as set out by 
Rhodes... [because] the type of network involved in the nuclear field is more than a 
semantic question; it is crucial if we are to assess the utility of the network image’ 
(Saward 1992: 76). Saward then adopts the Rhodes typology and understandably has 
difficulties in managing to use the vague suggestions therein with his aim of linking 
geometry (in which he ends up being reassuringly specific albeit in a stylised way) with 
the effective use of resources in obtaining power. Saward usefully critiques the mixed 
basis of Rhodes’ typology that mixes some distinctions ‘according to dominant force, 
others ... according to the degree of insulation and integration’ (Saward 1992: 79). The 
understanding of geometry in networks reveals that he has made some assumptions of
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what a link must be, because to draw them as he does in differing configurations, that 
idea must exist even though it may not be explicit. Such links as ‘accountability to’, 
‘funded by’ and ‘creating policy with’ can be seen in his narrative. He also distinguishes 
between permanent relationships and other types of links that are more temporaiy in 
nature such as giving evidence at public enquiries. There is some mixing of the element 
1 definition as organisations are mainly used as the actor, but there is also considerable 
discussion of the centrality or otherwise of experts in the process, without clear 
explanation of how individuals involvement is aggregated to groups’ structural position. 
Overall though the chapter makes use of some sophisticated ideas that can be taken 
further with network analysis techniques; it could have been a truly network based 
analysis method, but in the end is type (a), looking at the world in a quite sophisticated 
network way.
Marsh (1992) excels in appearing to miss the point from the start. He maintains that
the key question that policy network literature should be concerned with, yet fails to
answer, is ‘whose interests are served by such institutional relationships?’169 This begs
the question: ‘what institutional relationships?’ We again face the assumption that policy
networks encompass only a limited range of relationship geometries. Marsh then goes on
to identify the plethora of network types that now exist without realising that to contain
this diversity a formal measure, even if it is approximated later for both definition and
identification purposes, has to be at least discussed. The ‘tripartite’ nature of the ‘policy
community’ (or is it a ‘fairly loose policy network’?) is contrasted with other formations
but we are never sure what the network consists of. For example, does the TUC’s
network role really change because ‘it criticised the Thatcher Government’s economic
policy, calling for reflation’ or is this the event that caused the network role to change? Is
169 My italics
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‘role’ really the word we are looking for or is it ‘structural position’? Can local technical 
college staffs changing relationships with managing agents of the local schemes really 
be a question about ‘policy ’ ‘networks1 Even if we retain faith that it is, we never find 
out in any detail why it should be so. The conclusions seem to have little to do with 
networks either: this is illustrated if the words ‘policy network’ or ‘network’ are replaced 
with ‘policy process’ in the following quote. It shows that there is little or no value added 
in this use of this version of a network concept.
Overall we have identified a policy network which has clearly affected outcomes, 
but in which the exact nature of the relationship amongst participants has 
changed. However it is a network which has always been quite complex and 
which has tended to be dominated by government.
(Marsh 1992)
This work can be described as an ill-defined type (a) if it deserves to be classified at 
all.
Marsh and Smith (2000) provides a great deal of unhelpful meta-analysis based on 
some questionably useful diagrams and some demonstrably poor terminology (Evans 
2001: 543; Raab 2001: 556). However, there are also some useful pointers towards how 
and why the set of base elements that we proposed are useful. The use of element 6 
attributes alongside the rest of the network defined in terms of structure is clearly laid out 
(Marsh and Smith 2000: 6). There is an explicit understanding of this endogenous 
(structure) against exogenous (environment) distinction and a worry that existing work 
(as can be seen by the way this review is structured) tends to stress, even to exclusion, 
one or other of these factors leading to a false situation as in reality they form part of a 
whole (Marsh and Smith 2000: 7). The hypotheses that are to come in the next chapter 
are also linked to this recognition and are presaged here: ‘exogenous structural positions, 
for example based on class, gender or ethnicity, may be both more important generally
167
Existing literature
and reflected in network membership’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 7). Such a claim, with 
the ‘...may be...’, suggests this should be empirically tested.
Type (b) studies
Cunningham (1992) recognises, in line with this thesis, that individual case studies 
related to decisions, rather than ‘grand’ issues and broad patterns of relationships within 
a policy sector, must show utility in order to assign value to the policy network approach. 
In terms of her assumptions, she talks of mapping interactions, at least a broad 
recognition of the need for identifying the element 2 of links. She also realises that we 
cannot merely talk of ‘the engineering profession’ as ‘more than one branch of 
engineering is involved and therefore more than one professional body’ (Cunningham 
1992: 120). This idea is not, however, extended to moving from the individual up to a 
suitable definition for this case, so element 1 is left hanging somewhat. Element 6 is clear 
throughout as the key variable that is being related to a network structure is the actor 
attribute of whether the actor is an engineer or not. Cunningham generally defines well 
and makes good points about using networks in this type (b) study.
Stones (1992) starts off well in terms of making clear assumptions. His aim is to 
reveal some of the ‘hidden wiring’ in the international finance sector of UK policy 
making and he usefully defines his element 2 links as ‘”face-to-face” interaction in the 
policy-making process,’ rejecting simply similar interests and he also adds an explicit 
and imposed boundaiy condition on his actors that they must be participants in certain 
‘specialist organisations and policy-making institutions’ (Stones 1992: 207). The case 
study is then carried out given these contexts but not analytically based on a network 
methodology.
Peterson (1992) also offers, as others before, an analysis based on the ‘tightness’ or
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‘looseness’ of the policy network, but the measure is based only on an impressionistic 
reading of a traditional narrative.
Heinz et al. (1993) is notable for the fact a broad conclusion (the hollow core) about 
policy making is reached by using methods that fall into the b/c category. However there 
are some unusual elements in their analysis; it is not clear why, for example, the use of 
smallest space solutions is used as opposed to graph theoretic formulations when looking 
at actor centrality. The early chapters of this work consist of exploratory data analysis 
(EDA) of the element 6 type exogenous actor characteristics and chapters 5 and 6 consist 
of regression analysis of these variables. Chapters 7 and 8 address the element 2 
questions on link types, but the analysis of ‘frequency of contact’ is not a graph theoretic 
network analysis, but rather a regression analysis on these variables, with the element 3 
‘individual actors’ as the units of observation. Chapters 10 and 11 consist of smallest 
space analyses on a transform of the element 2 link strength variable with element 6 
variables of ‘interests’ and ‘political positions’. Heinz et al. therefore achieve in some 
measure what we are setting out to discover: they build an analytical method on the 
network world view and, as a result, they gain an insight that would not be available 
without this view. What they do not do though is to use the inherent mathematical nature 
of networks to uncover structural or other factors that are only revealed when a network 
world view is adopted and are unique because only a network can be analysed in such a 
way. This is the crux of the issue that we introduced in Chapter 1.
Type (c) studies
Laumann et al. (1991) carries out its sampling on a graph theoretic conception and the 
study then concerns a smallest space problem over interests. The study also concentrates 
on changes over time, something that we earlier excluded from our field of interest. The
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boundary condition of element 1 is effectively stated where networks are said to exist 
within the boundaries of a policy sector, but the true boundary condition becomes a bit 
less clear cut when the sampling is considered. The sampling is based on some initial 
questioning to narrow the field and the true conditions seem a bit vague (although the 
method used is clearly stated). Element 3 is covered with a clear focus on organisational 
actors and the element 6 variables are interests/ preferred outcomes. This is though again 
a network study without any defined links, the membership of the network is partly 
determined by the strength of links to others (contact often or episodically is a factor) but 
the network is taken as unit of investigation with the element 2 missing. This is clearly a 
type (c) analysis.
The introduction to Read (1992) looks straight away like a type (c) study as he 
promises to explore ‘the distinction between the closeness of the relationships in a 
network and dominance within that network.’ Element 1 is quite explicitly addressed in 
discussions about those at the core of the network being this or that body, corporation or 
government department, although no clear reason is given as to why his comments about 
‘close relations with senior civil servants’ or ‘direct access to the Chancellor’ (Read 
1992: 130-131) does not merit, for him, a push into the network of individuals. Some 
understanding, at least in Read’s attempt to ascertain if the network is a ‘producer 
network’, exists of the link definition element 2; ‘a producer in a policy network 
attempts to influence government decisions in a way that either benefits it, or at worse, 
minimises its cost of compliance with the policy’ (Read 1992). In the end this study turns 
out to be typical in that the introduction offers a sound basis for a truly network based 
test of some hypotheses, the content offers some correspondence with a well defined 
network analysis, but not enough and in the end the conclusion is drawn from broad
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observations collected from the narrative, rather than from constructing an 
approximation of a network and drawing the conclusions from a limited, but relevant, 
construct.
Schneider, Dang-Nguyen, and Werle (1994) is another paper which bases itself 
around a bargaining and exchange model but within a network context. Element 3 seems 
to be undecided, while there is a clear preference for organisational actors, individual 
experts are considered to be important in the networks as well. Although used in a 
restricted construct (relations only from the European Commission to other actors are 
considered, ignoring any potential interactions not with the Commission) the relation 
used is defined as ‘intensity of information exchange and co-operation’, this is well 
defined and corresponds with the approach taken in the boundary definition for links and 
the interviews in this thesis. Element 6 factors are also brought into play, as so often in 
the studies we have seen, through defining the actors’ similarity of interests. There is 
some use of graph theoretical methods and an analysis that uses mapping sized circles 
(influence reputation). It is not evident why this approach is used when there is a more 
appropriate and purely network based method of analysis that would look at path lengths 
with strengths. This qualifies as a type (c) study, where the network view has been used 
to create an analytical method, but it would have been even more so had a network 
analytical method been used giving a logical link between the conception, the data 
collection and the analytical tool.
Konig and Brauninger (1998) uses element 6 attributes of interest similarities and 
correlates these with the network relations (send, get information, doing a favour and 
accepting support) on a graph theoretic basis. The work moves into an area that is not
171
Existing literature
covered by this thesis, but which demonstrates the importance of well defined network 
studies for politics if they are to be used at all; that of how policy networks are formed.
In John and Cole (1998) all the necessary elements in the base set are not only defined, 
but discussed and the method that is to be a basis of comparison between two networks 
is explained and reasons given for why it will be interesting. The results are given 
visually to aid understanding of the analysis, which is original and integral to the 
question and the method of investigation. A tight and complete type (c) analysis.
A highly complicated dynamic modelling based on some graph theoretic notions 
(access-possibility) with resource exchange modelling is offered by Stokman and 
Berveling (1998) . It is not, however, enormously illuminating in broader political 
science terms and is more impressive for the construction of the model than the political 
analysis. This is a thoroughly novel type (c) analysis which could not have been 
conceived of without a network foundation, but the concept of network linkages due to 
shared policy positions or access to similar resources does not really fit in with the NFP 
conception.
Melbeck (1998) offers a study that uses graph theory analysis (centrality of actors and 
density of graphs) in a straightforward yet sophisticated methodology that also offers 
good reading in the narrative as well as the methodological explanations. The paper 
proposes, somewhat like this thesis, to ‘view the same object from various aspects and 
describe the different aspects thereby revealed’ Melbeck 1998: 553). The elements 1 and 
3 are discussed and defined as well as an explanation of the link relations used in the 
study. Those influential in local community issues in two towns are identified with 
various techniques, whilst defining a boundary upfront. A survey questions these actors 
on various different relations that they have with other actors, both generally and on the
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policy issues on which the study focuses. These results are subject to an analyses that 
reveals concrete findings that the relation type used alters the structure of the network 
and also a general finding proving that networks can display somewhat pluralist and 
corporatist features at the same time (Melbeck 1998: 551).
Pappi and Henning (1998) addresses in a direct and useful way many of the elements 
of the base set. An element 1 definition is approached first by the idea that a ‘policy 
network’ should in fact be termed a ‘policy domain network’ as it is most useful when it 
relates to a single policy and then proposes that something like a ‘snowball’ method of 
discovering actors should produce a closed system effectively defining a boundary 
through questioning on ‘who is influential in the domain’ to get those who influenced 
policy (Pappi and Henning 1998: 554-555). This procedure is very close to the one that 
is described in Chapter 8 of this thesis. In the more advanced analysis though, the 
element 3 aspect is overturned to set collective actors as the actor and, for the first time 
in this review, element 5 is addressed when the diagonal of the network matrix is set to 
measure the internal strength of the composite actor. Element 2 links are explicitly 
defined as information exchanges. Stylised networks representing ideal types different 
governance forms under these assumptions are then created and these are used within a 
model of political exchange, which need not concern us except that to note networks are 
being used as a building block of a wider explanatory study.
Pemberton (2000) investigates the place of network theory in policy learning. On the 
way he usefully covers much other ground. He is rightly worried that despite the Marsh 
and Rhodes typology being constructed across four non-binary dimensions that no-one 
seems to be able, or be inclined, to use it except by referring the two of the comers170 of 
‘policy community’ and ‘issue network’ and he is quite keen to emphasise that terms
170 In a four dimensional sense
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should be defined. On links he says that the relationships must involve dependency if we 
are to have a useful network representation, when he constructs his network he is 
specific about which relationships he is using in each case, and he clearly puts forward 
both individuals and group actors as valid nodes in his schema. He also explicitly 
addresses the element 6 by assigning actors to one of five groups, thus giving each one 
an endogenous actor attribute. The one element that is not really addressed is the element 
1 boundary definition for nodes, although an exhaustive list is not needed for his 
analysis. He builds an analysis that combines the illustrative power of networks with 
policy learning ideas and falls comfortably into the type (c) category neatly proving that 
use of networks does not have to be over sophisticated and computationally complex to 
provide value added.
It is fortunate that this, the latest of the type (c) studies comes last as it allows the 
conclusion to be drawn, from this work and all the others that have been examined, that 
it is not the theoretical complexity of the analysis that leads to a good network study but 
the appropriateness. The less good studies that we have seen have mostly not lacked 
insight but clarity and where networks give most leverage on a problem it is where the 
recognition of their existence is tied most closely in to the analysis method that is 
selected.
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VII. Hypotheses for analysis_______________________
The overall shape of the hypotheses being tested in this thesis was laid out in Chapter 
4. The process of defining the specific hypotheses (called ’third-level’) that would be 
tested in the analytical work was postponed until the theory and definitions for NFPs had 
been developed. This chapter now develops these third level hypotheses.
The hypotheses relate to the three broad questions that were outlined in Chapter 1 and 
around which the drawing together of threads from the case study were arranged in 
Chapter 4. Additionally, in order to escape from the self-referential frame, it has been 
decided to adopt third level hypotheses of external interest; two on the theme of ‘the 
language of politics’, one examining the how developing ‘small worlds’ theoiy might 
relate to the classification of NFPs and a study of whether different measures of 
centrality in the network correspond to some ‘power’ or ‘importance’ derived from the 
non-network information. These hypotheses will, aside from their own inherent interest, 
also be used to demonstrate the general value of NFP analysis (hypothesis 1) and show 
that it is operable across countries (hypothesis 2). This will be done by the process 
described in Chapter 4 whereby we use the new knowledge created via the NFP analysis 
from our proved hypothesis about features of the policy process and use it to make a 
defensible claim about policy outcomes that would not have been defensible from the 
case study material alone.
Four hypotheses
The broad question concerning the working methods in the network is addressed by 
examining the extent to which actors, grouped by different labels, are interacting with 
those within their group compared to outside or how they are (dis)similar in their
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structural connections within the NFP. It is this investigation that also looks at traditional 
case studies’ political language. Language is used as a summarising mechanism for a 
multitude of variables concerning the subjects of investigation.171 Take for instance the 
statement that ‘a minister discusses spending decisions with members of the party’. A 
case study might then compare this minister to, for example, a civil servant, who does 
not have any contact with a political party. Similarly, a distinction may well be drawn 
between the interaction patterns of three actors, two of whom are from academia and one 
from industry. NFP analysis is able to establish whether there is any structural content 
behind the language and labels such as academic, minister, industry, cabinet or Treasury. 
There are other kinds of content in these labels as well but to show that they do not 
correspond to structural factors of the political network would be a significant finding. 
To investigate this area two hypotheses are proposed:
1. Hypothesis 1: Actor’s functional labels have no structural content.
2. Hypothesis 2: Organisation labels have no structural content.
The broad question about what aspects relate to the policy process’ success or failure 
is addressed by looking at the communication efficiency in the network compared to the 
outcome. This will be addressed by the theory of ‘small worlds’ which is of growing 
interest in all kinds of sociological study and can be seen as highly relevant to policy 
making. This is especially so in the broader context of this thesis where NFPs, if seen to 
be small world in nature will suggest contradiction or weakening of existing policy 
network theory and lead to an alternative, more useful way of describing the network.
3. Hypothesis 3: NFPs exhibit the ‘small world’ property.
The remaining broad question on who is important and what makes them important is
171 See also comments in Gerring (2004) on language within case studies.
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to be founded on centrality measures and how the NFP structural measures of centrality 
correspond to other measures exogenous to the structure. The fourth hypothesis tests this 
within the context of the thesis.
4. Hypothesis 4: Centrality measures correspond to some given exogenous actor 
attributes of the network.
Hypothesis 1: functional labels 
This hypothesis will test whether the actor characteristic of ‘functional label’ 
corresponds to calculated network measures. The functional label is an exogenously 
assigned variable that groups the networks actors according to the description that could 
be expected to be allocated in a traditional case study through the use of accepted 
generalisations in political language. Roles, of course, contain many layers of meaning 
and much content. As well as the structural level that we are attempting to test, roles also 
have an institutional aspect of both formal and informal rules, a psychological aspect for 
both the role holder and those with whom she relates and, as roles are an ill-defined 
bundle, possibly other content such as task definition and, useful or not, some guide to 
the prevailing institutional norms. These various elements are taken into account 
depending on the whims of the analyst and/or the needs of the analysis. This hypothesis 
attempts to test whether these common labels contain consistent information about the 
structural relationships that actors have with other actors in the network. We do not have 
to hypothesise what various structural positions may imply in being related to different 
functional labels, although we may learn something interesting in this line from the 
analysis. We merely have to see whether different network structural roles tend to map 
onto functional labels or whether there is no correspondence. Both the advantage and the 
danger of the traditional case study approach is that its analytical method is to a large
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degree hidden. A fact that is often ignored is that even traditional case studies carry the 
hallmarks of a model; the world is reduced in complexity and the information that 
remains is used as a proxy for the real world in seeking some truth that can inform us 
more widely than the data from which it was derived.172 The difference between case 
study and more formal modelling is that in case studies a considerable body of heuristic 
devices are used to reduce the complexity of the world rather than explicitly selecting to 
reduce the variables that will be included in the analysis. The clear advantages of the 
case study can be seen, for example, in that it may use as a complexity reducing 
shorthand the ‘functional label’, pigeon-holing an actor as, say, a ‘lobbyist’ and we will 
all know immediately what this signifies without recourse to complex equations and data 
schema. The disadvantage of such a step is that we may all know what it signifies, but 
that the thing we know can be different for all of us because the assumptions are not 
explicit and we do not have to seek agreement over our understandings nor can we 
exhaustively test agreement even if we were inclined to. Furthermore, all of us - 
including the author - may be wrong: when the commonly held meaning behind a label 
is unpacked and tested, its content may prove to be misleading. Such ‘labelling’ and its 
correspondence to the idea of ‘roles’ is a complex area of investigation, a comprehensive 
analysis of the difficulties and some of the reasons why the use of roles in political173 
study has been limited is given by Searing (1994: Chapter 1). As discussed under 
element 4 in Chapter 5, the theory of roles tends to have a dynamic element when one 
considers a policy network, but often the general label or role assigned in a case study is 
static. The NFP analysis aggregates relations over the time defined and so therefore will 
present an aggregated view of whatever transient roles may have been played. This does
172 There is more discussion o f this in the conclusion Chapter 10.
173 In this Searing the cases are specifically legislative.
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not negate the analysis as for the purposes of this hypothesis we will assume that a 
corresponding case study and the ‘functional labels’ that we have as actor characteristics 
are also static, aggregated perhaps, over time in the usual heuristic way. Whatever a role 
may be, it cannot fail to imply some structural implications. Either roles have embedded 
within them some structural content (e.g. as a lobbyist, I maintain a dense network of 
contacts) or some there is some structural corollary to the package of received interests 
and norms that forms the core conception of role. (e.g. the role of a ‘dependable 
departmental minister’ implies a different set of relations to a ‘strong policy-leading 
chancellor’). What we are testing is whether these commonly understood roles do have 
an impact on the patterns of relations in an NFP or if, in fact, the patterns result from the 
exigencies of policy making and ministers may play the role of ‘administrator’ or 
‘conciliator’, neutral civil servants may act as ‘lobbyists’ or ‘advocates’ and lobbyists 
may be ‘experts’ rather than their academic colleagues who we would expect to play this 
role.
There are two main structural measures that we can consider for an analysis of this 
type: cliques and structural equivalence, while cliques are simpler to understand and 
construct, structural equivalence is closer to the usual conception of a role. In network 
analysis if two actors have the same (strong equivalence) or similar (weak equivalence) 
sets of relations with other actors in the network they are said to be ‘structurally 
equivalent’ (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 59). One of the interesting things about 
structural equivalence is that the actors that display it can be isolated from each other yet 
have exactly the same relationships with other actors. This makes it an ideal measure for 
hypothetically constituting a significant proportion of functional labels.174
174 To confuse matters slightly these patterns of structural relationships in network analysis are sometimes known as
‘roles’
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Cliques are most easily understood by reference to the usual meaning of the word in 
English and can be imagined as a group of actors that stick together more closely than 
they do with actors outside the group. Cliques refer to a collection of nodes that is 
densely linked within itself, the most rigid definition being that based on a ‘maximal 
complete subgraph’ (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 56). This strict definition defines a set 
of nodes that is completely connected yet not within a larger completely connected set. 
Hypothesis 2: organisational labels 
This hypothesis will test the actor characteristic of ‘organisation belonged to’ against 
the network structure. This is another test of the value of political language in case 
studies. When, in a UK case study, one talks of a Civil Servant, Special Adviser, 
Minister coming from the Treasury, whether they be expert or generalist, top-ranking or 
lowly, the organisational label carries analytical power in the hidden assumptions of 
narrative method. One assumption that can reasonably assumed to be included in this 
hidden multi-dimensional mix could again that of ‘structural equivalence’, but this time 
is more likely to be somehow connected to the concept of a ‘clique’. That is to say that 
when we have identified the various members of the policy making universe in our case 
study and allocated them to their organisations we would tend to subconsciously model 
in our head that they are in closer contact with those with whom they share an 
organisational label than with others in the process. This hypothesis will test whether this 
instinctive feeling that arises from the use of organisational labels in case studies has any 
basis in the NFPs that we have constructed.
Hypothesis 3: small worlds 
The classic example of the small-world phenomenon is the legendary ‘six degrees of 
separation’ whereby it is suggested that everyone is connected to everyone else in the
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world by six connections or fewer. Whether this is in fact true or not is a matter for 
debate (Kleifeld 2000). The essence of small worlds is that, despite high ‘cliquishness’175 
of a network, the path lengths to all other actors (that is not just those in each actor’s 
locality) can still be very close to those seen in a random network. This is particularly 
interesting for the impact that this property may have on the validity of the 
Marsh/Rhodes continuum for policy networks. Assuming that the continuum has some 
structural content,176 it seems to be based on the idea that there are networks that are 
similar in some way, called policy communities, that are ‘integrated’ in the sense that 
they have only a ‘core’. This language seems to imply closeness in the relations of all the 
actors of a ‘policy community’ and would suggest that, at least one measure that should 
correlate with this is the global efficiency of communication across the network. The 
other end of the continuum is the issue network (we ignore here the criticisms mentioned 
in Chapter 6 that the continuum conflates several variables) which suggests some kind of 
a ‘core’ of actors with a scattering of peripheral actors who are involved but not tightly 
connected with the rest. This implies, in structural terms, that the core has good local 
communications and that each peripheral area might talk well to themselves but that the 
overall network is less good in terms of overall communication. I propose that the small 
worlds property can expose that this non-formally backed set of assumptions about what 
networks ‘look like’ compared to how they actually behave is fundamentally flawed as 
basis for analysis. There is no reason why, given a very small number of shortcuts from 
one part of a network to another that an arrangement of actors that looks like an ‘issue 
network’ should not operate in almost exactly the same way one that looks like a ‘policy
175 This word describes the extent to which all of the actors in a network are found to be in cliques
176 Implied at least in Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 23) and Marsh and Rhodes (1992a: 251). The typology also relies on 
other aspects of the network but structure is heavily implicated.
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community’. In order to actually know anything about how a network will behave some 
knowledge of the structural properties of the network is needed and hence formal 
analysis, even of the most basic type, must be carried out. A useful labelling of networks, 
that says something very specific about exchange of ideas and influence, is whether a 
network is small world or not. This hypothesis narrowly suggests that the NFP studies 
here will exhibit the small world property and broadly proposes that NFPs will always 
show the small world property implying that much of the muddily explained difference 
between policy communities and issue networks are superficial and only on the level of 
false impressions. It is my contention that a NFP will organise itself to be efficient on 
both a local and global level irrespective of whether it has a single closed core or 
whether it has numerous offshoots of peripheral groupings of different sizes and types. 
Both the key decision makers in the network and the periphery groups (if they exist) will 
find it in their interests to create a ‘small world’ which as we will discover in the 
paragraphs below, is a process that has been found to be much easier than intuition 
would suggest. It can be strongly argued that testing for the small world property and 
seeing to what extent and in what way it is held by a network gives us more information 
about the real properties of the NFP than assigning a place in the Marsh Rhodes 
continuum can do.
On small worlds
‘Small-world’ networks have been widely studied recently in many fields that use 
network analysis and the implications are often dramatic. One thing that is important 
when transferring to the context of NFPs is that the networks tend to be much smaller, 
even than by some power of ten, than the usual networks that are studied in small-world 
investigations. The difference in size of the networks means that we may well not see
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Figure 7.1: Illustration o f rewiring to produce shortcuts moving from  
regular to a random network as the rewiring probability p increases
Regular Small-world Random
p = 0  ► p = 1
Increasing randomness
(Watts and Strogatz 1998)
such dramatic results, but theoretical work using simulation on networks of a 
comparable size shows that the range of potential configurations is large enough to be 
able to distinguish small world properties (Astill 2004b).
The most informative work for our purposes on the theory of small-worlds is Watts 
and Strogatz (1998), hereafter W+S, which, perhaps surprisingly given the mathematical 
approach they take, throws open the door onto a world of applications and further 
investigation. They start off by showing how a regularly arranged network, where every 
actor is linked only to their k nearest neighbours, contrasts with a random network where 
there is no ‘locality’ at all and network links can occur to anyone, anywhere (Figure 7.1).
The movement from the regular to the random can be carried out by ‘rewiring’ the 
network.177 Each link in the regular network is rewired from its original position in the 
regular graph to its new random position. Small-worlds, it is proposed, fall somewhere 
between these two extremes. They are obtained when, rather than rewiring every link to a 
random place the links are instead rewired with some probability p. When this
177 Also called a 'graph' by mathematicians
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probability is zero, no links are rewired and the graph stays regular, with p set to one, all 
the links are rewired but somewhere in between, curious things happen.
To understand what the curious phenomena of small worlds really means it is first 
necessary to think about what some features of the two extremes are: this also helps us in 
our transference of the mathematics into useful parallels in political science. When the 
graph is regular the ‘locality’ factor, also known as the ‘cliquishness’, is very high. 
Everyone at any point of the graph only knows people who know several of his friends 
and even his friends’ friends that he does not know are still well connected in his 
locality. However, this regular arrangement means that in order to discover a connection 
to whole swathes of ‘non-local’ nodes the number of nodes that need to be passed 
through is generally very high. In fact, for all of the nodes, most of the graph is only 
reachable through multiple node connections; this gives the graph a Tong average path 
length’.
The random graph is, not surprisingly, opposite in these properties; there is very little 
‘cliquishness’, it happens rarely that one node’s neighbour will know many of his other 
neighbours, however average path length is short as there are so many cross cutting links 
to every part of the graph.
What Watts and Strogatz show is that as the rewiring factor, p, increases, the change 
in these two characteristics is not as we might expect through intuition. In fact, the 
average path length drops rapidly as just a few rewirings are made while the cliquishness 
remains high much longer before falling away. As p increases, ‘each short cut has a 
highly non-linear effect on L [the path length], contracting the distance not just between 
the pair of vertices that it connects, but between their immediate neighbourhoods and so 
on’ (W+S: 440). Each link removed from the clustered neighbourhood has, however, at
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Figure 7.2: Characteristic path length falls o ff  long before the clustering
coefficient drops
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Note: Results are from 2,000 random graphs, each with 300 vertices and 900 edges
(Hayes 2000)
most, a linear effect on the cliquishness. There are some other technical restrictions on 
the conditions for this to occur, but none that ought to exclude the vast majority of NFPs 
and certainly not the ones that are going to examine. This basic formulation has been 
taken on and reinforced by work from, amongst other such rigorous operators, statistical 
physicists (Strogatz 2001). Marchiori and Latora (2000) developed a method that 
considers the two elements of the global and local levels in small worlds as efficiency 
measures that apply to metrical networks (with valued links) as well as topological (one/ 
zero links) networks. They conceive the networks in terms o f information propagation 
(playing off transmission against fault tolerance) they also introduce the notion that the 
introduction o f short cuts is not without cost, all o f  which are concepts that can be useful 
in political applications. It is this conception that we will use in Chapter 9 when we test 
our hypothesis.
What we have in a small-world is a relatively cliquish network where, surprisingly,
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anyone in the network can be reached through relatively few steps. Some of the 
implications of this were touched on above, but clearly this can be taken much further. In 
other fields that imply obvious analogies to NFPs we see dramatic implications. Take, 
for example, the spreading of an infectious disease; it is shown that the threshold of 
‘infectiousness’ needed to infect the entire population and the time for global infection 
both reduce significantly when path lengths are short. These diseases spread, therefore, 
much more effectively in the small world scenario, but the key point is the small number 
of short cuts required to produce a small-world and the difficulty for individuals to notice 
this occurring compared to, say, an obvious move away from a ‘localised’ structure. This 
also implicitly cascades down to a hypothesis that even isolated communities are 
affected by globalisation even when contacts (short-cuts) to the rest of the world are very 
few and consequently that the world could be as ‘globalised’ when only a few monks 
and soldiers were travelling as it is now when we can have a random connection to 
anyone. The corollary of this is that, as popular commentaries suggest, local 
communication has suffered at the expense of these massive random connections across 
the globe that have barely improved global communication. On a less grand level, it can 
also be shown that in a multi-player prisoners’ dilemma and in the physics of coupled 
phase oscillators the effects of a small-world structure of relations give surprising results 
compared to expectations when studies are based only on the random and regular graphs 
(W+S).
Hypothesis 4: centrality
Centrality is a fairly loose term even in formal network analysis. There are several 
different kinds of centrality and there are many variables that can be hypothesised as 
being indicators of influence on policy shaping or of having power within the policy
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process. Hypothesis 4 will consist of a set of predictions about the centrality relation to 
actor attributes and test using a range of the available centrality measures. One of the 
things that emerges from the case studies in Chapters 2 and 3 that lends itself well to 
testing with networks, even though it would be difficult to discover with networks, is 
whether different phases of the policy process, which were discovered in both cases, are 
reflected in the centrality of the actors. We can identify which actors were involved in 
the first phase, the second phase, or both and label the nodes accordingly. We can then 
test to see whether any one of these groups is favoured in terms of centrality in the 
network. This can show us if network centrality is more common in different policy 
process phases and can help us to understand both more about the meaning of centrality 
and, using some of the basic understandings of communication in networks, will allow 
us to make deductions n the other direction about the nature of the policy process in the 
different phases. Furthermore, as the different phases in the French case study were 
concerned with different governments, it may help us to understand something of the 
differing relationship patterns under these two regimes. The other two attributes that will 
be tested against centrality are more traditional indicators of power and influence. The 
first of these is position in the hierarchy we will call this grade. This is known in the UK 
Civil Service as rank, a quasi-military concept, in many organisations it is mistakenly 
called seniority -  a concept to which it is often related. Seniority is in fact purely 
concerned with length of service and not position in the hierarchy, this attribute, is in fact 
more closely related to the third element of hypothesis 4 which tests whether centrality is 
correlated with age. The longer someone has been around, the more opportunity they 
should have had to obtain respect, demonstrate reduced risk in dealing with a known 
quantity, gain experience and to have either built good contacts or a reputation that
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VIII. Development and discussion of mapping 
and data
Applying the six base assumptions
In this section, for the first time, I am going to define how the study of NFPs will be 
approached in this thesis. The previous work has been an attempt to provide a general 
framework that can be seen as applying to all NFP analyses giving individual researchers 
a common set of reference points. I wish to develop a system consistent with this general 
framework that creates a data representation of an NFP that can be analysed for the 
purposes of testing the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter.
Nodes
The first element in the base assumptions that we need to consider is the set of nodes 
which should be a finite set of actors rather than a potentially infinite set. In our case the 
set is restricted through the question: ‘what constitutes the formation of public policy?’ 
One answer to this was given in the ‘black box’ section of this chapter when it was stated 
that the output of the policy process was assumed to be a ‘tangible policy statement’. In 
general this sits well with the literature, where the actors involved in the formation of 
public policy encompass all stages up to the entry onto the statute books (or the 
equivalent dependent on territory and type of legislation), usually excluded, however, are 
those, such as parliamentary draughtsmen or translators, who would be wrongly 
considered as mere tools with no interest in the outcome of the policy formulation. Also 
excluded are those who have a hand in the formulation of public policy after it has found 
its way onto the statute books. These foot soldiers of public policy formation include 
firstly, the very same civil servants who advised on the legislation but in a different role
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as they draft guidance notes on implementation. Apart from those who have already had 
a hand in the policy there are also, for example, the local authority clerks who calculate 
housing benefit entitlements, police officers detaining cannabis users and hospital 
consultants supervising junior doctors; they will eventually see a trickle down of high 
minded policy changes into their eveiyday life and will, perhaps, implement them with 
military efficiency and unquestioning obedience.
The decision to include actors involved in the production of a ‘tangible policy 
statement’ means that the basic membership condition for being considered within the 
NFP is that there must be some effect of the actor on the formation of policy. This seems 
to imply that a potential actor who has been on the a department’s mailing list for five 
years and duly turns up to every consultation only to sit silently at the back of the room 
and is not within the NFP. Also excluded is the very noisy, but incredibly radical, action 
group who are dutifully copied in on every public document. They exist only to condemn 
the current policy and as a matter of principal will not engage in policy formation and so 
are excluded. This is not to say that they will never be included: NFPs are dynamic and if 
others who do influence policy shift the ground to a position where the radical group is 
prepared to engage then they would be brought into the analysis.
Structural limitations 
Marin and Mayntz (1991) discuss the numbers of actors possible in policy networks. 
They imply that there is a logical definitional constraint that
only a few or not too many actors can actually inter-act with each other -  instead 
of either simply re-acting more or less uniformly to the same (political or price) 
market signals or of being organized into more or less uniform action within the 
same bureaucratic hierarchy.
(Marin and Mayntz 1991:17) (original italics) 
If we set a boundary definition on the strength of a relation and classify this as strong
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enough to be classed ‘interaction’, and therefore within the network (see below on the 
link boundary), then because actors are limited in the number of people they can interact 
with at a level that falls within our boundary we have necessarily limited the number of 
actors. This would appear to be a much more robust and less arbitrary way of defining 
the boundaries of the network than setting numerical limits on the number of actors. 
Unfortunately, the method is not completely foolproof as the geometry of the network 
could conceivably imply a network that encompassed the whole world. The key is to find 
a relationship definition that is directly relevant to the policy area, and founded upon the 
likelihood of meme replication taking place; a boundary condition ought to be based 
upon a consideration such as ‘how often is the policy discussed with the intention of 
drawing specific conclusions’ as opposed to say ‘how often is the policy discussed’. This 
should, in theory, limit the number of actors in a non-arbitrary way when a boundaiy is 
set on the strength of the relationship measured. It is also possible from this idea to 
achieve a network o f ‘manageable’ size where those ‘in’ and those ‘out’ are included on 
the strength of relationship to ensure that the most important actors are included.
With such a boundary definition a sensible policy would be to over-sample. This 
would ensure that a secondary ‘cut’ could be made on the more detailed information 
available from the interviews of the actors. Another benefit would be that the relative 
network sizes resulting from set boundary strengths and the relative boundary strengths 
associated with setting the network size could in itself be a revealing comparison 
between networks. This aspect will be covered in more detail below and we will see that 
these considerations are clearly reflected both in the concept of snowball sampling and in 
the technique used to reduce the network size.
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Actors
Elements 3,4 and 5 of the base set refer to actors:
Element 3: the human individual is the node (called the actor)
Element 4: the node is indivisible
Element 5: actors have no links to themselves (Af O for all /)
Thinking about different kinds of actors in an NFP will influence the methods we may 
adopt for analysing NFPs. There are many justifications for adopting the assumptions 
above which rely to a certain extent on institutional factors, however, this is not to say 
that the NFP analysis is institution reliant; every institution set (state, region, 
international field, etc.) could offer a different justification, each of which requires 
understanding of the institutions. However, the NFP method itself, having been justified 
from any one of these perspectives, can be applied independently of these factors.
Traditionally the starting point for looking at the actions of civil servants is the 
Weberian analysis. Somewhere, usually unstated, this analysis is holding sway behind 
the idea that we must look at the organisational entity in order to analyse the dynamics in 
NFPs. The substitution of one bureaucrat for another, each representing only the desk, 
means that we can drop individuals out of our reckoning. This ‘ideal type’ as Weber 
described it is of course known to be untrue, but can be found as an enduring image both 
as an approximation of reality and as a vision of the perfect state. Richardson and Jordan 
(1979) observe that from an institutional perspective the policy formation process within 
government is characterised by departments competing for limited resources. This 
competition could be merely for monetary resources or for the equally scarce resources 
of glory and kudos for developing and leading a policy strand. What is neglected in this 
analysis is that what may be true of a department is not true of the actors that make up 
the department. The actors within these departments are likely to work in multi-faceted
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networks with each other, as their individual interests are much more complex than those 
of the department and they will work closely with some colleagues from one department 
but keep others at arm’s length. Civil servants also have sometimes veiy distantly -  
sometimes closely -  the interest of competing for resources for their department. 
However, at a more immediate level it is in their interest to please either their minister or 
their line manager and these can quite possibly be two very different directions. Another 
extra-departmental incentive is the ‘easy life’: this need not be the typical criticism 
aimed at tea-drinking shirkers, but rather an idea that civil servants generally spend a 
lifetime in the Whitehall village and it is far preferable to develop respect and friendships 
between departmental colleagues than to compete viciously with them. Of course, there 
is a greasy pole of success for civil servants and sometimes it pays to make enemies as 
well as friends. However, even this is unclear on its effect in an NFP; as Michael 
Corleone says in The Godfather 11 ‘My father taught me many things ... keep your friends 
close, but your enemies closer still.’178 
On a global level, civil servants will wish to appear competent in reaching sustainable 
policy conclusions and, importantly, they themselves have to deal with much of the 
resulting work from the policy that is finally decided upon. With this in mind they are 
unlikely to blindly go along with the intrinsic departmental/ministerial interest in getting 
as much resource as possible as if this direction results in an unwieldy or ‘risky’ policy it 
is the civil servants that will not only have to deal with it and brief the minister to deal 
with it, but will more likely than not be criticised for having allowed the situation to 
come to pass. Such criticism, in fact, could well come from the ministerial team or ‘top 
of the office’ that was pushing for the policy in the first place. The tight rope walk of
178 Pointed out by Keith Dowding. I suspect that it was Machiavelli that first said this although many original sources 
are claimed.
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civil servant policy advisers and analysts is often a thankless performance. It should also 
be remembered that it is the civil servant’s primary function is not only to advise, but 
also to warn and this has negative connotations for many ministers. If a civil servant is to 
discharge this function without alienating himself from his political masters then his 
strategic, and very personal, alliances with all kinds of actors both within and outside the 
Government circle must be used to the full. Although a civil servant’s strategy may be to 
act in the Departmental interest and warn a minister against a certain course of action, 
the strategy may be far more complex and involve a wide range of contacts within the 
NFP. All of these factors, for which, as explained above, similar arguments can be found 
in other countries and for other types of actors, support the idea that it is indeed 
individuals that are important in the policy process and lead us to comply with element 3 
of the base set of assumptions. Note that only one argument is needed to support the use 
of individuals while a counter argument would need to encompass every type of actor, 
not just civil servants.
On the question of the indivisibility of nodes it is a consideration of ministers that 
leads us to support the assumption. Ministers, like the civil service, have a bureaucratic 
role and the same references to Weber’s analysis (importance of role, unimportance of 
individuals) must be addressed. Ministers also have their political role -  this is much less 
clearly defined than the ‘bureau’ role and unarguably has a large ‘personal’ element. This 
role though is still firmly within their ministerial scope in contrast to their role as an MP 
or party executive committee member -although it is conceivable that even these roles 
need to be taken into account when enumerating the links in an NFP. There may be an 
argument for looking separately at these two roles, along with their associated contacts 
and networks, but there are also good reasons for complying, as we will, with element 4
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of the base set of assumption, which states that the individual actor is indivisible within 
the NFP. As such, it is the combination of these roles, the whole union of relations, 
which forms the unit of analysis. We must consider how a minister manages her own 
contacts and how she can operate (especially vis-a-vis her own civil servants) 
simultaneously on these two levels. We would, a priori, expect the Minster to be 
centrally placed and strongly implicated in the NFP from the political end and still 
central, although possibly not as strongly implicated, in the bureaucratic level.
The final element of the base assumptions is about actors not having links to 
themselves, which following the discussion in Chapter 5 follows from the above.
Links
Element 2 of the base assumptions requires us to define the type of link and a 
boundary definition. We already touched on this issue when discussing the boundary 
definition for actors as in our analysis the two are intrinsically linked. The link used in 
the NFP is primarily based on the fact that the policy would have been changed in some 
way directly or indirectly by the fact that the relationship existed. The link strength is not 
related to the number of times that contact was made, because certain people have 
limited time to deal with others and so much more content is packed into fewer 
encounters. This is what is trying to be reflected in the impressionistic ‘impact’ measures 
that are used. The key question addressed is the shaping of the policy. Once again, as 
with the boundary condition for actors, the link type is over specified to allow reduction 
at later stages of the analysis. Relations are to be valued on a scale of 1 to 5, thus 
allowing reduction in two ways: only keeping the stronger rated relations and, if 
necessary, reducing from this metric version to a binary ‘connected or not connected’
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version. The types of relations covered are also over specified covering three different 
types of contact that impact on policy but also asking for an overall figure. The relation 
types are described in the data schedule.
Data collection and quality
Given a clearly defined set of assumptions about the form that the policy network 
takes there needs to be an equally strong emphasis put on the quality of the data that is 
used to construct the NFP representation. In this research it was clear from the start that 
given the undocumented and dispersed nature of the policy processes under 
consideration there could be little use made of “neutral” (or any other) experts to build 
the data. Instead it was decided that, despite potential ’self serving' reporting problems, 
the members of the network would be used as the main source of information. There 
were some exceptions as described below where some expert and media sources were 
used for identification of network members and where data quality was verified by 
asking members of the network to report some third party information. Data quality was 
also assured by the checking of unlikely reciprocation or non-reciprocation of links. 
Furthermore in building the networks it became clear that due to the reduction process 
the core data that remained was of higher quality and was more verifiable (because it was 
for central actors on relations that were known and verified by others) and weaker 
peripheral data that was more difficult to confirm was eliminated from the final 
representations anyway because of its peripherality. The sections below describe how the 
sample was constructed, the interviewing process and how the mass of data was made 
into a form that could be analysed. This mass of data was never intended to be the NFP 
that would be analysed using the network techniques and the reduction process that
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results in the final NFP is detailed under 'Interim data quality'. It should be noted that no 
imputation or estimation was involved in reducing the network; this work was all done 
only on collected raw data and as such is entirely reproducible using the rules below 
given the original collected data. To confirm quality of the reduced network a new 
technique was used to compare the resulting network to the network which might be 
expected from a 'pure snowball' sample.
The final step in creating the NFP is where there are arguable data issues: there is a 
step of adding in certain actors who were previously removed. This process is fully 
explained in 'Creating a definitive NFP'. The process does have a weakness in that it 
relies on imputing links for certain actors based on reports of relations rather than on 
collected numerical data. The data quality of actors involved is nevertheless replicable 
and clearly explained. Some slightly less replicable work is done after the actor set is 
finalised. Some missing links are imputed between actors. The minimal effect of this can 
be seen by comparing actors labeled 1 to 3 in Figures 8.3 and 8.7 and their links with the 
final NFP representation (including re-added actors) in Figures 8.8 and 8.9.
The sampling method
Sampling techniques are not straightforward for networks. For this research in 
particular there was a strict limit on the resources available for the research and those 
resources had to take into account the fact that the interviews that collected the data for 
the network also had to serve as interviews for the case study element. The sampling 
technique that was used was a hybrid of an informal version of a probability proportional 
to size (PPS) sampling with factors which adjusted this sampling for the costs of
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interviewing (in terms of time taken to secure interviews) and in terms of benefits for the 
case study element of the research.
The method of sampling used is based on a technique (PPS) for when there is already 
some knowledge of the importance of units in the estimated population for their 
contribution to the parameters that are to be estimated. For example when producing 
price indices at national level, which requires prices of output to be weighted by the 
volume of that output, PPS is often used to ensure that the largest coverage is obtained 
by the smallest sample (i.e. the survey will target the firms that have the highest output as 
they will contribute large parts of the sample of prices).179 This method of sampling has 
clear application in our situation where we already have some knowledge, although 
imperfect and proxy, of the final parameters that we are interested in (mainly if the unit 
is in the population or not). One key parameter in the network is that of the known 
importance, pre-interview, of each actor: a high proportion of these actors in the sample 
has positive repercussions for the quality of the resulting network representation.
In both the UK and the French cases a first interviewee was chosen that had been 
judged as having a central position and this person was asked to produce a list of all the 
potential actors that they considered could be within the population. This list was then 
supplemented by knowledge gained from other written sources such as newspaper 
articles, official publications and the websites of institutions concerned.180 Using 
knowledge about the institutional factors within the NFP the list was ordered into 
priority on the understanding that peripheral actors were not as likely to end up in the 
final version of the NFP. They were also likely to be less useful in terms of providing the 
details of links necessary to construct the ‘snowball’ sample as their links were as likely
179 See for example Eurostat (1998) and Norrman (2004).
180 Full lists can be found in Appendix 6.
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to lead away from the central area as they were to link towards it. As the interviewing 
continued this priority list was reassessed in terms of the number of nominations that 
each actor received from those already interviewed. This combination of external 
institutional information and ongoing network information created an evolving sampling 
frame that corresponds to the sampling method required in that those highest up the list 
were pursued more intently (effectively attempting, but failing to get, a 100% coverage) 
than those lower down the list. These sampling factors were always modified by the cost- 
benefit issues and by the need to obtain interviews with certain actors for the case study 
purposes. This is why, for example, there was a higher sample of academics in the 
French case than might be expected. There are effects of such trade-offs on the final 
network data quality which form part of the data quality assessment below. In relation to 
the sampling and the evolving sampling frame the section below on the ‘eleventh hour 
data collection and verification’ is also relevant. Note that the prioritisation in sampling 
does not imply anything for the analysis of the network or the actors in the network. 
There is no knock on to the analytical results from this sampling method that relies on 
impressionistic ‘reputation’ or ‘importance’; other than any critiques that can be raised of 
it as a sampling policy. Such critiques were considered and rejected -  a decision that is 
upheld by the results where it will be seen that several strongly pursued interviewees 
were eliminated to create the final NFP and unprioritised non-interviewees can end up 
very centrally placed.
The data schedule
The interview data is of two types: core data (for coding) and other data. There are 
also non-interview data; biographical details and contextual information available for
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use. The information that on the relationships was on the ‘content’ of relations and the 
relational ‘forms’ (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 15). For this data collection there are 
three main concerns 1) the hypotheses to be addressed and how they will be tested and 2) 
the need for extra data for checking purposes. The relational content, due to its almost 
infinite potential, has to be decided beforehand and depends on the use that will be made 
of the data and the type of analysis to follow. Given that the thesis will use relatively 
simple tests the relational content was fairly general covering communication links with 
two kinds of additional information on how the communication is carried out (face to 
face, telephone, email) and on the purpose of the communication (informational, 
decision taking). The link types shown on the sheet were simple descriptions, but the 
interviewee was given more detailed explanation to be given about exactly what the link 
types are. The form of relations was defined by an intensity scale from 1-5.
In addition to the questions about the interviewee’s own contacts there were also 
questions to establish the interviewee’s perception about other members of the policy 
network for validation purposes, i.e. a third party contacts table. The questions were 
identical to those concerning the interviewee’s own relations. There was also an 
unstructured section at the end of the interview where the additional data that puts the 
network structure into context were asked.181 
Preparation and coding 
The data is stored in Microsoft Access in a relational database format. This allows for 
the most flexibility in analysis, exporting of data and report building in all stages of the 
work. The database structure has four central tables: an ‘actors’ table (in effect an index 
table, but also containing basic information and interview completion tracking details), a
181 See Appendix 7 for the interview sheet , Appendix 8 for the third party form and Appendix 1 for a sample 
interview.
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table containing the biographical details (‘Interviewee Biography*) and the key ‘links' 
table. This corresponds to the logical structure o f NFPs as outlined in the theoretical 
section o f the thesis. The database was set up in advance of the first interview and as the 
interviews progressed the data was entered allowing checking to be carried out during 
the process (see Appendix 9 -  ‘data for one interviewee’). Reports have also been 
created at various points during the process to examine how the network is developing, 
producing such outputs as the Appendix 10 -  ‘diagram showing the network after 9 
interviews'. With the data entered in whole or part, many such queries can be created 
within a few minutes to produce ad-hoc analyses.
The core interview data was coded directly from the interview sheets into a tailor- 
made data entry form o f Microsoft Access that allows a simple one paged entry o f the 
data as it is seen directly on the interview sheet which then, once entered, is transferred 
into the ‘links table’ in Access as one data element per line in the form shown in Table 
8. 1.
S i j j j l links
1, from
1
to I
........  I
link | 
value;
■' I ..
reported by type of contai
8
ztl link identity
1001 1002 4 1001 a “  (ii)l
1001 1002 2 1001 a (ii)ll
1001 1002 5 1001 a (ii)lll
1001 1002 5 1001 a i
1001 1002 1 1001 b (ii)l
1001 1002 0 1001 b (ii)ll
1001 1002 2 1001 b (ii)lll
1001 1002 2 1001 b * . .....
The most important output produced is the links table used for the formal analysis; this 
is like Table 8.1 but uses a suitable filter to select only the required link types. The result 
is a table that can simply be copied into Microsoft Excel or a text editor for input to
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further analysis. However there are many other secondary analyses and reports that 
Access is able to do directly. The links table could, say, be filtered for a specific actor to 
produce that actors set of neighbours, or the characteristics table could be sorted by 
‘functional role’ to produce an exhaustive list of actors, grouped by role. Access also 
allows easy cross-tabulations which eases the work during the data collection and 
analysis phases.
Eleventh hour data collection and verification
In this project, as in all network studies that do not have a fully defined universe of 
named actors at the outset, the data collection period could have gone on almost 
indefinitely. The length of that almost indefinite period cannot be estimated as the 
population is unknown and the sample continues to evolve by the combination described 
above of the ‘snowball’ method and the sampling with differing weights. A time limit 
has to be imposed on the data collection phase of the research and roughly four weeks 
before this absolute deadline for data collection an assessment was made of how 
complete the network appeared to be and which actors should be approached in the 
eleventh hour to improve the quality of the network data. With a considerable amount of 
data already in it was decided that, while risking methodological purity, it was a 
practically sound idea to use the collected data to carry out a dry run of the creation of an 
NFP that could be used for analysis and to examine, at each stage of an appropriate 
network reduction process, which actors were eliminated from the network and which 
parts of the network seemed to lack acceptable levels of data. In fact, to spoil the 
excitement of the story, it turned out at the end of this verification process that the 
networks produced were acceptably complete according to the tests that were used and
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so this section of the thesis -  originally intended as a dry-run for interim assessment -  
actually produced the final NFPs that were used in the hypothesis testing. The data that 
were used to create these versions of the NFPs were only those collected from interviews 
about the interviewees own contacts: no third-party information was included and no 
imputation was used. This additional information was brought in at the re-additions stage 
described below.
Diversion on snowballs
There is no perfect place to put the following discussion on snowball sampling despite 
the fact that it is absolutely essential; if it is introduced during the sampling section it 
seems to forestall too many other aspects, data that should have appeared later have to be 
pulled back to illustrate calculations and by the time the subtler points of snowballs are 
important they may be forgotten. However, when placed here this section can seem like a 
diversion from the main subject matter. Having the information at this later point does, 
however, allow a full understanding of the points about data quality and completeness of 
actor representation that follow.
Earlier, when discussing the boundary condition, we covered both the principle of 
requiring interaction rather than reaction and the essential condition, part of our basic 
assumptions, that actors must affect the policy output if they are to be considered part of 
the NFP. These key points will now be drawn together with the mathematical aspects of 
snowball sampling. These mathematical aspects are relatively straightforward to follow 
when they are explained in context. Unfortunately I was unable to find any 
straightforward discussions of snowball sampling that addressed the mathematical issues 
that I was concerned with182 within a context that was both appropriate and adequately
182 Mostly the reduction in the growth velocity of the snowball as described below.
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comprehensible and so I was forced to resort to working from first principles. The 
method that I used to do this was to cany out a basic simulation of a snowball sampling 
process, to construct the relevant statistics from this simulation and then to attempt to 
model the statistics by fitting a curve. When this was done I was able to make the 
theoretical links that became obvious when seeing the process as a whole. It must be 
emphasised at this point that this thesis is not intended to be breaking new ground in 
network mathematics and the mathematics that follows is used on an ‘as is’ basis insofar 
as it presents useful methods for estimating parameters that we need to know about the 
networks we are studying. On this basis I am satisfied with the work, however due to the 
lack of peer reviewed work in this area I am unable to present the detail of the 
calculations as fully accurate. Furthermore, as someone with formal training in 
mathematics I know for certain that the method I have used is not elegant. Having said 
this, 1 made double-checks on the range of values that might be expected, using simple 
‘linear change’ or ‘no change’ methodologies and the techniques described in Frank and 
Snijders (1994) and they fall comfortably in the same space of results.183 While the 
verification of the calculations falls outside the work of this thesis I am currently 
producing a version of the work for dissemination to assess its validity. To summarise, 
the inclusion of this mathematical derivation is important in practical terms to the thesis 
and the results are demonstrably usable, but the proofs and elegance of theory are outside 
the scope of the present work.
183 Frank and Snijders (1994) is a statistical paper that 1 suspect could, with a considerable amount of work, be made to 
yield up the useful application that 1 have produced here from first principles. 1 make no apologies that 1 used the 
paper merely to confirm my results were acceptable and did not spend longer deciphering it. I hope that the 
advantages in working from first principles are obvious in pedagogical terms.
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ln(nom )=m.irrt+c 
nom=exp(c ).eA-m.int parameters nom exp (c ) 6,18614
In(nom) m -0,0747
c 1,82231
lasymptote check 79,72|
formula:
rCOMBIN(remalning;r)*COMBIN(tot 
already selected;avnom- 
r)/COMBIN(netsize;avnom)
*r.p(selecting r already selected actors 
when choosing avnom without 
replacement)
ts intrv nom total
0
remain
80
ln( remain)
4,38
In(nom) r 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.0 1 6.0 6,0 74 4,30 1,79 6
0,5 2 5,6 11.6 68 4,23 1,71 1E-06 3E-04 0,013 0,23 1,608 3,699
1,2 3 4.8 16,3 64 4,15 1,56 1E-04 0,005 0,083 0,596 1,908 2,185
1,6 4 4.4 20,8 59 4,08 1,49 9E-04 0,024 0,222 0,951 1,871 1,357
1,9 5 4.1 24,9 55 4,01 1,42 0,003 0,055 0,37 1,151 1,666 0.9
2.1 6 3.9 28, B 51 3,94 1.35 0,008 0,105 0,53 1,253 1,389 0,579
2,4 7 3,6 32,3 48 3,86 1,28 0,017 0,174 0,681 1,257 1,094 0,36
2,7 8 3.3 35,6 44 3,79 1,19 0,031 0,259 0,803 1,178 0,817 0,214
2,9 9 3,1 38,7 41 3,72 1,13 0,048 0,33 0,865 1,075 0,632 0,141
3,1 10 2.9 41,6 38 3,65 1,06 0,068 0,403 0,898 0,948 0,474 0,09
3,3 11 2,7 44,3 36 3.58 0.98 0,095 0,474 0,898 0,806 0,342 0,055
3,5 12 2.5 46,7 33 3,50 0,90 0,126 0,538 0,865 0,659 0,238 0,032
3,7 13 2.3 49,1 31 3,43 0,84 0,151 0,573 0,827 0,564 0,182 0,022
3.9 14 2,1 51.2 29 3,36 0,75 0,19 0,613 0,747 0,429 0,116 0,012
4.0 15 2.0 53,1 27 3,29 0,68 0,219 0,629 0,681 0,347 0,083 0,008
4,2 16 1.8 55,0 25 3,22 0,60 0,248 0,633 0,608 0,274 0,058 0,005
4.2 17 1.8 56,7 23 3,15 0,56 0,283 0,631 0,57 0,241 0,048 0,004
4.4 18 1.6 58,3 22 3.08 0,48 0,292 0,618 0,46 0,182 0,031 0,002
4.5 19 1.5 59,8 20 3,00 0.39 0,32 0,593 0.41 0,132 0,02 0,001
4.6 20 1.4 61,2 19 2,93 0,34 0,333 0,576 0,37 0,11 0,015 8E-04
4,7 21 1.3 62.5 18 2.86 0,23 0,356 0,531 0,293 0.075 0,009 4E-04
4.8 22 1.2 63,7 16 2,79 0,18 0,366 0.505 0.257 0,06 0,006 2E-04
4.9 23 1.1 64.8 15 2,72 0,12 0,374 0,476 0.222 0,047 0,005 2E-04
4.9 24 1.1 65,9 14 2,65 0,05 0,381 0,444 0.189 0.037 0,003 1E-04
5.0 25 1.0 66.8 13 2,58 -0.02 0,385 0.41 0,159 0,028 0,002 6E-05
5,1 26 0.9 67,8 12 2,51 -0,09 0,387 0,374 0,131 0,02 0,001 3E-05
5,2 27 0.8 68,6 11 2,43 -0,17 0,388 0,337 0,105 0,015 9E-04 2E-05
5,2 28 0.8 69,4 11 2,36 -0,26 0,382 0,298 0,083 0,01 5E-04 9E-06
5.3 29 0.7 70,1 10 2,30 -0,35 0,374 0,259 0,063 0,007 3E-04 4E-06
5.4 30 0,6 70,7 9 2,23 -0,46 0,362 0,22 0,046 0,004 1E-04 2E-06
5.4 31 0.6 71,3 9 2,16 -0,46 0,362 0,22 0,046 0,004 1E-04 2E-06
5,4 32 0.6 71,9 8 2,09 -0,58 0,347 0,181 0,032 0,002 7E-05 6E-07
5,4 33 0.6 72,5 8 2,02 -0,58 0,347 0,181 0,032 0,002 7E-05 6E-07
5.5 34 0.5 73,0 7 1,95 -0,71 0,326 0,144 0,021 0,001 3E-05 1E-07
5,5 35 0,5 73,4 7 1,88 -0,71 0,326 0,144 0,021 0.001 3E-OS 1E-07
5.6 36 0,4 73,9 6 1.81 -0,86 0.3 0,109 0,012 5E-04 7E-06 2E-08
5,6 37 0,4 74,3 6 1,74 -0,86 0.3 0,109 0,012 5E-04 7E-06
5.6 38 0.4 74,6 5 1,68 -1,05 0,268 0,077 0,006 2E-04 1E-06
5,6 39 0.4 75,0 5 1.61 -1,05 0,268 0,077 0,006 2E-04 1E-06
5.6 40 0.4 75.3 5 1.54 -1,05 0,268 0,077 0,006 2E-04
5,7 41 0.3 75,6 4 1.48 -1,27 0,23 0,049 0,003 4E-05
5,7 42 0.3 75,9 4 1,41 -1,27 0,23 0,049 0,003 4E-05
5,7 43 0.3 76,2 4 1,34 -1,27 0,23 0,049 0,003
5.8 44 0.2 76,4 4 1,28 -1,56 0,184 0,026 7E-04
5,8 45 0,2 76,6 3 1,22 -1,56 0,184 0,026 7E-04
5.8 46 0.2 76,8 3 1,16 -1,56 0,184 0,026
5,8 47 0.2 77,0 3 1,09 -1,56 0,184 0,026
5.9 48 0.1 77,2 3 1,04 -1,96 0,131 0,009
5.9 49 0,1 .77,3 3 0,99 -1,96 0,131 0,009
5.9 50 0,1 77.4 3 0,94 -1,96 0,131 0,009
5.9 51 0,1 77,6 2 0,88 -2,03 0,131
5.9 52 0.1 77,7 2 0,83 -2,03 0,131
5.9 53 0,1 77,8 2 0.77 -2,03 0,131
5.9 54 0,1 78,0 2 0,71 -2,03 0,131
5.9 55 0.1 78,1 2 0,64 -2,03 0,131
5.9 56 0,1 78,2 2 0,60 -2,66 0,07
5.9 57 0.1 78,2 2 0,56 •2,66 0,07
5.9 58 0.1 78,3 2 0,52 -2,66 0,07
5.9 59 0,1 78,4 2 0,48 -2,66 0,07
5.9 60 0.1 78,5 2 0,44 -2,66 0,07
5.9 61 0,1 78,5 1 0,39 -2,66 0,07
5.9 62 0,1 78,6 1 0,34 -2,66 0.07
5.9 63 0,1 78,7 1 0,29 -2,66 0,07
5.9 64 0.1 78.7 1 0,23 -2,66 0,07
5.9 65 0,1 78,8 1 0,18 -2,66 0,07
5,9 66 0,1 78,9 1 0,12 -2,66 0,07
5.9 67 0,1 78,9 1 0,05 -2,66 0,07
5.9 68 0,1 79,0 1 0,07
205
Mapping and data
Imagine a snowball sample situation where each actor nominates their contacts. We 
set parameters, for the purposes of simulating the situation: the network is 80 (netsize) 
actors in total, each actor has the same number of contacts, which is therefore the mean 
number -  this will be set at six (avnom=6). The process being simulated is that each 
actor is interviewed in sequentially at random. Interview number one (intrv=l) is easy to 
model: the actor names six contacts -  none of whom are already listed in the network. 
She has nominated six she has revealed six new population members (nom=6) making a 
cumulative total of six revealed actors {total=6). The total number of actors remaining to 
be uncovered is now 74.
netsize - total = remain = 74 
The second interview is slightly more complicated in terms of calculating the expected 
numbers of newly revealed actors. The problem is analogous to the classic statistical 
problem of drawing balls from a bag without replacement. This is because the second 
actor being interviewed has no knowledge of who has already been nominated and 
therefore revealed (let us say ‘green’ actors) and who has not (say ‘red’ actors). 
Therefore, although the interviewee is unaware, there is a ‘bag of actors’ with 6 green 
and 74 red from which she is going to nominate (i.e. draw without replacement, as once 
a given interviewee has nominated one contact they are not allowed to name them again) 
6 contacts at random. This ‘at random’ is from the point of view of the experiment as far 
as the ‘bag’ and ‘colours’ are concerned, clearly not from the point of view of the actor 
being interviewed. We know that the interviewee will nominate six contacts so she can 
draw anything between zero ‘red’ actors and six ‘red’ actors, let us call this variable x. 
The expected number (or in layman’s terms ‘average number’) of red actors will be 
given by the sum of the probabilities for drawing x of them multiplied by x:
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E (reds drawn )= x . P( drawing x reds)
The solution to the problem uses the binomial function to calculate the probability for
each of their x values according to the formula:
remain total,
P ( * )= netsize.c
avnom — x where nC
avnom
In the simulation it can be seen that the expected number of red (i.e. not already
the running total of already nominated, i.e. green, actors thus changing the probabilities 
for the next interview. Table 8.2 below shows the full simulation results. The 
information that is of interest to us is how this expected number of new nominations, i.e. 
newly revealed actors, (nom) gets smaller as the interviews progress. How this parameter 
decreases is very important for assessing the value of further costly interviews in terms 
of getting more information and, furthermore the family of functions that represents such 
curves allows us to estimate the final size of the network -  the total hidden population. 
Once the curves are drawn what became obvious is that the reduction of nom is an 
exponential decrease. This is because the probabilities of the nominations occurring are 
binomial, this distribution can be approximated by a Poisson distribution and the decay 
curve of events that occur in a Poisson process is an exponential function. It is outside 
the scope of this thesis to do the mathematics of how the parameters of the binomial can 
be reconstructed into the parameters of the exponential decay curve, but they can be 
easily extracted by taking a natural-log-linear regression and converting back to the 
exponential curve. When we wish to use the exponential decay model on data that we
nominated) actors for the second interviewee (intrv=2) is 5.6. This figure now feeds into
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Figure 8.1: UK network showing removals fo r  Stage 1 o f  the reduction process
(in blue)
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have collected we will do a similar process o f reverse working to find the parameters as 
we will be working from point estimates and not distributions.
To obtain the curve’s parameters the regression is performed on the straight line that is 
the natural logarithm (e) o f the new nominations series (nom):
ln( nom ) = m. in trv+ c
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brought back to estimate nom itself this gives (taking exponentials):
c m.intrvnom =  e e
Note that as the curve is decaying the m parameter is always negative. The final 
mathematical feature of the data that is useful to us is to see that the cumulative total of 
nominated actors is growing asymptotically towards the parameter we set for the overall 
size of the network {netsize). We made the assumption that the network in the simulation 
is of some finite size and this reflects our assumptions that an NFP is limited in size 
according to its definition. Thanks to the procedure of making sensible assumptions our 
estimate for the size of the hidden population is converging to the true value.
We use the parameters of the exponential decay curve to estimate total size of the 
network as it is the sum of all new nominations of all interviewees. As we are using a 
continuous function to model a discrete process we can sum the individual estimates of 
nom to infinity, which means all actors are interviewed:
00
netsize = ^  nom
intrv=  1
2 ,  e e
intrv=  1
m.intrv
This expression is evaluated as a check in Table 8.2 in the box ‘asymptote check’. 
Given this model, the simulation and parameters of which are shown in Table 8.2, we 
can now start to examine the data that we have already collected and if we provide some 
parameters - combinations of the level of new nominations or the network size at
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Figure 8.2: UK network showing removals fo r  Stage 2 o f  the reduction process (in
blue)
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specified stages o f interviewing - we can estimate any o f the others. We will now end 
this diversion and return to the evaluation o f the current network data quality.
Interim data quality 
As explained above the data was over specified to allow ‘cuts’ to be made to achieve a
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manageable self limiting network and to give, effectively, a sensitivity analysis on the 
link data.
The first step of the estimation process was to create a network exactly according to 
the data that had already been collected. A series of network manipulations were then 
carried out using Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 2003). The following stages were an attempt 
to presage the process that would create a representation of the NFP had all the data been 
collected. That is to say that the large population of all potential NFP members would be 
cut down to a size that reflects the assumption of Marin and Mayntz (1991: 17) that we 
have already taken on board: the actors must be able to interact rather than react. The 
network must also reflect the boundary definition that we adopted which was related to 
those who affected the ‘policy output’ (see Chapter 5 above). The first step was an 
iterative reduction of the network eliminating all actors who were not nominated by at 
least one other actor.184 This makes the network equivalent to one that has been 
obtained by a method akin to a snowball sample. The second step that was taken was to 
remove all links that were weaker than value three and to once again iteratively remove 
all actors that are not nominated by at least one actor. This is a reasonably safe 
procedure as anyone that is key in the network should be mentioned by some actor more 
strongly even if they are weakly nominated by others. Each actor removed can later be 
looked at to see if they were much nominated, but only weakly, which if it is the case 
would be a phenomenon worth further investigation. The third step was based upon the 
institutional element of the boundary condition for actors: the relation to the policy 
output. An artificial node was inserted into the network, called ‘output’ that was given a 
reciprocated relation (an edge) of value 5 with those actors deemed to be institutionally
184 In formal network terms this is eliminating all nodes with an ‘in-degree’ of less than 1.
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Figure 8.3: UK network showing removals fo r  Stage 3 o f  the reduction process (in
blue)
(4) impBlaiT
(4) ThoineC
(3) MacDonaldJ
a(3) impBrownl
[2) Qraj
(0] output
'1) impDarl
;-[2) MillibandE; ^^impLird»IE 
j(2) Newmanc/
[21 WardD (4] PowdlS
PataC,
[4) Blsboii
[4] T okleyS(3) BettsP,
(4] GlassboroS
,(3) K dj
HomibrookB (4) LoganF
(4] Rattettyl w (4] MackreUP
responsible for the policy output. Sensitivity analysis is also of value in this procedure as 
well asking, for example, if it makes a difference if the Prime Minister is deemed to be 
jointly responsible for the policy output along with the departmental minister, or not. The 
network was then partitioned into the increasing k-neighbours of this ‘output’ node. That 
is to say the network was labelled to show all those actors who, by either being
2 1 2
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nominated or nominating, are 1-step from the output, 2-steps and so on. There is a slight 
weakness in this procedure; it might be argued that this allows an actor to include 
themselves in the NFP through interview by claiming that they had contact with the actor 
responsible for the output. There is indeed some danger in allowing this ‘output 
neighbour’ measure rather than just ‘input neighbour’ (i.e. they were nominated by the 
actor, or by someone nominated by the actor), however it is almost entirely unavoidable 
in this study as the actors responsible for the output were not interviewed. The actors that 
were more than 3 steps away from the output node were removed. So, in effect, the third 
step removed actors more than 2 steps away from those deemed to be institutionally 
responsible for the output. This final NFP representation was then labelled to show the 
input degree (i.e. number of nominations) received by each actor.
Each step removed either some actors that were interviewed (although certain actors 
concerned were interviewed for case study purposes in the knowledge that they would 
very likely be removed) or it removed some actors that could have been expected to be 
central in the network - the consequences of this are discussed below. Any actors that 
were eliminated on the technical conditions applied but were known to be connected to 
the network through other information, either primary or secondary sources, were noted. 
Any re-inclusions cascading on from these additions were also noted. Secondly any 
actors that should have been ‘promoted’ to nearer the output, due to a link from a higher 
actor that was known to exist from similar information as the reinclusions, were noted 
for promotion and the effects of this were cascaded to their known neighbours if 
appropriate for noting inclusion or promotion.
At this stage a network could be created that was a ‘best guess’ on the existing data 
and additional information. What was needed, however, was an estimate for the size of
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Figure 8.5: French network showing removals fo r  Stage 2 o f  the reduction process (in
blue)
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the complete network to draw conclusions about remaining ‘missing and unknown’ 
actors. If, for example, a level two actor (i.e. an actor that is one step from the actors 
connected to the output) who was already known to be in the network had not been 
interviewed then, while some of their contacts would almost certainly already be in the
214
Chapter VIII
current estimate o f the NFP, there is some probability that they would introduce one or 
more entirely new actors into the NFP estimate. This is the effect o f the ‘snowball'-type 
design discussed earlier. In order to try and estimate how complete the network was, in 
terms o f actors, some basic statistics were constructed, particularly important to estimate 
was the current ‘growth velocity' of the snowball. To recap, while the snowball grows 
much faster in the early stages of the network construction, in the later stages even 
though the newly interviewed actors would continue to roll it, on average, over just as 
much ground (i.e. nominate the same number of actors) they would not pick up as much 
snow because much of this ground would have already been covered at least once 
already.185
Figure 8.4: Modelled running total o f  estimated NFP network size (total) and 
new nominations (nom) at each interview
9,00 60
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6,00 40
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- o ~  France nom 
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- •  France total
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3,00 20
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If we can estimate the growth velocity to see how many new actors are likely to be 
introduced by each interview and, as we have seen above, the set o f equations that allows
183 All other things being equal, which they were not due to the sampling techniques used, see above.
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us to do this can also predict the limit size of the network and so we can estimate how 
many actors are 'missing and unknown’.
The tables 8.3 and 8.4 show two key statistics at the various stages of the network 
reduction process described above; in the table 'a ir  indicates no reduction, after stage 2 
o f the process is labelled ‘S>2’ and after stage 3, i.e. the resultant NFP, is denoted by 
'N FP’. The statistics shown for these three stages are 'out', the number of contacts 
named by each actor (the out-degree) and ‘nom’ value that shows how many additional 
actors would have been added to the network if each actor already interviewed had been 
the last actor to be interviewed.186 So for example out (NFP) indicates the total number 
o f contacts named by each actor who still remain after the final stage of the network 
reduction process. The means are also calculated for these per actor statistics.
Table 8.3: Snowball growth velocity for France after 18 interviews
A cto r NFP level out (NFP) out (S > 2 ) nom (NFP) nom  (S > 2 ) nom all
Le M orvan 2119 4 11 10 14
B ro ca s 2 04 9 11
M andraud2004 5
Fitoussi2006 4
Paolini2090 2 7 7 4 4 9
le D uigou2010 3 11 14 0 3 7
B ras2051 2 10 10 5 3 4
C re y sse l2122 2
Touiisse2013 2 12 13 1 1 2
M e yeu r2099 3 3 5 1 1 2
R igaudiat2036 2 11 11 1 0 1
Taup in2003 2 11 11 0 0 0
M orgenstern 2018 2 10 10 0 0 0
Leg ro s2029 3 5 8 0 0 0
B ertran d2123 5
D erou ssen2017 3 5 5 0 0 0
P ech2109 1
S terdyn iak2007 3 0 0 0
M EANS 2 .4 0 8 .5 0 8 .75 1 .20 1 .83 3 .7 2
nfp level2 10.20 1 .83
nfp level3 8 .0 0 0 .2 5
n 12 10 12 10 12 18
The data shows that for both countries the snowball has slowed down considerably,
Calculated from the raw data using Microsoft Access SQL queries.
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Table 8.5: Model for UK stage 3 NFP (19 actors) after 21 interviews 
UK: Exponential model
E stim ates Data (note 1)
UK UK
UK nom / UK total/
int nom avnom total netsize int actual nom In
1 7.32 1.00 7 0.19 1[ 7.32 1.99
2 5.91 0.81 13 0.35
3 4.78 0.65 18 0.47 i9ps;i ’" 0 .1 6  j -1.85
4 3.86 0.53 22 0.57
5 3.12 0.43 25 0.66
6 2.52 0.34 28 0.72 Param eters
7 2.04 0.28 30 0.78
8 1.65
1.33
0.22
0.18
31
33
0.82 exp ( c ) 9.053382 
m -0.2131039 0.85
10 1.07 0.15 34 0.88 c 2.203138
11 0.87 0.12 34 0.90
12 0.70 0.10 35 0.92 f
13 0.57 0.08 36 0.94 Estim ate
14 0.46 0.06 36 0.95
15 0.37 0.05 37 0.96 netsize 38.11748
16 0.30 0.04 37 0.97 A
i
i17 0.24 0.03 37 0.97
18 0.20 0.03 37 0.98 1i
19 0.16 0.02 37 0.98 i/
20 0.13 0.02 38 0.99 Ii
21 0.10 0.01 38 0.99 /1
22 0.08 0.01 38 0.99 1
23 0.07 0.01 38 0.99 //
24 0.05 0.01 38 0.99 /
25 0.04 0.01 38 1.00 1t
26 0.04 0.00 38 1.00 11
27 0.03 0.00 38 1.00 /
28 0.02 0.00 38 1.00 /
29 0.02 0.00 38 1.00 i/
30 0.02 0.00 38 1.00 1
31 0.01 0.00 38 1.00 1
32 0.01 0.00 38 1.00 /
33 0.01 0.00 38 1.00
I
34 0.01 0.00 38 1.00
!
i
35 0.01 0.00 38 1.00 /
36 0.00 0.00 38 1.00 //
37 0.00 0.00 38 1.00 11
38 0.00 0.00 38 1.00 I1
39 0.00 0.00 38 1.00 1
40 0.00 0.00 38 1.00
|l in e a r  regression  
[’the i n t ’ U n terv ie  
i  and In {natural *
|o f  data) produces 
[parameters
L  * im ~ w *
r ; r
II
Note 1: The data here comes from Table 5.4 being the mean out(NFP) and nom(NFP) figures respectively, that is the 
expected average nominations if each actor were interviewee 1 and 19.
the out degree value (forgetting the complications inherent in reducing the network) 
gives an idea o f the initial growth velocity of the snowball: the mean number o f 
nominations (link strength > 2) supposing each actor was the hypothetical first 
interviewee would have been somewhere around eight or nine for France and for the UK 
around eight (this is the mean o f out(S>2)). By the time we get to the 14th interview for
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France and 21st for the UK, the growth velocity, which is the mean of the ‘nom' 
variable, has dropped, in the experimentally reduced NFPs o f 12 and 19 actors, to just 
over 1 and under 0.2 respectively (mean of nom(NFP)).
Table 8.4: Snowball growth velocity for UK after 21 interviews
A cto r N FP level out (NFF1) out (S > 2 ) nom  (NFP) nom  (S > 2 ) nom  all
Pate 1011 3 11 15 0 F g 5
E atock1013 3 5 10 0 3 5
C ocke ttl 0 08 2 17 18 3 2 3
H ornibrookl 0 33 3 6 13 0 1 1
M acP h erson 1020 2 6 7 0 1 1
OppenheirrH 0 34 7 1 1
Feke te1002 3 12 12 0 0 0
N ew  man 1001 2 12 12 0 0 1
M lliband1024 2 10 10 0 0 0
Couling1040 2 9 9 0 0 0
Farrell 1006 3 6 9 0 0 3
W o o d 1 0 16 3 7 8 0 0 0
A still1005 2 7 7 0 0 0
Phipps 1003 3 7 7 0 0 0
W a rd  1007 2 7 7 0 0 0
S e a rle1 0 1 8 2 6 6 0 0 6
Balls 1058 2 3 5 0 0 0
M acD onald1012 3 4 4 0 0 1
G ra y 1019 2 3 3 0 0 1
Ball 1009 2 1 1 0 0 0
R o s s 103 6 0 0 2
M EANS 2 .4 2 7 .3 2 ^ 8 .1 0 0 .1 6 0 .5 2 1 .43
nfp level2 7 .7 3 0 .2 7
n fp level3 9 .4 4 0 .8 9
n 19 19 21 19 21 21
This figure represents the mean number o f actors being nominated that had not been 
nominated before, had each interviewee been last. This implies that we can on average a 
hypothetical next interviewee to own around this number o f ‘missing and unknown’ 
actors. Further hypothetical interviews would reveal fewer and fewer ‘missing and 
unknowns’ according to the same pattern o f decline in the snowball’s velocity as has 
already been seen. Remember that this is not a linear relation, it falls away exponentially 
as described above and as illustrated in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.
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Figure 8.7: France network showing removals fo r  Stage 3 o f  the reduction process (in
pink and dark blue -  labelled 4 and 5)
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With the model described above and the statistics shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 on the 
snowball velocities, we can construct a model of the snowball sampling process for each 
of the different versions of the NFP. Table 8.5 shows the series of data that forms the 
model for the UK stage 3 reduced NFP.
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Figure 8.6: Fraction o f total estimated NFP network size (total/netsize) and 
fraction o f new nominations in total nominations (nom/avnom) at each
interview
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►
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As can be seen in Table 8.5 we have the estimate o f the final network size (netsize) 
and we can see the additional previously un-nominated actors that can be expected to 
emerge at each additional interview as well as the running cumulative total. These data 
are presented in Figures 8.4 and 8.6 and show the rapid reduction in new nominations 
and the asymptotic approach to the final network size. Note that the calculations are 
based on continuous functions and as such fractions can be taken to represent 
probabilities, e.g. a new nominations value of 0.25 for the sixteenth interview would 
indicate a one-in-four chance of a new nomination in that interview
Creating a definitve NFP
These charts are valuable for making a rough assessment o f how the data collection is 
progressing and given that the size of the estimated NFP that emerged from the last stage
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of the reduction process was very close to the estimated final network size it was decided 
that both the statistics from this model and the estimated NFP with potential promotions 
and additions should be looked at more closely. Firstly the model results for the 
estimated sizes of the three stages o f the networks for the two countries were estimated 
at both the current level of interviews ad the projected final network size. The standard 
errors o f the means in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 were also used to calculate confidence intervals 
around the network size estimates.
Table 8.6: UK Network sizes with 95% confidence intervals: at interview=int 
(total) and final projected size (netsize) from modelled interview-only data and
all available information
UK
out all ; nom all out (S >2) S nom (S>2) out (NFP) nom (NFP)
M EANS 12.19 1.43 8.10 0.52 7 .32 0.16
int 21 21 19
est total 107 60 37
upper 95CI 142 96 59
lower 95CI 85 10 9
data total 72 50 32
est netsize 120 63 38
upper 95CI 167 110 62
lower 9SC1 71 14 12
data netsize 36
Table 8.7: France Network sizes with 95% confidence intervals: at 
interview-int (total) and final projected size (netsize) from  modelled interview- 
only data and all available information
France
out all nom all out (S>2) nom (S>2) out (NFPjf nom (NFP)
MEANS 14.89 3.72 8.75 1.83 8.50 1.20
int 18 12 10
est total 146 54 39
upper 9 5 0 205 83 58
lower 95CI 85 10 9
data total 107 60 41
est netsize 190 66 43
upper 95C1 287 118 72
lower 95CI 98 10 9
data netsize ! 51
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Table 8.8: removed actors in the French network reduction
Stage 1
* Bertrand,X r3
* Brimont,S
* Chirac,J rX
* Creyssel.J r3
* Gayssot,J-M rY
* Hollande.F
* Hue.R
* Mandraud.l
* Mer.F
* Rocard.M
* Salat-Barou,f rX
* Seillere,E r3
Stage 2
* Brocas.AM
* Delevoye.J r3
* Fabius.L
* Fitoussi.J
* Pech.T
* Rocchi.JF r3
* Sapin.M
* Schramek.O
* Strauss-Kahn.D rZ
* Villeroy de Gallau
Acoyer,
Bachy,
Bayet,
Becresse,
Bichot.J
Blondel.M
Boyon,
Carayon,
Chantepy.C
Coen.E
Comilleau
Dessaint.J
Douste-Blazy.P
Geulaud
Gremetz,
Jacquart.D
Jeannet.A
Kluzer
Labroille,
Le Garrec,
Lianos.F
Mahieux.S
Mazeroll
Notat,N
Pele.LP
Pierre,JP
Quinet.A
Rey.JL
Seux
Steinmetz,
Touraine.M
Van Eeck
Wallon.V
Waquet.C
Wenz-Dumas
Stage 3
* Blouet.K
* Caila.P r3
* Le Morvan.F
* Libault.D
* Moreau,Y
* Sterdyniak.H 
Blanchet.D 
Charpentier 
Chevrier.V 
CNAV.A 
Guilhembet 
Lassus-Min 
Le Roux.M 
Lefebvre.E 
Mair6,J 
MinFin,B 
MinFin,C 
MinFin,M 
Nathan 
Ricordeau, 
Tisseron.S
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Figure 8.8: UK fina l network after reinclusions (showing colour coded k-steps
from  Darling)
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Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show the relevant parameters from Tables 8.3 and 8.4 along with 
the calculated estimates for ‘total’ (being the network size at the given number of 
interviews) and ‘netsize’ (the projected final network size). The equivalent figures from
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the actual data and the reintroduction/promotion process carried out on the basis of other 
information are also shown. The table thus presents, on one hand ‘est’, the estimated 
figures modelled using interview data relating only to the interviewed actors and, on the 
other, the ‘data’ figures based on all available information from, but not limited to, the 
interviews.
For both UK and France it can be seen from the tables 8.6 and 8.7 that, in the 
estimated NFP and also for the version reduced on the link stronger than two criterion , 
the estimated size of the network at this stage (19 and 10 interviews respectively) shows 
a good correspondence with the actual network size (indicating a good model) and that 
the projected final network size is only a little bigger than the current position.
For this intermediate NFP version we can also see that the cascading reinclusion and 
promotion technique used to try and create a final network gives a figure very close tothe 
projected final network size from the model (model estimate of 38 compared to a created 
36 for the UK and model estimate of 43 compared to a created 51 for France). It can 
therefore be concluded from this data summaiy and from the modelled curves that we are 
extremely close to the end of discovering new actors and that we have almost completely 
enumerated the NFP through interviews already conducted. The next two paragraphs 
give a summaiy of the process of reduction and the reintroduction and promotion process 
that led to the predicted final NFP versions.
In Table 8.8 the actors for the French case that are excluded at each stage of the 
network reduction process are listed, note that Stage 1 removes a large number of actors 
who have not been referenced at all but were present in die actor list due to either the 
initial informant or other sources. Table 8.7 tells us that there were estimated to be, at the 
ten interviews stage, 39 actors in the network and there were 41 in the reduced network
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Figure 8.9: French fina l network after reinclusions (showing colour coded party 
loyalty -  blue = left, yellow = non-aligned, green = right)
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that was created from the data. The estimate for the full network is that it would have 43 
actors. On the removal lists in Table 8.8 the actors that we will reintroduce have been 
annotated -  this pushes the network size up to 51, eight more actors than the estimate,
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we ought not to expect many others. The readditions are classified into three groups. The 
first and least controversial is ‘r3\ which denotes an actor added in as a result of reliable 
third party information given by interviewees, limited to those interviewees who had 
described specific working practices (informal committees, continuing sets of relations 
such as all technical advisers working closely together) and excluding implicit links 
(such as someone saying that minister X was important, hence implying that they, 
minister X, had contact with another key minister). The second group is denoted by ‘rX’ 
which introduces the President of the Republic Jacques Chirac and his most senior 
Cabinet adviser on social issues, Frederic Salat-Barroux on the grounds that there is 
good third party evidence that he (Salat-Barroux) was involved in the policy making 
process and that we can assume that the President discusses a politically sensitive 
policy like this with his Prime Minister. This is particularly likely in this specific case of 
President and Prime-Minister (see Chapter 3). The last two reasons for reintroduction 
are denoted ‘rY’ and ‘rZ’, they both refer to the reasonable deduction that if a minister’s 
advisers are being nominated by others advisers then we can safely assume that the 
minister is also involved (a similar argument, in fact, to that for introducing Chirac). It is 
interesting that this fails to introduce either Elisabeth Guigou, the Minister for Social 
Affairs in the Jospin II Government nor Laurent Fabius, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs in the same Government. Another notable exception is that of Francis Mer, the 
Minister of Finance for Raffarin during the period under consideration. While there is 
ample evidence187 of many actors formerly at Bercy (the Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
there are no nominations of anyone currently serving there.188 There are two promotions 
to be made on the basis of similar information used for the reintroductions: Phillipe Bas
187 Interview with Jacques Creyssel.
188 There is evidence from the interviews that this is a reasonable finding.
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was nominated in the network and being the adviser of Raffarin we can assume that a 
link exists promoting him to level two, this has no knock-on effects as he was not 
interviewed and so has no contacts that were excluded as level 4 that need to be 
reintroduced, in addition Francois Chereque, who from several sources is known to have 
been involved in the end game of the policy process certainly has a link worth 3 to the 
PM -  this has the knock on effect of introducing Thierry Pech who worked for him at the 
CFDT at the time.
For the UK case the data in Table 8.6 shows at the 19 interview stage an estimated 
network size of 37 while the network created from the data has 32 actors. The estimated 
size of the full network is predicted to be 38 -  with the inclusions described below the 
data finally creates a network of 36 actors, an acceptable approximation. There is only 
one potential set of reinclusions for the UK, annotated on Table 8.9, which circulate 
around the Prime Minister and his advisers that were known to be involved in the 
process. There are several references from actors towards the PM’s advisers and Ed 
Balls references the PM and his Private Secretary, but as Balls is currently at level 3 in 
the network Blair is removed. Since we have at least two reasons (see below) for 
reversing this elimination Blair can, at least for now, be included at level 2 and so his 
advisers are reincluded at level 3. On the promotions side there is some work to be done 
as the key actor for the output, the minister Alastair Darling, was not interviewed but 
there is good evidence about many actors who worked directly with him. Hence, Gordon 
Brown the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Elspeth Johnson, Darling’s special adviser, and 
Kate Kelly, his Private Secretary, can be safely assumed to have been level 2 even 
though neither they nor Darling have interview data to support this. Also it is clear that 
Emma Lindsell, who was the lead Treasury civil servant at Grade 7 level, was present in
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small configuration meetings with Alastair Darling and would have interacted directly in 
these meetings on policy matters. The implications of these promotions are not worrying 
for the consequences of introducing new actors as it is clear from the UK data that the 
more central actors are, the less likely they will nominate actors that are unknown to 
others.
Table 8.9: removed actors in the UK network reduction
Stage 1 
Wilson,R 
Hawkins, D
Stage 2
* LomaxR
* MillibandD rX
* OppenheimC
* RookerJ
rX
* RossT
* SmithA
AthowJ
BartlettP
BielbyM
BroomeM
DigaceN
DoddC
EghanD
FeighanG
GuestC
HeminsleyS
HughesJ
JohnsonP
SandersonA
ThomasG
WarburtonR
WestS
Stage 3
* HeywoodJ rX
* BlairT rX 
AkroydE 
BilsboroughM 
CunliffeH 
GlassboroS 
HillaryJ 
LoganF 
MackrellP 
MameyJ 
MathiesonM 
McCleanC 
PowellS 
Raffertyl 
RodgersG 
ThomeC 
TokleyS 
TottieD
As we are now sure that we will use this data for the analysis there are some further 
questions to be addressed. The first question is whether Gordon Brown should be 
supposed to be jointly responsible for the policy output, along with Alastair Darling. 
Remember that this is not vital in terms of the analyses that will follow but only in its 
effect on the actors included in this final network. The second question is about Blair and 
how he is reincluded in the network. These questions are in fact linked as the only real 
effect of Brown being promoted to being an output connected actor (1-step) is that Balls,
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McPherson and Blair become level two actors and hence Blair’s advisers are all brought 
in as level 3 actors (Balls’ only contacts that are brought in by his promotion are Blair 
and his advisers so there is no extra knock-on). However, if we leave Brown at level 2, 
this means that Blair must be deemed to have a link strength of at least 3 with Brown or 
Darling (or anyone else at level 2 for that matter) to even be included and must have at 
least a strength 3 link with Darling in order to come in at level 2 so that his advisers to be 
included. The best evidence that we have in this area is from Ed Balls, he was talking to 
both Heywood, Blair’s Senior Private Secretary and to Blair himself with strengths of 3 
or above. This gives us reasonably good grounds for assuming we can impute a link 
strength of 3 between Blair and Brown. This is not guaranteed though as in the context 
of No. 10 it is likely that the actual engagement in the policy process is done by advisers 
and the Chancellor and the PM meet only to approve the work and tend to discuss more 
politics than policy. As for Darling, we have little to go on. No-one that is close to 
Darling in the network was meeting Blair himself and Oppenheim was the only adviser 
referenced from this part of the network and she was not placed above the level 3 
threshold that would put her in the final network. If there was only one possibility of 
introducing Blair and his team and we were unsure of the probabilities it would be 
reasonable to call it 50-50 and so stick with our no change policy and not introduce 
Blair. Having two possible routes to bring the PM in means that we can be considerably 
less sure than 50-50 for each route and still have the overall probability on the side of 
introducing Blair. So no matter which values we decide to impute between the ministers 
and their PM we shall put Blair and his advisers in the network.We now have robust 
networks that can pass into the analysis phase after some double checking.
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Cleaning and integrity
Before the analyses used in the hypothesis testing can be carried out there must be a 
step of checking the integrity of the data and cleaning any errors either from the reporting 
or coding stages. At the most basic level this involved comparing either side of the 
‘from-to’ relations to check that they are reasonable. There should also be cross 
checking, as mentioned in the interview schedule, of different actors report from a third- 
party viewpoint the existence or level of a relationship. Such integrity checking was done 
using the query formulation functionality in Access to give tables showing which links 
meet given criteria and comparing the major differences by eye to see if there were 
patterns of inconsistency. The final preparation involved the core data (mainly the 
tabulated contacts details but also actor information) being coded into matrix form ready 
for use in C++ or Pajek (see the analyses in Chapter 9). Access allows easy output to 
Excel from where, after manipulation of labels and formats, import into these packages 
is straightforward.
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IX. Testing the hypotheses with NFP methods
Hypotheses 1 and 2 analysis
The actor attributes
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are concerned with looking at the correspondence between some 
of the structural features of the network and the ‘element 6’ actor attributes that are 
endogenous to the network data as described in Chapter 2. For hypothesis 1, concerning 
functional labels, in the UK the networks were divided subgroups of analysts, lawyers, 
generalists, politicians and special advisers.189 The generalist and analyst split within the 
Treasury is a little difficult as while the vast majority of actors from the Treasury are 
economists by training190 they do not tend to be carrying out strictly analyst roles when 
working in the Departmental ‘shadow’ teams posts. The choice was more or less down 
to making everyone at Treasury an analyst or a generalist and as they are not working 
within analyst units, unlike for example, Treasury forecasters would be deemed to be, 
they are classed as generalist civil servants. The other questionable allocation was that of 
Ed Balls who was occupying the Chief Economic Adviser post at the Treasury that in the 
past had always been a career civil servant’s job. Balls was previously special adviser to 
the Chancellor and had taken this post in what amounted to an open competition but on a 
similar contract to that of a special adviser. He did, however from most accounts, carry 
this post out in a way that was compatible with its former status. In terms of network 
relations though it is the case that given the unusual circumstances and the extreme 
closeness in political terms of Brown and Balls he can be classed as being ‘political’ and 
therefore grouped with the special advisers. For hypothesis 2, organisational labels, the
189 The group labels for UK and France are given in Appendix 11.
190 Interestingly this is also true for quite a few of the DWP generalists.
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UK network was divided into subgroups of DWP, HMT and No. 10. There was no 
difficulty in assigning these labels. In France, due to the wider variety of organisations 
from which the actors in the network are drawn, the assigning of functional labels 
becomes more difficult and there is some possible debate over the breakdown. The first 
grouping consists of the members of a ministerial cabinet. This group could potentially 
have been broken down further into Conseiller aupres des Ministres, heads of cabinets, 
technical advisers and perhaps, communications advisers but this split would have 
defined groups that were so small that meaningful analysis would have been difficult. 
The next two groups of external advisers and politicians are quite safe and should not 
cause debate. The subdivisions within the ‘social partners’ are fairly sound and self- 
explanatory, but it could be argued that more general headings should have been found 
that associated functions within the social partners to their equivalents within ministries, 
however, the role of the negotiators from the social partners can be seen to stand alone. 
All the negotiators are officers of their particular organisation and so hold a legitimacy 
and a mandate that appointed members of the ministerial cabinet do not: they are strictly 
functionaries and there to do the bidding of their ministers, which, at least from an 
institutionalist perspective, is a quite different function from their interlocutors on the 
side of the social partners. In the analysis below there is an explanation of how this 
schema is further broken down in the light of how the dissimilarity measure works and 
its relation to the party structure.
The party structure is also important in assigning the organisational labels. For 
example, the actors at ‘Matignon’ the PM’s office, that feature in the network have no 
correspondence between the two periods of left and right government. The French 
system and the nature of the NFP is Such that ‘Matignon socialist’ and ‘Matignon droite’
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are two entirely different organisations. There was no sense in associating two 
organisations that saw a 100% difference in personnel. Perhaps if some of the permanent 
officials, the ‘administration’, of the Government had found their way into the final 
version of the NFP we may have looked again at the question, but under the 
circumstances all the government organisations that are staffed entirely with political 
actors in the NFP are treated as different organisations under left and right. The Social 
Partners are split, quite obviously into MEDEF and the unions, but the unions are not 
split as even in the absence of a common confederal body they are still theoretically one 
‘movement’ and in any case the splitting down would merely result in a list of singletons 
which are of no use in the analysis. Two politicians who represent the legislature are also 
present in the network and their organisational label reflects their institutional position in 
the French political system.
Structural equivalence and dissimilarity 
If two network members have exactly the same relations with every other member of 
the network then they are said to be structurally equivalent and are, in structural terms at 
least, substitutable. For the kind of network that we are looking at this definition is not 
very useful and so it is transformed into a weaker proposition that concerns the similarity 
of different actors relations with the rest of the network. One of the interesting aspects of 
these comparisons is that actors do not have to be connected to each other at all to be 
structurally equivalent, it is only their pattern of relations that counts, not their own 
relation to each other (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 59-60).191 The measure that we will
191 The values that were originally collected as strengths of relations on a scale of 5=high to l=low need to be 
transformed for this part of the analysis. They are translated into distances between the nodes, hence, if two actors 
have a strong relation they are deemed to be close within the network. Two actors with a strong relation, at level 5, 
will be set at 1 unit apart, actors with a weak relation at 1 will be set 5 units apart. The transform form strength to 
distance is simply distance=6-strength. Somewhat confusingly the closeness or not of the actors in terms of their 
structural relations are also referred to as distances; two actors that are almost entirely similar would be said to be 
close and those almost entirely different would be said to be far away.
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use for examining the structural equivalence of actors is a euclidean distance measure, ds 
(w,v), that represents dissimilarity in structural terms between the two nodes u and v. This 
measure is calculated by the software ‘Pajek’ (Batagelj and Mrvar 2003) and is called a 
corrected Euclidean-like dissimilarity: the function is reproduced below.
d3(w ,v)=l['Z((<fm- 4 j 2+(9su- q J 2)+((9m- 4 j 2+ ( 4 „ - 9 j 2)
s* u ,v
(Batagelj and Mrvar 2004)
In this equation qtJ represents the distance between the two actors i and j  (which in the 
NFP is derived from the question about closeness of relation).
The output matrix from this calculation showing the dissimilarity measure, ds, 
between every pair of actors, is transferred into the Excel spreadsheet program and then 
further manipulated. The labels representing either function or organisation are put 
alongside the matrix and the matrix is then sorted both horizontally and vertically on 
these labels and the actor names to allow the ease of calculation and visualisation using 
blocks as in Figure 9.1 below.
We are testing the hypotheses that 1) actor’s functional labels have no structural 
content and 2) organisation labels have no structural content: if this hypothesis can be 
supported we should expect to see comparable levels of dissimilarity in roles when 
looking at the comparison within each group as when looking at the comparisons from 
within to outside each group. In formal language, supposing we call the set of actors in a 
given group L that is a subset of the full set of actors A and we have the set of actors split 
up into n subsets, we are concerned with a comparison of:
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1 - Z l d s ^ v )
5 = 1
vsLt
, u*v
5 = 1
and
d rest=— ---------------- Z E d 5( « , v )
S2(|ij-|lj),=1
5 = 1
This gives an overall comparison of the ‘group member to group member’ 
dissimilarities compared to the ‘group member to outsider’ but we can also get more 
information by looking at each group of the s=l to n summation separately.
d in=---------------------
Z I4 f-w
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Figure 9.1: Calculation matrix fo r  group dissimilarity statistics: UK
functions
a a a a a a g g g g g g g I I p p p p p s s s s
a AstillS 
a BallJ 
a FeketeM 
a MacDonald J 
a PhippsJ 
a WardD 
g BettsP(i) 
g CockettN 
g CoullngN 
g EatockD 
g FarrellC 
g GrayP 
g HeywoodJ(i) 
g HolgateN(i) 
g KellyK(i) 
g LindsellE(i) 
g MacPhersonN 
g NewmanC 
g PateC 
g ReynoldsH(i) 
g RogersB(i) 
g SearleP 
g WakelyR(i) 
g VMIIiamsM(i) 
g WoodS 
I HomibrookB 
I MallickN(i) 
p BlairT(i) 
p BrownG(i) 
p DarlingA(i) 
p JohnstonE(i) 
p McCartneyl(i) 
s BallsE 
s MillibandD(i) 
s MillibandE 
s OppenheimC 
Note: a=analysts
H u m  HU/ / / / / / / /
16
19 18
13 10 16
17 14 14 14
15 14 14 15 13
18 12 16 15 16 
21 20 18 21 20
17 15 21 15 19
16 12 15 13 13
18 12 16 14 14
14 10 20 14 17 
21 14 22 16 19 
18 9 18 12 16
15 9 16 13 14
15 20 22 19 20
18 14 22 15 19 
18 22 20 21 22
19 18 15 18 18
17 7 17 11 14
16 11 18 12 14 
12 13 19 11 16
17 7 17 11 14
16 10 19 11 16
19 14 13 15 14
20 14 19 16 17
19 10 18 13 16
21 13 22 16 19
18 16 23 17 21 
18 20 22 19 21 
14 16 21 15 19
17 5 17 11 14 
21 14 22 17 19
20 13 21 16 18
21 20 22 20 23 
20 12 22 16 19
g=generalists
12 
16 
18 
12
14 
16 
19
15 
12 
19 
18
19l
16
14 
14
17 
14
17 
12
16 16 18 19 
16 13 19 17
19 17 24 19
20 18 23 14 
22 21 24 15 
19 19 22 11 
14 11 19 15 
19 15 24 17
18 16 23 18 
22 19 23 17 
18 16 22 17
Mawyers,
18
17 21
13 17 18
13 16 18 7
15 21 14 14 14
17 24 19 17 17 16
8 20 15 13 13 13 14
11 18 15 12 13 12 16 10
18 23 15 20 20 16 23 18 18
16 21 14 17 17 16 16 13 16 17
22 22 20 21 22 20 26 23 21 18 23
11 19 20 16 17 19 21 15 16 21 19 22
10 20 16 10 9 10 13 8 11 19 14 23 17
15 18 17 12 10 13 16 12 11 20 15 22 18 10
17 20 13 16 16 13 18 15 13 15 14 19 19 14 14
11 19 16 10 9 11 14 9 11 19 14 23 17 3 11
14 21 15 14 14 11 15 11 13 18 12 21 18 10 13
6 17 17 12 12 16 18 11 11 19 18 22 10 12 14
14
14 10 
18 12
12 11 16 18 15 16 21 19 23 19 12 13 18 12
11 7 13 15 11 13 20 16 23 18 7 9 16 8
17 16 16 2 14 16 23 16 26 21 13 16 18 13
20 19 15 17 15 18 17 13 22 20 16 19 17 17
21 21 16 21 19 20  16 18 20 21 19 20 16 19
19 19 13 19 16 16 14 16 19 20 17 17 12 17
10 10 9 14 9 10 19 14 22 17 3 11 13 4
17 17 16 13 13 17 18 13 25 20 14 16 19 14
16 16 16 6 13 16 22 16 25 20 13 15 18 13
22 22 17 20 19 20 17 17 22 20 20 21 19 20
17 17 15 10 14 15 21 18 24 20 14 16 17 14
p=politidans, s=special advisers
16 16 
12 14
15 18 18 15
14 20 21 18
19 21 22 20
15 20 20 19
10 12 12 8
14 17 19 16 13 12 20
15 17 18 15 5 17 21
19 20 24 21 20 14 18
16 17 18 16 10 17 21
18
21 17 
19 14 10 
13 16 19 16
18 14
19 13
17 20
18 13
18 22
The calculation is easier to see in the spreadsheet, Figure 9.1, where each o f the 
squares in the matrix represents the groups (in this case the UK functional groups) and 
the values are dissimilarities, ds values, o f which the averages are taken to calculate the 
above statistics. Only half the matrix is shown as the dissimilarity matrix is symmetric 
even when the matrix representing the relations is not.
A similar calculation matrix is used for the French functional groups and for the 
organisation groupings of both countries. The results for both the overall summation and
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the individual groups is given below in Table 9.1 after the rest of the discussion on 
methods.
Cliquishness
A clique was defined in Chapter 4 as being a group of actors that is well connected 
within itself. In our hypotheses we do not care about finding cliques but we are interested 
in how ‘clique-like’192 the groups are that we have already defined through exogenous 
labels. To do this we use a method based on the n-clique that demands ‘every member of 
the clique can reach every other member through n or fewer binary links’ (Knoke and 
Kuklinski 1982: 58). An n-clique thus allows connections through intermediary actors 
but limits the maximum distance across which such indirect interactions can occur. The 
original definition of an n-clique allows these connections to pass via a node outside the 
clique. The definition of a clique equates clique-likeness193 with proximity of the 
constituent nodes in terms of path length (taken for topological networks to be the 
number of intermediate nodes passed through). This is the definition on which we make 
our analogy to in the method we will use.
The network that we are using has more information in it than simply the number of 
links between two of the actors as it is a metrical network. We now have to make an 
assumption about what this means in terms of a political network. Understanding a 
metrical network in terms of a metro map is easy: I do not really care how many stations 
I pass through to get from A to B, I just want to know the shortest path.194 However, in a 
political network it is not so clear. Under the topological version it is clear that the
192 The word is important: we reserve the word ‘cliqueish’ for use later when describing whether a network has a lot of 
cliques in it or not The word ‘clique-like’ defines whether a group itself looks like a clique.
193 Similarly, to footnote above, the word ‘cliqueishness’ is reserved for describing the extent to which a network is 
‘cliqueish’ hence the ugly word ‘clique-likeness’
194 Even this is not strictly true as there can be some cost in ‘shortest path’ terms translated into journey time that relates 
to the number o f stations. It is a problem very close to that about to be described for the NFP.
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shortest path is to talk directly to someone (path=l) to pass through one intermediary is 
next (path=2), through another intermediary makes the path longer (path=3) and so on. 
When we introduce link values some confusion can be created as it is not clear, referring 
to Figure 9.2 below, whether one might consider it better for Appleby to contact Bernard 
directly, even though they are five units away, or whether it would in fact be better for 
him to make contact via Cope and Darcy as the total path length would then only be 
three.
Figure 9.2: Illustration o f differing influence paths through an NFP
The assumption that we will make to solve this dilemma flows from the assumptions 
that defined the NFP originally. The criterion for being part o f the network is that the 
actor influences the policy, the raison d'etre of the network therefore is for policy to be 
influenced195 and that is the reason that communication o f whatever sort is taking place. 
Indeed this was also the conditions that were given for rating the contact that actors had 
with each other -  did a particular contact influence the development o f the policy. Under 
these assumptions the number o f intermediaries can be ignored and it is the path length 
that counts. If Appleby can make Cope accept his point because they are so close, then
,<'5 Note that it does not matter why. "This is not suggesting that actors are acting according to some se lf interested end 
o f  influencing policy. It could be entirely institutional; a Civil Servant may influence the policy because he is 
ordered to put forward that point o f  view to the Treasury officials, for example.
A  p p le  b y
E p s t e  in
F l a t t e
Darcy
Cope
B e  r n  a r d
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Cope can influence Darcy and Darcy can deal with Bernard. The likelihood (a vital term 
used in the true statistical sense) of Appleby getting Bernard to take any notice of him is 
lower via a direct approach. A sophisticated model under these assumptions may build in 
some loss for the fact that there are intervening actors, but this model will remain 
unsophisticated in that direction.
Marchiori and Latora (2000) define a measure for a metrical network, G, that is 
analogous to the path length in a topological network. This measure is called 
connectivity length, D(G), and it consists of the harmonic mean of shortest path lengths 
between all vertices. The reciprocal of this measure is defined as E(G), efficiency which 
measures the communication efficiency (amongst other things) of across the whole of 
matrix G. When defining the clique-likeness of some subgroup of the network we can 
use this measure which is analogous to path length to test the cliquishness of the 
subgroup -  the higher the E(.) communication efficiency (or the shorter D(.) path length) 
the more cliquish is the subgroup.
Our hypotheses 1 and 2 try to establish if there is any structural content in the labels 
and for Hypothesis 2 particularly but also for Hypothesis 1 the suggestion was made in 
Chapter 7 that it would be a clique related analysis that would inform our conclusion. 
We can therefore look at the connectivity length and efficiency for the various 
subgroups defined by the organisational or functional labels to see their ‘clique-likeness’ 
and compare this to the same measures of relations from those in the subgroup to those 
outside it.
Unfortunately there is no standard software that will find the set of shortest path 
lengths from all vertices to all other vertices for a metric network, there is however a 
fairly straightforward mathematical method of doing this called the Floyd-Warshall
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algorithm (see Appendix 3) which was written into a C++ program196 to calculate the 
matrix of all shortest paths for a given network. With the output file from this program, 
using Excel, the harmonic means of the shortest path lengths of each member of the 
subgroup to each other member was calculated - called D(.) - and the harmonic mean of 
each shortest path lengths of each member of the subgroup to each member of the 
network not in the subgroup -  called D(.’). These data are shown in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 
on the left hand side.
As a comparator for the levels of efficiency we can also calculate the global 
connectivity length and efficiency over the whole network. An additional comparator can 
be calculated using a program that does multiple runs of the global calculation on 
randomised versions of the network but with the same distribution of links as in the 
actual network.197 We see (Tables 9.1 and 9.2 top left) that the random version has a 
slightly shorter path length, i.e. that it is more efficient, than the actual network. This is 
due to reasons that we will examine more deeply under the hypothesis 3 discussion on 
small worlds, but, in brief, it is because there is a trade off for local efficiency against 
global efficiency and because the network, as we are about to see, has some local 
subgroups that are very efficient at communicating within themselves. This high local 
efficiency trades off against some global efficiency compared to a random network that 
will not have these local communication advantages.
To test the hypotheses using cliquishness we look at statistics similar to those that we 
examined for structural equivalence. We calculate the harmonic mean of the path lengths 
of every ‘group member to group member’ relation in groups and compare this to the 
harmonic mean of the path lengths of every ‘group member to outsider’ relation. This
196 See Appendix 4 Listing 1.
197 See Appendix 11 code fragment 1.
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transforms to the efficiency o f‘within to within’ communication and the efficiency o f‘in 
to out’ communication according to the following equations, given as before the break 
down into n groups called Ls.
1
E (within)= -----------
Z N - N «=£v
5=  1
1
E (outwards)= ---------------
Z 2(|£,
5 = 1
Rejection of hypotheses 1 and 2
Our hypotheses are rejected for both the functions and for the organisations as there 
are differences between the within group statistics and the within to outside statistics 
under both of the measures considered. Even though the measures are quite close at the 
global level it is clear that we must reject the hypotheses as for some groups there are 
clear differences that suggest considerable structural content for at least some of the 
groupings.
Z Z f
5 = 1  U&L. UV
v € L
I Z  f
5 = 1  U&L, UV
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Table 9,1: Summary statistics f or France: hypotheses 1 and 2
France CLIQUISHNESS DISSIMILARITY
n D(.) DC) E(.) EC) d w/in d out
norm'd 
d w/in
norm'd 
d out
random 51 5.0 0.20
global 51 5.3 0.19
bercy soc 2 1.0 5.3 1.00 0.19 bercy soc 8.6 9.7 0.38 0.45
fonc publ dr 4 3.2 6.5 0.31 0.15 fonc publ dr 8.6 10.4 0.37 0.50
legislature 2 4.0 6.6 0.25 0.15 legislature 7.1 9.5 0.28 0.44
min aff soc dr 4 1.9 4.8 0.53 0.21 min aff soc dr 11.6 11.5 0.58 0.57
min aff soc soc 7 2.4 6.4 0.42 0.16 min aff soc soc 7.1 11.8 0.27 0.59
matignon dr 5 4.4 5.7 0.23 0.17 matignon dr 10.6 11.2 0.51 0.55
medef 4 2.8 5.3 0.35 0.19 medef 10.5 11.1 0.51 0.55
matignon soc 4 2.1 4.8 0.49 0.21 matignon soc 8.6 10.5 0.37 0.51
min transp c 2 1.0 5.3 1.00 0.19 min transp c 9.4 10.1 0.43 0.48
presidence 4 2.3 6.6 0.43 0.15 presidence 8.1 10.0 0.34 0.47
syndicats 8 2.5 4.9 0.40 0.20 syndicats 10.3 10.9 0.49 0.53
all organi. 51 2.5 5.0 0.41 0.20 all organi. 9.3 10.9 0.42 0.53
cabinet 24 5.5 5.4 0.18 0.18 cabinet 10.5 10.9 0.50 0.53
external 2 3.0 7.0 0.33 0.14 external 6.2 11.2 0.21 0.55
politician 10 4.0 5.6 0.25 0.18 politician 9.6 10.6 0.44 0.51
soc partn chef 3 1.9 4.4 0.53 0.23 soc partn chef 8.5 10.5 0.37 0.51
soc partn neg 7 2.4 4.8 0.42 0.21 soc partn neg 10.6 11.8 0.51 0.59
soc partn offc 2 5.5 5.4 0.18 0.18 soc partn offc 4.8 8.6 0.12 0.38
all functions 51 4.8 5.3 0.21 0.19 all functions 10.3 10.9 0.49 0.53
cabinet dr 13 4.7 5.8 0.21 0.17 cabinet dr 9.8 10.8 0.46 0.52
cabinet soc 11 3.0 6.4 0.33 0.16 cabinet soc 8.8 11.6 0.39 0.57
external 2 3.0 7.0 0.33 0.14 external 6.2 11.2 0.21 0.55
pol dr 5 3.5 5.9 0.29 0.17 pol dr 9.9 11.1 0.46 0.54
pol soc 5 2.0 5.5 0.49 0.18 pol soc 8.4 10.4 0.36 0.50
soc partn chef 3 1.9 4.4 0.53 0.23 soc partn chef 8.5 11.0 0.37 0.53
soc partn neg 7 2.4 4.8 0.42 0.21 soc partn neg 10.6 11.8 0.51 0.59
soc partn offc 2 5.5 5.4 0.18 0.18 soc partn offc 4.8 8.6 0.12 0.38
all functions 51 3.3 5.6 0.30 0.18 all functions 9.4 11.0 0.43 0.54
socialist 17 3.1 7.2 0.32 0.14 socialist 9.6 11.3 0.44 0.56
droite 20 4.7 6.3 0.21 0.16 droite 9.9 11.0 0.46 0.53
Note 1: five actors are singletons in the organisational schema 
Note 2: Three actors are singletons in the functional schema
Note 3: For the parties Charpin is included as a socialist and Levy and Soubie are included with the right. Others are as the 
party-functional schema
Note 4: The Cliquishness columns show the D(.) path length average within the group and the D(.’) average within to outside 
along with the equivalent efficiency measures E(.) and E(.’)
Note 5: The Dissimilarity columns show the dissimilarity measure in its raw form, d, for the witihin and within to outside along 
with the normalised measure ‘norm'd d’ that is normalised against the highest dissimilarity measure found between any two 
actors in the network.
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Table 9.2: Summary statistics for UK: hypotheses 1 and 2
UK CLIQUISHNESS DISSIMILARITY
n DO E(.) E(-') d w/in d out
norm'd norm'd 
d w/in d out
random 36 3.3 0.30
global 36 3.8 0.27
dwp 22 3.4 4.4 0.29 0.23 dwp 15.4 17.1 0.55 0.62
no10 4 1.3 6.0 0.76 0.17 no10 6.8 17.5 0.20 0.64
hmt 10 2.5 4.0 0.40 0.25 hmt 15.8 17.0 0.57 0.62
not no10 32 3.5 4.9 0.29 0.21 not no10 16.1 17.3 0.58 0.63
all organi. 3.1 4.5 0.32 0.22 all organi. 15.3 17.1 0.55 0.62
analysts 6 2.2 4.2 0.46 0.24 analysts 14.8 16.6 0.53 0.60
generalists 19 3.7 3.9 0.27 0.26 generalists 15.7 16.3 0.57 0.59
lawyers 2 1.0 4.7 1.00 0.21 lawyers 9.5 15.9 0.31 0.57
politicians 5 2.7 3.8 0.37 0.26 politicians 16.5 16.8 0.60 0.61
spads 4 2.6 3.7 0.38 0.27 spads 15.8 17.6 0.57 0.64
all functions 3.4 4.0 0.29 0.25 all functions 15.6 16.6 0.56 0.60
Note 1: The Cliquishness columns show the D(.) path length average within the group and the D(.’) average within to 
outside along with the equivalent efficiency measures E(.) and E(.’)
Note 2: The Dissimilarity columns show the dissimilarity measure in its raw form, d, for the within and within to outside 
along with the normalised measure ‘norm’d d’ that is normalised against the highest dissimilarity measure found between 
any two actors in the network.
For hypothesis 1 looking at the functional labels we suggested that it would be the 
structural equivalence that would be most likely to display some reflection of the 
labelling. Looking at the bottom line on the right hand side of Table 9.1 we can see the 
average dissimilarity for within function group relations there is a normalised value of 
0.56 compared to 0.60 for outward relations. The dissimilarity being lower for the within 
group relations implies that there is some structural information in these groupings i.e. 
the nodes within groups have similar structural properties. While this is not a 
pronounced difference it is repeated for each of the groups taken individually and 
although politicians are not comparable in their structural relations with other politicians 
any more than they are with others this is not so for the generalists, analysts, lawyers 
(albeit there are only two) and special advisers where each member of these groups is 
shown to have similar patterns of relations as the other members of their group. It should
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be noted that all the analysts and lawyers are within the same organisational grouping as 
well, which may lead to the phenomenon seen in some measure, but the special advisers 
are not concentrated in any one organisation and so the result seems to be validated.
The hypothesis 1 results for France can be seen in the lower right hand part of Table 
9.2 where functional labels have been grouped in two ways reflecting simply the 
functions of the actors and also the functions with party alignment. This is because the 
measure of dissimilarity looks at the similarity between relations across the whole of the 
network and we know that even if two advisers in a cabinet have in the abstract very 
similar sets of structural relations within the network we only find them comparable 
within their party. It may have been even more revealing to have constructed two sub­
networks, but this would have caused problems with the actors who have no party 
affiliation. We do see however that structural equivalence is only weakly revealed if the 
party distinction is not included: the result is only as convincing as that seen in the UK. 
The global within/without figure is barely different in the non-party version and while 
the social partners groupings, who are non-party aligned anyway, support the rejection of 
the hypothesis, only the politicians show even a slight reason for rejection amongst the 
other groups. Note that the experts group only contains two actors and they both happen 
to work together anyway -  this is not to say that the figure is not relevant, but it is less 
convincing than a counter-intuitive disperse selection of actors that either lead to 
acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. The functional labels that include party, 
however, show a clear reason to reject the hypothesis that labels have no structural 
content as every division and the overall sum have noticeably lower levels of structural 
dissimilarity between themselves than between themselves and others. The breakdown
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into these groups shows a much stronger meaning behind the labels in the French NFP 
than was seen in the UK NFP.
There is also evidence of clique-likeness in the UK functional division (seen in the 
bottom left-hand part of Table 9.2). Communication efficiency is almost 5 percentage 
points greater for relations within functional groupings than for relations between them 
when looked at overall. The small group of lawyers are fully connected as close as they 
can be giving an efficiency coefficient of 1 and analysts go over the 45% efficiency 
barrier for communication within themselves but are shown to have the poorest out of 
group communication efficiency with only 24% score. Only generalists do not show a 
marked difference in their ‘within group’ to ‘out of group’ communication efficiency, 
but this is perhaps what would be desirable for a group called ‘generalists’. In the French 
division ignoring party only the social partners chiefs and negotiators show strong 
evidence of clique-likeness in their grouping showing 30 and 21 percentage points more 
efficiency respectively (centre left of Table 9.2) within their functional group than to 
outsiders, although this alone could well be enough to reject a hypothesis of no structural 
content in the labels. The division by function-party schema shows, in alignment with 
the dissimilarity measure, considerable clique-likeness in the groupings.
Here, though, we must come back to the question of data quality: for example many of 
the links for the socialist cabinets were imputed based on the existing information that 
we had from a few interviewees on how the Cabinets worked. Some of the imputation 
took as a basis the supposition that if actors were in the same cabinet they would have 
links with each other and links were not imputed at random to outsiders. While the 
results in the table suggesting differences in the strength of clique-likeness and similarity 
of relation patterns are all reasonable, given that the data for the Cabinets of the right
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contradict, in terms of working practices what we do know for sure about the socialists, 
there is still some room to understand that both clique-likeness and low dissimilarity in 
the ‘cabinet soc’ line of the table is a result of applying limited knowledge and 
suppositions to create imputed links and does not come directly from the data. What the 
data suggest, for example, about the cabinets is that while the right specialised in their 
own particular parts of the tasks, having different sets of relations to each other and 
therefore complementing each other, the cabinets of the left worked more in concert and 
were tightly knit but substitutable for each other. This interpretation of the data on 
clique-likeness and dissimilarity of structural role meshes well with the fact that the left 
were working on less specific policy development over an extended period while the 
right would have had to impose, over a short space of time, a division of labour in order 
to achieve their aims within the timetable.
The general pattern of results for hypothesis 2 on organisational labels is quite similar. 
We saw earlier that, if there was to be structural content, the clique measure seemed 
most likely to manifest itself. At the top left of Table 9.1 we can see the results for this 
test. The overall difference comparing the within to the outward communication 
efficiency for ‘all organisations’198, E(.) compared to E(.’), is indeed higher than for the 
equivalent measures in hypothesis 1 on functional labels. Within organisations the 
efficiency is 10 decimal points higher than the between measure. At the individual 
organisation levels No. 10 has a very high score for its within measure but a score that 
falls even beneath the analysts at only 17% for the communication efficiency measure to 
outsiders. DWP’s figure for internal relations is almost exactly the same as the figure for 
all relations (seen in the table as ‘global’) but is still lower for outsiders. This probably
198 Labelled as ‘all organi’ in the table.
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reflects the fact that many of the ‘foot-soldiers’ of the policy making process are in DWP 
and they tend to be connected less broadly, keeping relations with only those that are 
direct contacts in their own areas of the policy. This topic will be covered more under 
hypothesis 4 on centrality.
The French statistics in the corresponding section of Table 9.2 support the rejection of 
hypothesis 2 even more strongly. The efficiency measure for within groups is almost 
twice that of outwards links. Individual groups all show evidence of fairly strong clique- 
likeness. While for some this may well be due to the small numbers involved and 
attention must be drawn to the imputation of data, there are still cases that are robust and 
strongly demonstrate the cohesiveness of the groupings in these terms. For example the 
unions were well covered by the collected data and are a good sized group that shows a 
clique-likeness which reflects the overall result by having an efficiency of 
communication measure within the union-labelled actors twice that of the within to 
outside communications at 41% and 20% respectively. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
shows as much clique-likeness under the right as the left and the only significant 
organisation that does not display the clear clique-likeness is the PM’s office, the 
Matignon, under Raffarin (‘matignon dr’).
Somewhat against expectations the structural equivalence measures are enshrined in 
the labelling by organisation in the UK. At the top right of the Table 9.1 there are quite 
clear differences in the normalised measure for the overall value and for the individual 
groups. The marked structural content in the No. 10 label is reflected here, however we 
can see that the Treasury does not show so marked a similarity in the structural relation 
patterns of its members as it does in its clique-likeness as a grouping. The French data 
for the dissimilarities show that the structural information in the groupings is not as
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strong as the corresponding clique data, and so while this still supports rejection of the 
hypothesis it is less convincing than the clique data, which is what we expected.
If we were pursuing a route of exploratory data analysis rather than testing our 
hypotheses we could find many other interesting features in these tables, this can 
however be somewhat dangerous as any network can show features that are interesting 
when exploring a number of measures. It is safest to have hypothesised in advance and to 
test. This avoids committing the easy error, of statistics in general and networks in 
particular, of choosing what is interesting in order to draw conclusions while ignoring 
the much more substantial and convincing mass of ‘uninteresting’ data. Table 9.2 for 
France, however, does show the measures for groupings of those who are party-aligned 
in order to demonstrate the source of some of the effects when the functional grouping 
was broken down into party-functional grouping.
Hypothesis 3 analysis
The original tests for small-world networks were developed by Watts and Strogatz 
(1998) who noted that in the move from a regular to a random network, as the degree of 
randomness increased that the characteristic path length of the network fell away rapidly 
but there was a region where the cliquishness of the network was almost as high as in the 
regular network. The measurement of small worlds was therefore based on the two 
properties of characteristic path length and cliquishness through the clustering 
coefficient. The small world requires that the characteristic path length is similar to that 
of the random network, although it will always be bigger it is still almost as short as the 
random network. The other property is that the clustering coefficient is much larger than 
in the random network showing that the locality measure has moved far away from that
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Table 9.3: Marchiori and Latora network measures showing small world test 
statistics for UK and France data
n D(.)
36 UK 
51 FR
Oglob Dglob
reg Dglob rand
4.82
8.75
3.75
5.29
3.29
4.97
Dloc
reg
2.54
3.32
Dloc
Dloc
rand
2.61 11.54 
5.18 21.4
E(.)
UK
FR
Dglob Dglob 
reg Dglob rand
0.21
0.11
0.27 0.30 
0.19 0.20
Dloc Dloc
reg Dloc rand
0.39 0.38 0.09
0.30 0.19 0.05
Dglob Dglob 
norm'd E(.) reg Dglob rand
UK
FR
0.42 0.53 0.61 
0.23 0.38 0.4
Dloc Dloc
reg Dloc rand
0.79 0.77 0.17
0.6 0.39 0.09
Note 1: Calculated from the reverse score matrix where 5 maps to 1 and 1 maps to 5
Note 2: the UK regular matrix was based on average edge length of 2 (in original it is 2.245) and on a range of 3 (degree 
6) where average degree in the original network is 6.25
Note 3: the French regular matrix is based on averaged figure for regular matrices for all 4 of the combinations of edge 
length 2 and 3 and range 2 and 3. The figures for the original network are average edge length 2.47 and degree 5.2 
implying range 2.6
Note 3: normalised E(.) based on a fully connected graph edge lengths-2
seen in random graphs and more towards that of the regular graph. Caution is needed, 
however, as it can be shown that there is limited scope for observing this effect in 
networks of the size and type that we are considering (Astill 2004b).
The data that we have is metric, that is to say that it contains information on the 
strength as well as the existence of a link whilst the network to be used in the Watts and 
Strogatz version of the small-world analysis is a non-directed, non-valued graph so the 
strengths shown in the original data are no longer relevant. We could however create the 
topological network by taking all contacts, from strongest to weakest and converting 
them to a link but this is as arbitrary as taking only the strongest. To try and remove 
suspicion that the small-world property might change depending on the strength of tie 
that is treated as the cut-off point, the test can be done for all levels and then repeated
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Figure 9.3: Marchiori and Latora network measures showing small world test 
statistics for UK and France data
0.35
Ukrand, 0 .09, 0 .30
0.30
Uknfp, 0.38, 0.27
0.25 g lo b a l
E(.)
FRrand; 0.05; 0 .20
0.20 Ukreg; 0.39; 0.21
FRnfp; 0.19; 0 .19
0.15
FRreg; 0.30; 0.11
0.10
0 .05
lo ca l E (.)
0.00
0.00 0 .05 0.10 0 .15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
loc
increasing the threshold until the final network o f  only those who have the strongest 
relations.199 There is however a later method of testing for small worlds that draws on the 
statistics and the explanations that go with them that have already been presented on the 
Marchiori and Latora (2000) path lengths and global efficiency. These methods are 
fundamental building blocks towards testing for the small world in a metric network. 
The other statistic that is needed is the local efficiency measure for the neighbourhood of 
each actor. This measure takes the subgroup of all the 1-step neighbours o f a given actor
199 Such an exercise is carried out and the results compared to the method used by this thesis in Astill (2004b).
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and looks at the path-length and efficiency statistic for that subgroup. The calculations 
for path length, D(.), and efficiency, E(.), are exactly the same as seen above but they 
have to be calculated for the neighbourhood subgroup of every actor in the network. This 
procedure results in a vector containing a value associated with each actor which is then 
averaged to give an average local measure. Once again a special program had to be 
written to calculate this statistic which is given as Listing 2 in Appendix 4.
Marchiori and Latora’s (2001) method is founded upon the realisation that the small 
world property can be seen as efficiency on both local and global scale and they 
developed an alternative to the Watts and Strogatz method to apply small world network 
testing directly to metrical networks as well as topological ones. When we take into 
account the values on the links (in this work, the distance transform) it is intuitive that 
this move to a metrical network has an effect on the existence of cliques because groups 
may not only be well connected, but have stronger connections within themselves and 
therefore be tighter. The metric measure also affects the overall path lengths in the 
network as discussed above in the section on cliques. The use of the Marchiori and 
Latora method uses this extra information and relates it to global and local efficiency and 
how we can better determine whether the network is small world.
In their two papers Marchiori and Latora approach the small-world problem by 
determining what it is that happens in small worlds that gives rise to their properties. 
Their conclusion is that propagation of information across the network is the key and to 
capture this they propose the measure of connectivity length, which we touched on 
earlier, that is D(G) where G is a metrical graph, to be harmonic mean of all path lengths 
between all vertices. Measured at a global level this measure is analogous to the path 
length in W+S. The average D(G) for the sub-graphs that are the neighbours of each
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vertex (but not including the vertex itself) corresponds to the reciprocal of W+S’s 
clustering coefficient (Marchiori and Latora 2000). As previously, the reciprocal of 
global path length, D(G), is defined as E(G), the efficiency of G, and with this measure a 
small world graph can be defined as having high E(.) at both the global and local level 
and so be very efficient at both local and global communication (Latora and Marchiori 
2001). Calculating these measures using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm on the full matrix 
and various subgraphs has already been discussed. Touched upon more briefly earlier 
was the need to randomise completely the full graph while keeping the same distribution 
of edge strengths. A program to do this is given in Appendix 4 as Fragment 1. The 
measures also need to be calculated for the regular graph,200 which is taken to have an 
edge length equal to the average edge length and the closest integer number to the 
average in the real graph is used for the number of links from each vertex.201 The 
comparison to the fully connected graph, used for normalising the measures, has two 
potential choices of comparison: one with an edge length equal to the average edge 
length and the other with an edge length of one, representing the best possible 
communication between vertices.
Table 9.3 is arranged so that the communication efficiency increases towards the 
centre of the chart where the random network is the more efficient globally and the 
regular network is more efficient locally. Reading from the efficiency measures, E(.) 
normalised to compare to a fully connected network, we see that at the global level the 
UK network is closer in terms of propagation of information to the random network than 
the regular, at 53% of the efficiency of a completely connected network. There is not, 
however, much room in terms of gain with the particular network we have, between the
200 See Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7.
201A program to create such a matrix is given in Appendix 4 Listing 3.
252
Chapter IX
random and the regular versions.202 We can see as well Table 9,4 The centrality
measures and ranks fo r  
that the local efficiency, analogous to the clustering in the UKNFP
W+S, reaches 77% of the efficiency of the fully
connected graph whereas the regular graph, by definition
highly clustered, reaches 79%. What we see for the UK is
a network that is almost as globally efficient as it can be
in terms of local communication yet which still comes
much closer to the efficient random graph in terms of its
global communications than it does to the regular graph.
This seems to indicate considerable small world property
for a network of this size and type.
The French network contrasts with the UK in that it at
the global level it is hardly less efficient at all than the
random graph, this being despite the fact that it still
remains closer to the high local efficiency of the regular
graph than towards the poor efficiency that would be
expected by the closeness at the global level to the
random network. However, the French NFP is only
closer, not very close to the local efficiency of the regular
network. It has move 11 decimal points along the
measure from the regular to random and there are 14 points of the measure remaining, it
has not reached the halfway point, but it is not far away. While the French NFP, like the
UK, is not strongly displaying the small world characteristics there are small world
202 This, as we mentioned before, can be shown through simulation techniques to be a problem with graphs o f the type 
and size that we have.
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name F-W-gd rank
DariingA(i) 2.7 1
MillibandE 2.7 2
BrownG(i) 2.9 3
NewmanC 3.1 4
LindsellE(i) 3.3 5
CoulingN 3.5 6
MacPhersonN 3.5 6
BallsE 3.6 8
AstillS 3.7 9
JohnstonE(i) 3.7 10
CockettN 4.0 11
FeketeM 4.1 12
GrayP 4.3 13
PateC 4.4 14
WardD 4.6 15
SearleP 4.7 16
BettsP(i) 4.7 16
RogersB(i) 4.9 18
WoodS 4.9 18
HeywoodJ(i) 5.2 20
EatockD 5.3 21
HolgateN(i) 5.3 22
KellyK(i) 5.4 23
WilliamsM(i) 5.6 24
PhippsJ 5.6 25
MacDonaldJ 5.6 25
FarrellC 5.7 27
BlairT(i) 6.1 28
MillibandD(i) 6.1 29
HomibrookB 6.2 30
MallickN(i) 6.6 31
McCartney l(i) 6.9 32
ReynoldsH(i) 6.9 32
WakelyR(i) 6.9 32
OppenheimC 8.1 35
BallJ 8.4 36
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properties evident. Being so very efficient
Table 9,5 The centrality
globally would normally mean a massive trade-off measures and ranks fo r  the
French NFP
in efficiency on the local scale that is not seen in 
this case.
Figure 9.3, above, shows in a graphical 
representation how far the networks are from the 
extremes of Marchiori and Latora global and local 
efficiency measures (the random and regular 
versions respectively) that are used to test for 
small worlds.
Hypothesis 4 analysis
The hypothesis 4 analysis tests for correlation 
between centrality and other endogenous actor 
attributes to find if there is a relationship. For the 
age and grade actor attributes the rank test is used 
as there is no reason to believe, in our hypotheses, 
that there is correlation between the actual age or 
hierarchical grade of an actor and their centrality 
measure (which is purely comparative between 
actors in the NFP and has no exterior meaning), 
only that there could be correlation between 
where the actor appears in a ranked list of age or hierarchical grade and there position in 
a centrality ranking. For correlation between the variables rather than the ranks to be
name
TouiisseJM
FillonF(i)
FaugereJP(i)
CherequeF(i)
le DuigouJC
RigaudiatJ
MeyeurP
CirelliJF(i)
RaffarinJP(i)
PaoliniJ
SarkozyG(i)
TaupinB
MorgenstemS
CreysseU
DevysC(i)
ChiracJ(i)
ChertierJD(i)
SeillereEA(i)
KesslerD(i)
BasP(i)
CharpinJM(i)
DelevoyeJP(i)
JospinL(i)
MarcelD(i)
AmbielD(i)
LegrosF
Carre re-G6eMC(i)
QuintinAF(i)
BarrotJ(i)
BrasPL
Ca'ilaP(i)
MuetP(i)
AubryM(i)
DevyB(i)
RocchiJF(i)
Strauss-KahnD(i)
DeroussenJL
Pisani-FerryJ(i)
Salat-BarouxF(i)
el KarouiH(i)
LhostisA(i)
PechT
GrimaldiS(i)
ChastelX(i)
LevyM(i)
SoubieR(i)
DavanneO(i)
GayssotJ-L(i)
Fulachier(i)
MacquartB(i)
BertrandX
F-W-gd rank
4.1 1
4.6 2
4.8 3
4.9 4
4.9 4
5.3 6
5.3 7
5.3 8
5.4 9
5.5 10
5.9 11
6.0 12
6.1 13
6.2 14
6.2 15
6.3 16
6.3 17
6.4 18
6.4 19
6.5 20
6.5 21
6.5 21
6.5 23
6.6 24
6.7 25
6.8 26
6.9 27
7.0 28
7.0 29
7.1 30
7.1 31
7.1 31
7.1 33
7.3 34
7.3 35
7.3 35
7.3 37
7.4 38
7.4 39
7.4 40
7.7 41
7.9 42
7.9 43
8.0 44
8.0 45
8.0 46
8.4 47
8.5 48
8.9 49
9.1 50
9.8 51
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used both variables must come from known and comparable distributions: the method
we will use is non-parametric and hence gives a distribution free statistical test. For the
correlation between the involvement in different stages of the policy process and the
centrality measure, the hypothesis concerns a categorical variable that is assigned a
numerical value according to the assumed importance of that stage in the process and so
a hypothesis of differing mean centrality measure for these groups is used. This tests to
see if there are significant differences in the mean centrality within each group of actors
representing the different stages of the policy process.
The centrality m easures
There are many different measures of centrality in network analysis, a summary of
these can be found in Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) and a slightly different approach
leading towards the proposition of a new centrality measure based on the
communication efficiency measures that we have used in the tests above can be found in
Latora and Marchiori (2004). The choice of which centrality measure is the most
appropriate is a complex one and in the absence of further work examining the
differences between these measures and the implications for NFPs it has been decided to
make and uncontroversial choice and to Table 9.6: Critical values o f  the
Student’'s t distribution
select the closeness’ centrality measure and
df p=0.5% p=l% p=5%
to calculate it by using the Floyd-Warshall UK 36 2.72 2.43 1.69
France 51 2.68 2.40 1.68
geodesics averages for each node already „ ...
°  ^  J Source: Microsoft Excel INVT function
calculated for the other tests.203
203 Work is underway on looking at the implications of centrality measures for political networks in a joint paper 
between the author and Vito Latora, using data from this thesis and the data collected by John and Cole (1998). 
Unfortunately the work was not able to be completed before the submission of this thesis but it does not suggest that 
the movement in ranking of actors between the different centrality measures is likely to greatly change the 
conclusions o f a hypothesis test done in the way seen in this chapter. There are however some noticeable differences 
in particular actors rankings under different measures which merit deeper investigation into the implications for an 
NFP.
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The hierarchical grade and age
The allocation of a hierarchical level to actors within the NFP is unexpectedly 
difficult. There is no good way of comparing, for example, a junior minister in the 
Department of Work and Pensions in the UK with a senior Special Adviser in the 
Number 10 policy unit. A similar problem for France concerns, for example, comparing 
the Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic with the President of the 
employers federation MEDEF or the Deputy Director of the Cabinet of the Prime 
Minister with the Director of the Cabinet of Social Affairs. We could use salaries but this 
would put the external experts who are Directors of private companies in a stratospheric 
position compared to a Cabinet Adviser. The final tables of hierarchy are shown in 
Appendix 5. As we are using a ranking method and because we are looking at the overall 
strength of correlation our main concern is that the each ranked list seems reasonable, 
even if there are potentially some points of dispute this would be unlikely to affect our 
rejection or acceptance of the hypothesis if we choose a strong significance level for the 
tests.
For the age and grade measures the Spearman’s rank correlation test is used. The 
method simply requires that the variables each be ranked and then the square of the 
differences between the ranking of each of the actors is calculated, being d2. Then the p 
(rho) statistic, Spearman’s rank correlation (also sometimes known as r) is:
p=  1 - 6 - ^ - —
n(n —1)
Given this statistic, the hypothesis test that p is significantly different from zero, 
which indicates no correlation, can reject the null hypothesis of no correlation in the
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rankings. The t-statistic to test against the Student’s-t distribution for the appropriate p 
values of significance is:
I n—2t — P \  r with degrees of freedom equal to n-1.
Y 1 - p
The critical values that the t statistic must exceed to show significance are in Table 
9.6.
As can be seen in Table 9.7, comparing the t- Table 9.7: Centrality against
grade and age rank correlation 
statistic to the values in Table 9.6, the UK test statistics and statistics to
check rank correlation between 
hypotheses that there is correlation between the age and grade ranMngs
centrality ranking and the age or grade rankings Centrality p t n
. . , . , _  , , fJ UKgrade 0.08 0.48 36
are convincingly rejected. That they should UKage -0 150 91 36
. , . . . „ . France grade 0.43 3.35*51
both be rejected is not that much of a surprise, prance age q.03 0 19 51
as the check shows that the age rankings are check
UK grade-age 0.63 4.78*36
heavily correlated with the grade rankings. The pR grade-age 0.22 1.60 51
French grade rankings however are strongly Note: * indicates significant at o.5% level 
correlated with the centrality rankings, easily coming inside the 0.5% significance level 
while the age ranking does not correlate to the centrality measure. The check of grade 
ranking to age ranking shows that the correlation is outside the 5% significance level, but 
not far outside.
The stages of the process
The way that the stages were calculated involves first of all deciding on the division of 
the process into the stages and then the assumed importance of those stages. For the 
French example the stages are the ‘preparation phase’, which consists of the Jospin 
Government’s time in power and the ‘legislative’ phase, which consists of the Raffarin
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Government’s reign. We further hypothesise that centrality will be related to these 
phases in a way that means involvement in both phase implies the highest centrality 
ranking, the legislative phase alone implies middle ranking and the preparatoiy phase 
alone implies the lowest centrality ranking. For the UK the division is similar except that 
there are the phases outlined in the case study of ‘what will achieve our aims?’, called 
policy shaping, and ‘how are we going to make that thing happen?’, called pre­
legislative. Appendix 12 shows which actors were assigned to which stages. The 
hypothesis is that, as for France, involvement in both tends to imply the highest centrality 
ranking, then involvement in only policy shaping is next most highly ranked then 
involvement in pre-legislative alone is the lower centrality.
A simple test was run on the Floyd-Warshall average geodesic measures (representing 
average path length to all other actors) across all actors within each of the stage groups 
and these averages were tested for significant differences from each other using a t-test. 
As the direction of the difference (i.e. which stage is more important than the other) is 
hypothsesised the t-test is a one tailed test.
The results in Appendix 13 show that for the UK actors that were involved in both 
stages of the policy process had significantly higher centrality (that is significantly lower 
average path lengths over the whole network) than those who were involved in either 
one or other of the stages. There was no significant differences in the centrality measure 
between being in only the policy shaping phase or only the pre-legislative phase. For the 
French network being in both phases gives significantly higher centrality than only being 
involved in the preparatory phase, but there is not significantly different centrality seem 
between those who were in both phases and those who were involved in the legislative 
phase alone. The tests also reassuringly triangulate to show a significantly higher
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centrality from being involved in the legislative phase compared to the preparatory 
phase.
Summary
The hypothesis tests carried out using the NFP approach have produced some 
interesting and valuable findings. We have convincing evidence at the three levels of 
hypothesis and interesting material across the three broad questions we wished to cover. 
The key findings in terms of hypotheses are that NFPs do appear to give us valuable 
information that we cannot discover from case study work (acceptance of level 1 
hypothesis) and an NFP approach is applicable across countries (acceptance of second 
level hypothesis). We also see that not only is the NFP approach applicable in both the 
UK and France but that it throws up some convincingly objective comparisons about the 
NFPs and, hence, the policy process in the two countries. The third level hypotheses had 
varying success in both the strength of their evidence and the interest that is generated by 
the findings and the methods used to test them.
The most interesting finding is that connected to the small world property (hypothesis 
3); we see that the NFPs for both the UK and France exhibit to some extent the small 
world property but we discover that they vary in the extent to which it is the global or 
local communication ability of the NFP that is notable. This tells us about the first broad 
question we wished to address by revealing that the success of the policy process (i.e. no 
collapse) in both cases is found alongside a small world network despite the fact that the 
process itself varied greatly, something reflected in the different character of the small 
world seen. The fact that NFPs are small world could lead us to hypothesise that an NFP 
that succeeds in achieving a policy output without collapse may indeed need to be small
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world to ensure that the process is possible i.e. that communication has to be effective at 
both local and global levels. This leads us onto questions of what the process is that 
allows or incentivises the actors to arrange themselves into such a configuration: it is 
almost certain that this is not a clear objective of actors. Further techniques could be 
developed to see which actors contribute most to the ‘small-worldness’ of the NFP and 
what characteristics these actors have in terms of the policy process. This is backed up as 
being a fruitful line of investigation by the finding that the small-worldness is of a 
different ‘flavour’ and probably therefore comes from a different source in the UK and in 
France.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 address three issues: the bare hypothesis that labels correspond to 
structural measures, the question behind this about whether the language we use in case 
studies has validity, at least in terms of structure, and the broad question about working 
methods in an NFP. The hypotheses that propose no structural content are rejected; the 
labels we use do have at least some structural meaning and clearly they have other 
content. This is valuable knowledge when conducting case studies as it means that we 
can assume that functional labels and organisational labels give us a basic understanding 
of an actor and we can concentrate on seeking out the exceptions to these generalisations 
and leveraging their explanatory power. Once again, however, the objectivity of the 
formal analysis raises interesting points about the differences between the two NFPs that 
were studied. The structural content behind the labels is considerably stronger in France 
for both hypotheses suggesting that despite the mixed up picture of cross cutting 
relations that emerges from the French story it is in fact in the UK where cross-cutting 
communication and a fluidity in structural relations is most apparent in the unfolding of 
the policy process.
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The findings on centrality are perhaps the least exciting, but there is an interesting 
point in terms of the design of the French part of the study as we discover from the 
‘stages’ testing that the centrality of actors is no different for those that take part only in 
the legislative phase (Raffarin) than for those who were in both. This effectively 
relegates the pre-legislative (Jospin) phase to secondary importance in terms of the 
structural centrality of the actors. Further investigation could suggest that in fact we 
should only have treated the policy network as consisting of actors that were involved in 
the second phase and that our boundary condition was inappropriate. Of course, there are 
many considerations other than the structural ones but it is a direction that deserves some 
thought. The substantive hypothesis that structural centrality corresponds to exogenous 
labels is supported as centrality is seen to be related to grade for France (with a 
convincing reason behind this and interesting differences between the UK and France), 
however neither country’s NFP has a correlation between age and centrality in the 
network; this perhaps reflects a balancing act whereby older actors may be more central 
due to their experience and, perhaps seniority (the results were unconvincing for this in 
the correlations) but, as one interviewee in France pointed out, that the high pressure jobs 
in the cabinet are ‘a game for the younger ones’.204 The work under this hypothesis 
contributes to the findings in the case study around the third broad question of who are 
the important people and why are they important.
204 Interview with Frank le Morvan
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X. Conclusions
The NFP concept, the techniques to create networks suitable for analysis and the 
specific formal analysis methods used to examine the networks have unquestionably 
demonstrated that NFPs are able to answer questions about the policy process that would 
otherwise remain entirely unapproachable. We have already seen how NFP analysis 
shows the low overall leverage of typical labels used in a case study whilst being able to 
show where these labels have more significant structural content and we saw in the 
small-worlds analysis a detailed comparison of the communication efficiency of the 
French and UK networks. Aside from the specific hypotheses proposed, however, the 
analyses have also revealed hidden details about the policy process as an inherent part of 
the work.
To illustrate a typical example, this concluding chapter will start with a finding that 
was observed in both the case study side and the NFP analysis, but which is only 
verifiable through NFP analysis. One of the interviewees in the French case talks about 
the policy making implications of ‘the network being much larger’ in the French case.205 
It is interesting to see how this idea might typically be handled in a case study analysis 
and how it is handled using the NFP ‘toolbox’. How can we understand the number of 
actors in a policy process206 to be much bigger or smaller than a comparator? At first, this 
idea would seem a fairly simple observation that could be drawn from a case study; 
several interviewees will mention that the policy process involved a larger number of 
actors than the comparator, it certainly appears that there are more actors being taken 
account of and this impression is not even complicated to draw from the case studies.
205 Interview with Franck le Morvan
2061 use a neutral formulation here that avoids the trap of using the word ‘network’ when it has no analytical purpose.
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However, the good political scientist is more careful than this and will start to construct 
in her head a set of criteria by which she could defend this inference if she wished to 
present it as evidence. Reduction is always a powerful tool in these circumstances and 
perhaps the political scientist would imagine a very simple decision making process that 
involved two people and another exactly the same that involved four. How would she 
establish to her satisfaction from case study evidence that the one was bigger than the 
other. It cannot be simply that more people are mentioned; it must be that more people 
are mentioned in the context of having a relationship with others that meets some criteria 
of having an impact on the emerging policy. We have arrived then at what amounts to a 
reformulation of the question ‘people involved in the policy process’. I am not 
suggesting that even when the best political scientists are working on case studies that 
this is done in a fully concious way; it is done in a way more akin to the ‘rational’ mind 
of homo-economicus making his utilitarian decisions. However reasoning such as this 
could be elicited from the political scientist by questioning her after the event. What is 
notable about the justification is that it reproduces almost exactly the assumptions that 
had to be made going into the NFP analysis. In a nutshell, what the NFP analysis does 
for us in this relatively easy to compare case is to give us a way of holding exactly the 
same assumptions constant when examining the two policy processes and thereby 
facilitating a convincingly objective assessment of the number of actors involved. With 
the traditional case study approach, even if assumptions were stated, the basis of 
aggregating the subjective evidence leaves us with a mostly subjective result in contrast 
to the aggregation in the NFP which uses the subjective views of the interviewees yet 
leads us through rigorous analysis towards a more objective conclusion. There is a 
technical reason behind the difference in these two processes which, again, is reliant on
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the mathematical truths about networks. Any node in a network is only aware of the local 
conditions surrounding itself; any inference that is made by the node about the overall 
network from these local conditions has no guarantee of being accurate.207 The case 
study process relies on accumulating local views, which may or may not be accurate 
while the NFP method relies on using the information to produce a representation of the 
whole network and then examine that to discover its properties.
Thanks to the formal analysis of the networks we have shown, in Chapter 8, that the 
French network is indeed bigger having followed exactly the same procedure and having 
held the assumptions we make exactly the same between cases. This demonstrates the 
ability of NFP analysis to give added precision compared to the case study approach. 
Such precision is necessary in making valid claims about outcomes of the policy process 
that rely on such observations. For example, we may wish to claim that bigger networks 
correlate with lower probability that the policy process will come to a sustainable 
decision. If we proceeded from case studies alone to make such a claim we would have 
the same problem that the theory allied to the Marsh-Rhodes continuum has in making 
its claims: the tightness or looseness and the size of a network cannot be convincingly 
derived from case study material. The NFP analysis on the other hand, with its replicable 
assumptions and method, can convincingly compare such factors as size and tightness or 
looseness of different NFPs. Thereby it scores over the case study in this vital way when 
building theory. A difference between the two approaches ability to deal with specific 
questions is verified and we will now discuss the NFP approach and its comparison to 
the case study approach further knowing there to be a real difference.
207 This is demonstrated in an example about the dangers of AIDS spreading in small-world networks where individuals 
do not see the change in the network from regular to small world as they observe only their local conditions (which 
appear the same) yet the disease spreads much more rapidly in the small-world environment (Watts and Strogatz 
1998)
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The questions that will be addressed in this concluding chapter are: how did the case- 
study and the NFP approach compare, how broad is the NFP concept, where does it run 
into difficulty and where should it go next?
Comparison of the NFP and case study approaches
Having drawn the strands together from the case study approach in Chapter 4 and 
having discussed the findings from the NFP approach at the end of the previous chapter 
we are now in a position to compare the two. Something that is veiy striking from the 
first reading of the threads drawn from the case study compared to the NFP approach is 
that the case study analysis often relies on the actual compared to the potential: the UK 
Labour party were frustrated that they could not go ahead on two fronts at the same time, 
the French socialists were not confident of their ability to keep people in line. These are 
potential scenarios that are then compared to what actually happened. This is possible 
because of the heuristic and unspoken (as they are largely instinctive) analytical devices 
used to summarise the evidence in case study. Compare this to the detailed and 
documented analyses that the NFP approach uses to tie down with precision the 
implications of what actually did occur in the policy process. Other heuristic devices are 
evident in the language of the case study -  comparisons over time are given without the 
need to carry out intensive analysis and data collection explicitly for two time periods as 
would be needed for the NFP, appeals to the broad ideational environment are made to 
explain where the policy process was heading, institutional factors are linked to actors 
attitudes and language such as ‘rigidity and fluidity’ are used without the need to define 
how we consider these two terms, that must exist on a continuum, to be precisely 
differentiated.
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On the NFP side, however, there are devices that are equally revealing but for the 
opposite reason of being precise and grounded in what occurred. Where the case study 
makes an observation on communications concerning the contrast between the French 
way of talking to non-government actors the NFP analysis is able to offer statistics on the 
theoretical communication efficiency at both local and global levels in each network that 
are objectively comparable. Statistics could even be created to compare individuals’ 
communication patterns. According to our test for confirming hypothesis 1 we should be 
able to make a more valid claim about the policy process output or outcome using this 
precision than we could with the case study evidence alone. Unfortunately due to the 
limited scope of two countries, both of which had a more or less successful outcome (the 
UK more and the French less) this is not as easy as we may have hoped. Confusion may 
arise at this stage over the dependent and independent variables. It would be nice to 
claim that the success in the UK network was due to the fact that, as can be seen in 
Figure 9.3, local communication was highly efficient without a big fall in global 
efficiency and this meant that the higher priority technical work was efficiently carried 
out without any major impacts on the global ’bigger picture' discussions. We may wish to 
claim that thanks to the way the network was organised the policy process succeeded. 
This creates a problem, however, that we may in fact be seeing evidence of causality 
running in the other direction: policy processes that require this kind of communication 
to succeed may form networks that look like this. The same applies to the French case. It 
may be that it succeeded because the kind of network we see has great global efficiency 
thereby allowing the various actors the necessary communication without a major 
sacrifice in small group problem solving or we suggest that, given the policy problem to 
be dealt with, this is the network that formed. I am convinced that the balance of
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probabilities lies with the first causal direction, that the success depends on the network 
that we see: the chances of forming such efficient networks that just happen to be so for 
a policy problem appears unlikely. It is almost certain that heuristic rules and historico- 
institutional precedent mean that certain kinds of networks form and the case study 
evidence suggests that the networks form irrespective of the particular kind of policy 
problem that is being addressed. We could test this further by finding counter examples 
in each country where the opposite needs for global and local communication are 
implied and see whether the networks and outcomes are the same or not. The NFP 
approach can test exactly (albeit in the limited scope of structural terms) the relationship 
between importance in the policy process and hierarchical position while the case study 
is able to appeal to socio-psychological evidence, such as sensitivity to the pecking order 
and the differential effect on relationships of having larger or smaller numbers of 
political advisers. When looking at working methods once more we find that the NFP 
gives precision and unarguable comparability telling us to what extent different groups 
of actors work amongst themselves or with others. The case study approach to how the 
business of policy making went on is to give us the colour and impressions of French 
Union leaders rushing back and forth, a story about the dogged determination of a UK 
party having suffered years of opposition finally seeing the chance to have their policies 
realised and technocrats on both sides of the channel coming up with new ways to let 
their ministers tweak the policies to please whoever they feel necessary.
To once again verily hypothesis 1 (that NFP analysis reveals results that would not 
emerge from a traditional case study) we must try to make a claim that is more valid 
using this evidence than could have been done with the case study evidence alone. 
Fortunately this is almost inherent in the question in this case. Because we are verifying
267
Chapter X
that there is undeniable and strong structural information about the NFP within the case 
study ’language' this means that any claim made from the case study using such 
generalisations as 'the unions' or 'public servants' or 'the cabinets' is more valid thanks to 
what we have learnt from our NFP analysis. The method has therefore not only revealed 
the structural truth that was hidden (and unverifiable) in a case study but it has 
strengthened the claims that are made from the case studies' 'unstated assumptions' 
inherent within the language used.
A not unsurprising conclusion is that we do learn a lot from the NFP and that what we 
do learn is complementary to the kinds of things we learn from the case study. That is 
not to say at all though that we cannot address the same broad questions with the two 
techniques, we will however end up with very different answers. Ultimately, however, 
we can draw on both sides to defend or reject a single hypothesis as the information is 
merely different not incompatible.
How broad is the NFP concept
We have seen now that the concept of NFPs is strong in its analytical leverage, but we 
must consider its breadth of application. We can see that networks have are found all 
around when, for example, Richardson (2000: 1021) criticises the policy network 
concept’s ability to explain policy change if all that we find out is that the process 
involved networks at some point ‘as surely it always did.’ This criticism may be valid 
when considering the mass of policy network literature, but it is one of the main reasons 
that at the very start of this thesis I created the new terminology of ‘networks that form 
policy’. The valid criticism of a policy network approach that considers networks to be 
something that we see or not is transformed by NFPs because within this concept the
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important point to realise is that wherever policy is formed there is a network that forms 
policy. Even the dictator has his network of advisers and informers, our tribal example in 
Chapter 3 was the sort of place that we would not expect to find sophisticated political 
analysis and if politics is not about people communicating ideas then it is difficult to 
imagine what the definition would encompass. The NFP concept then can be seen to 
cover all types of government across time and territory.
Many other hypotheses to be tested 
The data that has been collected and the analyses that have already been carried out 
have laid strong and usable paths to the testing of many other hypotheses. Some highly 
sophisticated work could be done with little more preparation. A good example of this 
would be to carry out an analysis of the relationships between the functional or 
organisational subgroups identified in the testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Using the path 
length or efficiency data between and within each of the groups to each of the other 
groups an examination can be made of the intergroup structures and this could be tested 
against hypotheses of the roles that we expect these groups to be playing in the policy 
process. There are hypotheses that are very interesting that we can test without even 
doing any further work. Baumgartner (1989) states that the core of the policy process in 
France is made up of specialists who are administrators and representatives of interest 
groups. Clearly if we simply looked at everyone who was mentioned by interviewees we 
would find a huge variety of actors -  by applying the steps of reducing the network we 
start to trim out those who while they are named, sometimes by many, did not contribute 
to the policy according to our definitions. Further questions can be answered about the 
dominance of the Treasury in UK policy making, the debate over the influence of the 
young (those in French cabinets and high-powered policy ‘wonks’ in the UK) compared
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to the older (senior civil servants and politicians who have spent years climbing the 
greasy pole of success) and a whole variety of other questions.
Problems inherent in the NFP concept
A very real problem with the network analysis that comes to light under the French 
case study in particular; that an actor need not get involved in the policy network, under 
the definitions that we use, if they think they will get what they want anyway (Melbeck 
1998: 536). As the network analysis does not care about peoples’ wishes compared to the 
outcomes this is entirely off scope. The case study can however reveal exactly this 
situation: Jacques Chirac has shared policy preferences with his Prime Minister and does 
not even have to voice his preferences to him, let alone become a central actor in the 
network. The question is, of course, one of whether without the network perspective, at 
least, and quite possibly without the NFP analysis that we carried out, would we be 
aware of the President’s very real absence from the policy process in order to be able to 
even comment on it. We did not raise it in the case study. It only comes to light here 
when we look to see what we have gained. On the other hand we become aware of 
MEDEF’s refusal to take part in the COR through the case study and this subtlety is lost 
in the aggregation that produces the NFP.
Going further
We have looked at the NFP alongside case study but there are other areas of political 
science that can benefit from an association with the concept. We have already seen that 
there is a natural link with ideational and evolutionary theory and this three way 
combination deserves to be tested further to assess its theoretical boundaries. It seems 
almost obvious that we can explain more by taking two methods that emphasise different
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aspects of the policy-making process and combining their insights in an intelligent way. 
Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) propose that we use state theory to answer questions about 
‘Who rules? Why do they rule? How do they rule? In whose interest do they rule?’ and 
although these questions appear to verge somewhat on the metaphysical it is fair to say 
that in approaching these big questions, rather than the small ones about ‘What shape is 
the network? Is it tight or loose? Is it like this other network?’, we must slot our network 
theory in with something else. Even if we are not feeling metaphysical and wish to leave 
the pluralists, corporatist and Marxist vendors of state-theory alone we still have to 
accept that the institutional environment in which the network is operating will affect our 
conclusions.
...agents are located within a structured context, which is provided by both the 
network and the broader political and social-structural context within which the 
network operates.
(Marsh and Smith 2000)
The NFP concept must exist in a symbiotic relationship with other theory, but its 
flexibility and ability to introduce an objective element of rigorous analysis should make 
it a good candidate to work with.
Marsh and Smith (2000) say that ‘if we argue that networks affect policy outcomes 
and, thus, that changes in networks can result in policy change, then we also have to 
address the question: what leads to network change?’ We have not even dared to go 
dynamic, but the question can still be: what causes the network to be as it is? The points 
raised when we were considering the findings of the small world analysis considered 
exactly this point. Does a network have to be a certain way if it is a network that forms 
policy? Once we start to examine this we also have to start to think about the micro- and 
macro-pressures that create the network’s form. The ability of the network methods to
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switch between actor measures and whole network measures and to see the contributions 
of actors to the network and the implications of the network on the actor clearly give us a 
very effective way into tackling these questions.
Other valuable points from the work
One of the first things that emerged unexpectedly from the way in which this study 
was approached was the fact that simply by being able to explain to the interviewees that 
the study was about the network that created the policy encouraged the vast majority to 
focus on the policy making rather than the policy itself in a way that was extremely 
beneficial to the investigation. It is often the case that when you go to interview an expert 
on, say pension policy, they will be considerably more interested in explaining their 
interpretation of the context of a reform and their view on whether the right or wrong 
path was taken. The NFP angle, even if it had have been merely a device would have 
been valuable as it focussed the interviews on the policy making, prioritised the 
consideration of relations with others, highlighted the communality and the individual’s 
place in the process and, very usefully, encouraged gossip about other members of the 
network. While such information in many cases cannot be reproduced, due to ethical 
considerations, it did allow a deeper understanding of the subtexts of the policy 
environment and made the piecing together of the story a lot easier and hence enhanced 
the final integrity of the case study.
Final thoughts
This thesis asked whether the NFP concept could add something over and above the 
traditional case study. The evidence shows that it does. The thesis was never foolish 
enough to call into question the basic value of carrying out case studies and this decision
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has also been justified. There is one question which is often asked which was avoided in 
this thesis; the question of ‘competing explanations’. Which is better: NFP analyses or 
case studies? Apart from the somewhat flippant answer that we seemed to get better 
answers from our case study interviews because we framed them in the context of the 
NFP research, there is another way to avoid answering which is more encouraging. 
‘Competing explanations’ can only be competing if they are trying to establish exactly 
the same thing and if the effectiveness with which that thing is established can be 
measurable in the same way for both of the methods being compared. We have seen 
some evidence that the two approaches can deal with the same broad areas of enquiry, 
but to suggest that they are competing explanations would be like assessing the value of 
a rubber mallet against a sledgehammer. They are good at different things even though 
they are clearly from the same family.
The strength of adopting the NFP approach alongside the traditional case study is that 
each method illuminates different aspects of the investigation. It is also good science to 
create hypotheses from a different source to that which is envisaged to test them; we 
have seen hypotheses arise from the case study side that are well suited to testing with 
NFPs and points that were thrown up by the NFP analysis that require us to look at the 
traditional case study approach to confirm them. Political scientists can, due to the 
necessity of specialisation, become somewhat ghettoised and perhaps even fearful of the 
flip side of their discipline. NFPs are a classic case for a catholic approach to 
investigations in political science.
Perhaps the true conclusion of this thesis is that political scientists of all persuasions 
should firstly be more clear about exactly what they are doing: what they define and what 
they are leaving unsaid. Secondly they should be prepared to try something new
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alongside what they have always done. I have sympathy with Raab (2001) when he fails 
to see why his study on secondary schooling in Scotland from the 1940s to the 1980s has 
to be categorised by Marsh and Smith (2000) as being ‘anthropological’ and ‘“cultural” 
rather than “structural”’ (Raab 2001: 553). His point that ‘the strategy... does not lie in 
pigeon-holing the world in terms of categories like rational choice, culture, structure or 
agency...’ precedes my final word. I conclude that the stand-alone value of NFPs is very 
high, but rather than competing with the case study approach we should recognise that 
both are overshadowed by the advantages of using them together. The lesson is that as 
political scientists we should, methodologically speaking, try and get out and about more 
often.
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A ppendix 1. S am ple  interview  sc rip t
NOTE: This is a fictional example of how an interview might run that was created for
. ,  f  uto follow as a script.
NFP INTERVIEWS: EXAMPLE SCRIPT FOR GUIDANCE
Intro
The reason that I have asked to interview you is that you have been identified as a key 
actor in the development o f the Pensioner Credit policy in the period before it was 
presented as legislation -  this means that we are concentrating on the period roughly 
form early 2000 through to November 2001 when the Pensioner Credit bill was given its 
first reading.
I’m investigating something that I call ‘Networks that form policy’ looking at 
configurations o f important actors in a comparison of the UK and France. Basically 1 
want to see whether, in these three very different countries, policy making still works in 
the same way -  and in both countries I'm looking at pension policy.
I know that we haven't got much time and I have quite a lot that I want to cover, but I 
also want to make sure that you are ready to make comments at any time aside from the 
structured questions that I am going to be asking. Then at the end as well there will be 
the opportunity to add anything that has occurred to you as we go along. This sort of 
information is going to be very important to me in assessing the implications of the more 
structured questionnaire.
I also want to assure you about the confidentiality o f the responses that you give. If
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you are quoted or your data is used in any way that could be even indirectly associated 
with you I will if you wish let you know exactly what I am hoping to use and I will 
ensure that you see it and agree to it first. The only people that will have access to the 
full information are the examiners of my PhD, who I will make sure are under a 
confidentiality agreement.
A
Before we start on the meat of the questions, I need to check and fill in the gaps in 
your biographical details. This sheet [interviewee biography] contains the information 
that I will be using to group people various different configurations. A lot of it is already 
filled in, but I would like to complete the missing sections and check the details that I 
already have.
A. I
The first section of questions is purely factual; you’ll notice that some of the questions 
ask about things like your date of birth and career or education. I’m asking these things 
as I would like to find out whether any of the patterns of relations in the networks that 
form policy might be related to people forming groups that are explained by this sort of 
data.
A.I.b
Under the question on current post I’m just interested in the official title of your post 
and any clarifying details about what it might actually mean.
A.I.c-A.I.e
These next few are fairly straightforward.
A.I.h
Under the education question I’m mainly interested in your highest level of education
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and if you went to any of the sort of places that might lead to you meeting former 
associates; perhaps a famous public school or Oxbridge, or for the French, ENA.
A.T.i
And there is the same sort of thing in this question on career history, I’m interested in 
seeing if people who have worked together or in similar jobs tend to work more closely 
together.
AM
I would like to know how long you had worked in the general policy area of pensions 
or welfare policy at the end o f2001.
A.II
This next section on the form relies on you making some assessments; I will give you 
some guidelines, but I don’t want to be leading you towards any particular answers. 
None of them are too complicated, but then again, some of the questions may not be 
clear straight away what is needed.
A.II.a
The first question in this section is about what organisation you would say that you are 
a part of.
A.JI.b
Under this question, I would like you to tell me what label you would give yourself 
regarding the function that you have; the obvious examples of this are a lobbyist, a civil 
servant, a Minister, a front bench opposition spokesman and so on. What would you say 
you had as a functional label in this context.
A.ll.c
Here I want you to try and assess your level of seniority, I’m using the Civil Service
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and government as a yardstick. The question tries to take a measure of the size of the 
organisation that you are part of and the size of your command or area of responsibility. 
For instance, you might have the responsibilities of a Cabinet Minister or Permanent 
Secretary of a large department, or maybe more like a Junior Minister or an Assistant 
Secretary and so on.
A.II.d
This question might look at first like the question on ‘function’ but in fact I’m looking 
more at how you fulfil this function and the role that you feel that you play. Perhaps, you 
see yourself as a policy advocate, and advisor or a decision maker. How would you 
describe your role in the policy process?
A J L f
Finally in this section I would like you to describe your political affiliation in simple 
terms -  it’s quite acceptable to say neutral or non-aligned here if that is a true reflection 
of your position on this policy.
B
In the process that resulted in the pensioner Credit policy that went forward in this bill, 
you will have dealt with a range of different people. Some of them may have provided 
you with information or you may have provided them with information. You may have 
discussed policy or exchanged emails and sometimes you will have been involved with 
others in making definitive decisions that affected the shape of the policy. This may have 
been in meetings or in making or responding to official submissions.
I would like to go through some of the people that you had dealings with and tiy to 
establish the extent to which you interacted with them over the eighteen months or so
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that we are covering, from the preparations for the Pensioner Credit consultation 
document up to the final isation of the bill.
B.1
Let’s take for example Actor 1. I’ve got three types of interaction that I’m interested 
in, but I’m happy if you think you would like to add something more. These three types 
are information receipt/provision, decision taking and generalised discussions.
B.l.a
The first category is probably the simplest so we can start with that. In this category 
I’m talking about a fairly dry one way movement of information, rather than exchanges 
of views. Did you this happen with you and Actor 11
B J M X
[If yesl I’m looking for a measure of the strength of the contact as well, my scale goes 
from 1 to 5. 1 represents contact rarely and goes up through 2 -  now and then, through 3- 
fairly often, 4 -  quite a lot and up to 5 which represents a high level of contact. Just so 
we can remember which way round the scale goes, I’ve got them written on this card 
[card 1: strength scale],
B.l.a(ii)
OK, thanks. The other thing I’m interested in is the way that the contact took place. I 
would like to split up how much of the contact happened in the four ways written down 
here [card 2: face-to-face, telephone, informal email, formal written] and give me an idea 
of how the strength ranks on each of these on the old 1-5 scale. Great.
B.l.h
Right, the next category is pretty clear as well, it relates to the taking of definitive 
decisions on the policy. We may need to talk around this one a bit, as decision taking
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doesn’t only cover agreements made in meetings, but it can be a more long drawn out 
process of submissions and agreements or agreements to redrafts and so on. Do you 
think that any of your contact with Actor 1 would have fallen into this category [then 
expand depending on actor and say: did you ever agree to any submissions from them? 
Did you ever make any decisions that would have gone through on the nod or contribute 
directly to submissions, etc.]
BA.b(i)
[If yes] OK, so there was decision making going on, at what level from the card [or 
explain the card as above if the answer was no to section A.l] would you rate the 
decision making contact with Actor 7?
B.l.bdi)
And again I’m interested in attaching the same sort of ranking to the different contact 
types on the card [or explain the card].
B.l.c
OK, so that leaves us with the final category of contact, the general discussion of the 
Pensioner Credit policy: did you have general discussions about the policy with Actor 7?
[If yes] We’ve got the levels of contact on the card, what level would you say this 
contact took place? OK, how would you say this discussion took place? The categories 
are on the card and we’re doing the 1-5 scale again.
[If no] OK, under this category I’m not just interested in face to face discussions as 
such, I’m also interested in whether you had general exchanges maybe by email or 
telephone or through more formal channels such as submissions, minutes or other 
written documents. What I’m trying to get at is general contact with an exchange of
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views, rather than primarily a one way giving or receiving of information or actual 
decision taking.
B .l.d
That pretty much wraps up actor 1 I’m just left with getting an overall rating for them 
on the 1 -5 scale for how you would summarise your contact.
B.l.e
And finally, I would like to know how you would rank your contact with this person 
outside the policy that we’re talking about, let’s use the 1-5 scale again. And have you 
any particular link with that person? For example at the same school, or worked with 
them previously? OK, thanks.
B.2
We can press on with the other actors now that we know what we’re doing, the cards 
are there so we should be able to move fairly quickly. If you think that there is anything 
interesting to add about any of the people we cover or anything you think may be 
important in tiying to understand the network then feel free to mention it at any point.
OK, Actor 2.
B.3 and onwards
This process continues for all the actors already listed.
B. extras
As you can see 1 have a limited list here of people that you might have dealt with that 
was compiled from my research into the policy area and from the responses of some of 
the other actors. I would like to have a full list of the people that you had dealings with 
concerning this policy. Can you add other people to this list and then we can quickly do 
the same exercise for them as well.
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We’ve already covered a lot, but there is a little more of the grind before we talk a 
little more generally. I have been interviewing several different actors and I am anxious 
to ensure that the data has no errors in it either of recall or from my interviewing and 
coding. This means that I have a few questions to ask you about how you see other actors 
relationships with each other. I want to emphasise that the actors that I’m going to ask 
about are not significant in who they are. I have tried to randomly select various 
combinations to give the best double checking that I can, so I’m not trying to catch 
anyone out!
You’ll see that I’m asking a much more restricted set of questions about these third- 
party links and I’m only going to ask you about the strength of the sort of relation 
(information, decision making or general) and not go into all the telephone and email 
business.
C.x-y
Off we go with a few of these questions about Actors x andy and their relationship.
D
That has wrapped up the detailed questioning about people’s relationships and all that 
is left are a few general questions about the policy making process and about how you 
view the way that the network operates. In this section, if you think a question doesn’t 
really apply or you have nothing to say, we can always skip quickly onto the ones that 
you find more relevant. Just say so when you find this happens.
D.l
D.I.a
Could you tell me if you think that there are any people in the policy making process
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for the pensioner credit that you are aware of who hold strongly opposing views to 
yourself or who you view as being antagonistic.
D.l.h
So these actors were/weren’t included in the actors we discussed.
D.I.c
[Especially if not listed] Could you tell me a little more about where you get your 
information on opposing views that existed on the Pension Credit policy?
D.ll
This section of questions refers to a fairly subtle effect in policy formation but one that 
we all know about: it’s about people that you didn’t have any contact with but who were 
influential in your thinking about the Pensioner Credit.
D.II.a
Could you tell me who, if anyone, was influential in the process, but that you did not 
have any contact with (or so little that they are not included in your list)?
D.II.h
[If given for D.II.a] And with these people, how did you ascertain what their views 
were when you were working on the policy?
[Clues: through other network actors, media, ‘the grapevine’]
D.lll
D.III. a
Something else I’m interested in is where you think that new ideas tend to arise within 
the network, are there any particular people or groups of people where that you would 
tend to think of here?
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D.III.h
And how would you say that your relationship tended to be with these?
D.IV
I asked earlier about the role that you thought you tended to have in the policy making 
process. I’ve got a few quick questions about who you think may have performed certain 
roles in the Pension Credit policy.
D.IV. a
In my research I define what finally comes out of the policy process as a tangible 
output. Can you tell me who you think is responsible for the output in this case and what 
you consider that output was?
D.IV.b
I’m also interested in who may not have necessarily has a hand in producing the output 
directly, but who you would consider to be key decision makers behind this output. 
D.IV.c
Some people think that in policy making like this there may be veto points; places 
where the power exists to say ‘no’ definitively and change the course of the policy. Are 
you aware of any points like this?
D.IV.d
Something else that 1 consider to be important is the existence of bottlenecks in the 
process, where information tends to get stuck as there is only one access point in the 
network. Are you aware of any issues like this in the process?
D.FVe
And on that topic, although it may not actually happen, or it may, is there anyone who 
you are aware of that could easily prevent you from having had important knowledge
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about the Pensioner Credit. Actors where key information was not available by any other 
route or means?
D.V
D.V.a
On this question 1 know we could spend all day discussing it, but I want to be brief. 
I’m interested in if, and where, you might have encountered different policy making 
styles. I’m thinking particularly about brainstorming,, theoretical discussions, evidence 
based methods or experiments and pilots.
D.V.h
And on a similar theme to the last question, are you aware if there was any policy 
transfer taking place at all, policy ideas coming from other countries or from other levels 
of government?
D.VI
D.VI.a
I don’t know whether you think that policy making worked particularly well or not, 
but what I would like to know is if there were any actors, whether they were in your list 
or not, who you think it would have been beneficial to the policy making process if you 
had had more contact with them.
D.VI.b
I’ve got a fairly broad question, that might provoke a strong response to finish with... 
Did you find, overall that the structure as it was enabled good policy making or not?
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How do you feel it could be changed for the better, particularly in terms of the 
relationships of key people?
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A ppendix 2. UK d a ta  sc h e d u le
NOTE: This was the data schedule that was set up at the start o f the interviewing 
procedure. Major changes that occurred as the process was underway are marked but
Wm .^ ... .. . . . . . . ... .. , . : . . . , . ... . . . . 
minor changes are not noted. The interviews did not always succeed in gathering
an me uaia in me scneuuie.
X Interview details
X.1 ACTOR CODE
This is the sequential actor code that is assigned to every actor in the NFP
X.2 Date of interview
The date that the interview took place or was completed if it took place over several 
days.
X.3 Interviewer(s)
X.4 Interview location
A. In te rv iew ee  b io g ra p h y
A.I Factual details
A.I.a Name
Full name including appropriate title of the interviewee
A.I.b Current Post
The official title and any further clarifying details about the post or posts that were 
held by the interviewee during the period.
A.I.c Address
The contact address for the interviewee.
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A.l.d Telephone
The contact telephone number for the interviewee
A.l.e email
The email address of the interviewee
A.l.f Preferred method of contact
The method by which the interviewee would prefer to be contacted in future
A.I.g i_________________________ DOB
The date of birth of the interviewee
A.I.h Education
A summary of the educational establishments and levels of qualifications of the 
interviewee. Particularly of interest is the highest level attained and whether the 
interviewee attended any establishments that are well known for networking such as 
Oxbridge or ENA.
A.l.i___________________________________________Career summary
A brief summary of previous postings or organisations for which the interviewee has 
worked. It essential to get an idea about how widely the interviewee is experienced, or if 
they have held similar posts for most of their career.
AJLj______________________________Length of time in this policy area
This question refers to the broad policy area of pensions or welfare policy.
A. 11 Self assessm ent -
A.II.a Organisation
This is a self assessment by the interviewee of what organisation label they would
attach to themselves.
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A.ll.b Function
This is a self assessment by the interviewee of what functional label they would attach 
to themselves. Examples should tentatively be given such as civil servant, minister, 
lobbyist, industry representative, public affairs officer, interest group representative; it 
essential to give the interviewee a flavour of what is being looked for but not to lead 
them in the response.
A.ll.c Seniority/Rank
This is an attempt to get the interviewee to self assess their seniority on some kind of 
unified measure based on the governmental rankings. The rough categories are:
1. 1: Minister: Permanent Secretary, where the interviewee is responsible for a broad 
range of issues in a large organisation, roughly as big as a sizable Government 
Department
2. 2: Junior Minister: Grade 2/S, the interviewee is either director level in a smaller 
organisation or is a deputy to the previous level
3. 3: Policy specialist: senior academic: Grade 5/7, here the interviewee is at a middle 
level responsible for a discrete area of policy, perhaps second in command in a 
smaller organisation
4. 4: Analyst: Assistant economist: interest group rep, here the interviewee is not the 
leader in the policy area but is a trusted representative or analyst
5. 5: the field, all the rest.
A.ll.d Role
This is a self assessment of the role that the interviewee sees themselves filling. This
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may conceivably be the same as question A.II.b function, but is more likely to be words 
such as independent analyst, decision maker, policy advocate, advisor, etc.
A.II.e   Policy-making-approach [question deleted]
This is to try and-ge^the-interviewecH:o assess-their approach-to-policy- making in 
terms of-word3 such as pragmatist, partisan, analytical, intellectual; realist, etc.
A.II. f Political affiliation
The interviewee should self assess their political affiliation. An assessment of neutral
or non-afflliated is acceptable.
B Actor relations
B.x Relations with Actor x
B.x.a Information provision/receipt relation
This question section refers to a relationship where there is only a receipt or provision
of information between the actors and the re is no general discussion or decision making.
B.x.afh_______Overall strength of information provision/receipt relation
This is to assess an overall level of the relationship of information provision/receipt on
a scale of 1-lowest to 5-highest. 1 - contact rarely, 2 -  now and then, 3- fairly often, 4 -
quite a lot, 5 represents - a high level of contact. This scale is given to the interviewee on
card 1.
B.x.afihl Strength of face-to-face information provision/receipt relation 
The strength of face-to-face contact within the overall relationship on the 1-5 scale.
B.x.a(iiftl Strength of telephone call information provision/receipt relation
The strength of contact by telephone calls within the overall relationship on the 1-5 
scale.
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B.x.afiillll Strength of informal email information provision/receipt relation
The strength of contact by informal emails within the overall relationship on the 1-5 
scale.
B.x.afihlV Strength of formal written information provision/receipt relation 
The strength of contact through formal written means within the overall relationship 
on the 1-5 scale.
B.x.b Decision making relation
B.x.b(i) Overall strength of decision making relation
This section measures the strength of the relationship in the field of taking substantive
decisions on the policy. It covers agreements made in meetings, the process of
submissions and agreements and agreements to redrafts, etc. It also includes the making
of any decisions that would have gone through on the nod or contributed directly to
submissions, to go and be approved or rejected by decision makers. It is important to
realise that decision making can take place in both informal personal situations and in
formal disjoint settings.
B.x.b(iill Strength of face-to-face decision making relation
B.x.b(ii)ll Strength of telephone call decision making relation
B.x.bfihlll  Strength of informal email decision making relation
B.x.b(iiftV Strength of formal written decision making relation
B.x.c General contact relation
B.x.c(i)  Overall strength of general contact relation
The general contact relation covers all other contact on the substantive policy issue. 
This section covers not only face to face discussions as such, but also general exchanges 
by email, telephone or more formal channels such as submissions, minutes or other
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written documents. It represents general contact with an exchange of views, rather than 
primarily a one way giving or receiving of information or actual decision taking.
B.x.c(ii)l Strength of face-to-face general contact relation
B.x.cfihlll Strength of informal email general contact relation
B.x.cfliW Strength of formal written aeneral contact relation
B.x.d Overall contact ratina for Actor x
This is to ascertain the overall summary strength of the relationship across all manner 
of relationship purposes and methods on the 1-5 scale.
B.x. e________________ Strength of relationship outside the policy area
Establishes the strength of the relationship with Actor x outside the limits of the
substantive policy issue. It is measured on the same 1-5 scale.
C Third party relations
C.x-y Relations between Actors x and y
These questions are to cross check the data provided by other actors on their
relationships. The questions ask the same questions as the interviewee is asked about
their own relations, but does not cover the means of communication.
C.x-y.a Information provision/receipt relation
C.x-y.a(i) Overall strength of information provision/receipt relation
C.x-y.b Decision making relation
C.x-y.b ( \ )  Overall strength of decision making relation
C.x-y.c General contact relation
C.x-y.c(i) Overall strength of general contact relation
C.x-y.d Overall contact rating for Actor x
C.x-y.e_______________Strength of relationship outside the policy area
D Additional questions
These additional questions do not form part of the formal quantitative dataset but it is
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important that they are asked if there is time. They should be open ended and are 
expected to be free form in response and to provoke wider discussion of policy making 
issues.
D.l Opposing views and antagonistic contacts
D.l.a___________________________ Identification of antagonistic actors
The interviewee should identity any actors in the policy area where antagonism or
strongly opposing views exist.
D.I.b________________________________________ Were they included
This question can be coded from the previous answer and is a yes/no as to whether the 
actors identified above were included in the actors identified by the interviewee in 
section B.
D.I.c Source of information on opposing views
Especially if antagonistic or opposing views are not included in the section B list of 
contacts, to find where the interviewee gets information on the opposing views that exist 
concerning the policy.
D.ll Non contact power
D.II.a__________ Effects from people that you do not have contact with
To ascertain whether there are people involved in the policy area with whom the
interviewee has no contact, but who still influence the interviewee.
D.ll.b How do you assess  these effects and aet information about views
As a follow up to question D.II.a, this is to find out what route the information takes
from those who are influential but are not directly in contact. Possibilities here include
not only the network itself, but the media or ‘grapevines’.
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D.lll New ideas
D.lll.a__________________________ Sources of new ideas/ information
The interviewee should point out, if possible, what are the main sources in the
network (or outside) of new ideas in the policy area.
D.lll.b_______________ Comments on the relations with these sources
This is a follow up question to ascertain the nature of the relationship that the 
interviewee has with the sources identified in D.II.a.
D.IV System roles
D.lV.a__________________________ Who creates the 'tangible output1?
The interviewee should identify the actor (or sub-group) in the network that produces
the ‘tangible policy output’ and to describe what they see this output as being.
D.IV.b___________ Who does not produce but is a key decision taker?
To establish where the interviewee sees the main decision making function as being in
this policy area.
D.lV.c______________________________________________ Veto points
Asks the interviewee to identify where they think there may be veto points in the 
policy process.
D.lV.d______________________________________________ Bottlenecks
Asks the interviewee whether they are aware of any information bottlenecks in the 
policy process.
D.IV.e Who can limit information to interviewee
Even if the interviewee is not aware of any actual bottlenecks, they may be aware of 
actors who could potentially limit their access to information.
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D.V Policy making issues
D.V.a What styles does the interviewee encounter and where
To identify where the interviewee encounters different policy making styles such as
brainstorming, evidence based methods, theoretical discussions, experimental (trials,
pilots), etc.
D.V.b Is there any policy transfer?
Is the interviewee aware of any policy transfer routes form other countries or levels of 
government in the policy area.
D.V.c How the interviewee sees the genesis of this policy
The interviewee should give a very brief summary of how they see the policy as 
progressing from conception to proposed legislation.
D.VI Normative questions
D.VI.a Actors with whom interviewee should have more contact
A list of actors whom the interviewee feels that they ought to have more contact with
in the interests of achieving their policy aims.
D.VI.b Is the structure enabling?
Does the interviewee feel that the existing structure and type of policy making is good 
for their policy aims? How do they feel it could be changed?
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Appendix 3. The Floyd-Warshall algorithm
The Floyd-Warshall algorithm is a solution for finding all the shortest paths from every 
vertex to eveiy other vertex in a metric network. This involves an iterative procedure 
which searches in a time that is equivalent to the most efficient algorithm (Gosper 1998).
The algorithm presented by Gosper (1998) below was converted into the form seen in 
the C++ programs in Appendices ???
The Floyd-Warshall algorithm for matrix W:
n=rows(JV)
D(0)=W  
for£ = lto« 
for/= 1 to n 
fory= lto«
retum£>(w)
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Appendix 4. The C++ programs
Listing 1: Program for calculating all shortest path lengths (otherwise known as Dglob) 
using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm
#include <iostream.h> // defines cout/cin 
tinclude <fstream.h> // needed for output to files
tinclude "TwoDIntArray.h" // library function for handling matrices
int main(){
char filename[20];
cout «  "Enter input file name (20 chars max): 
cin »  filename;
ifstream file_in(filename); // create input stream
int n; 
int i,j,k;
// Read n in 
/ /============================================
file_in »  n;
// Construct matrices
/ / = = = -------------------
TwoDIntArray mat(n,n);
TwoDIntArray shortL(n,n);
// Read matrix in
/  / = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = * = = = = = = = = = = = = =
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
(file_in »  mat(i, j);}
}
file_in.close();
// Floyd-Warshall Algorithm function 
// ((i, k) + ( k ,  j)) = Path through k 
// (i, j) = Path not through k 
/ / =
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
<
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
if (i!=j && mat(i,j)=0)
(shortL (i, j)=9999999;}
else
(shortL (i, j) = mat(i, j);}
}}
cout «  "orginal matrix" «  endl; 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{cout «  shortL(i, j) «  " 
cout «  endl;
}
cout «  "iterations" «  endl;
int DistAdder; 
for (k=0; k<n; k++)
{
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
for (j=0; j<n; j++)
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{
DistAdder = shortL(i, k) + shortL(k, j); 
if( DistAdder < shortL(i, j))
{
shortL(i, j) = DistAdder; // Update distance matrix
)}
}
}
float sum_recipr_dglob; 
sum_recipr_dglob=0; 
cout «  "shortest paths" «  endl; 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
cout «  shortL(i, j) << " 
if (i!=j)
{sum_recipr_dglob=sum_recipr_dglob+(l/shortL(i,j));}
}
cout «  endl;
}
float dglob;
dglob=n*(n-1)/sum_recipr_dglob;
cout «  endl «  "dglob=" «  dglob «endl;
// output section 
//
char ofilename[20]; //
cout «  "Enter output file name (20 chars max): "; 
cin »  ofilename;
ofstream file_out(ofilename); // create output stream; call it file_out
file_out «  "shortest paths" «  endl; 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{file_out «  shortL(i, j) «  " ";} 
file_out «  endl;
)
file_out.close(); // close output stream
return 0;
}
Fragment 1: Code fragment used in programs that need multiple randomised versions of 
a network
#include <iostream.h> // defines cout/cin 
#include <fstream.h> // needed for output to files
#include "TwoDIntArray.h" // library function for handling matrices
int main (){
char filename[20];
cout «  "Enter input file name (20 chars max): "; 
cin »  filename;
ifstream file_in(filename); // create input stream
int n; 
int i,j,k;
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I I Read n in//====================== ===============
file_in »  n;
// Construct matrices 
/ / = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
TwoDIntArray mat(n,n);
TwoDIntArray mat_rand(n,n);
TwoDIntArray shortL(n,n);
// Read matrix in 
/ / = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{file_in »  mat(i, j);}
}
file_in.close();
//input random seed here 
int seed;
cout «  "Enter random seed: 
cin »  seed; 
srand(seed);
// loop main repetitions here 
int reps, repcount;
cout «  "Enter repetitions required: ";
cin »  reps;
float sum_dglob;
sum_dglob=0;
float sum_dloc;
sum_dloc=0;
float av_dglob, av_dloc;
for (repcount=l;repcount<=reps;repcount++)
(
// make empty matrix
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
<
mat_rand(i,j)=9999; 
if (i==j) {mat_rand(i,j)=0;) 
}
}
// Randomise symmetrically
double r;
int irand, jrand;
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
(
for (i=j+l;i<n;i++)
{
do
{
r = ( (double)rand() / (double)(RAND_MAX+1) ) ;  
irand = (r * n);
r = ( (double)rand() / (double)(RAND_MAX+1) ); 
jrand = (r * n);
}
while (irand==jrand I I mat_rand(irand,jrand)!=9999); 
rand(irand,jrand)=mat(i, j); 
mat_rand(jrand,irand)=mat(i,j);
}
}
//do the calcs
 HERE GOES THE CALCULATION CODE (e.g. The code from Program 1)
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}
// Summary statistics output over all repetitions 
av_dglob=sum_dglob/reps; 
av_dloc=sum_dloc/reps;
cout «  endl «  "av dglob=" «  av_dglob «  " av dloc=" «  av_dloc «  endl; 
return 0;
}
Listing 2: Program for calculating all shortest path lengths (otherwise known as Dglob) 
and the local efficiency of each nodes 1-step neighbour subgroup (known as Dloc)
iinclude <iostream.h> // defines cout/cin 
tinclude <fstream.h> // needed for output to files
#include "TwoDIntArray.h" // library class for handling matrices
TwoDIntArray FloydWarshall(TwoDIntArray[],TwoDIntArray[],int[]);
int main(){ 
char filename [20];
cout «  "Enter input file name (20 chars max): 
cin »  filename;
ifstream file_in(filename); // create input stream
int n; 
int i,j,k;
// Read n in 
/  / = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
file_in »  n;
// Construct matrices 
/ /= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
TwoDIntArray mat(n,n);
TwoDIntArray shortL(n,n);
// Read matrix in
/  / = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{file_in »  mat(i, j);)
}
file_in.close();
// Floyd-Warshall Algorithm function
// prepare intial iteration: shortL(O) 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
if (i!=j && mat(i,j)=0)
{shortL (i, j)=9999999;}
else
{shortL (i, j) =mat(i, j);}
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}
}
// output original matrix (not required)
//cout «  "orginal matrix" «  endl;
//for (j=0;j<n;j++)
/ /  {
// for (i=0;i<n;i++)
/ /  {
// cout «  shortL(i, j) «  " ";
/ /  }
//cout «  endl;
// }
//cout «  "iterations" «  endl;
// the algorithm 
int DistAdder; 
for (k=0; k<n; k++)
{
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
for (j=0; j<n; j++)
{
DistAdder = shortL(i, k) + shortL(k, j); 
if( DistAdder < shortL(i, j))
{
shortL(i, j) = DistAdder; // Update distance matrix
}
)
}}
// calculation of the measure from Marchiori and Latora 
float sum_recipr_dglob; 
float tmp; 
sum_recipr_dglob=0;
//cout «  "shortest paths" «  endl;
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
// cout «  shortL(i, j) «  " ";
if (i!=j)
{
tmp=shortL(i, j);
sum_recipr_dglob=sum_recipr_dglob+(1/tmp); 
}
}
// cout «  endl;
}
float dglob;
dglob=n*(n—1)/sum_recipr_dglob;
cout «  endl «  "dglob=" «  dglob «  endl;
//calc the set of G(loc)
float gloc[50]; // array containing the Gloc values
int loc_l_ind[50]; //index for the local subgraph containing the member nodes
int loc_n; // the size of the local subgraph around vertex i (not including
i)
TwoDIntArray loc_l (n, n);
TwoDIntArray loc_shortL (n, n);
// prepare index list of neighbours (loc_l_ind) and count them (loc_n)
for (i=0;i<n;i++) // for i loop goes through each actor to get gloc[i]
{
// cout «  "for subgraph of vertex i=" «  i «  endl «  "neighbours: "; 
loc_n=0;
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
if (mat(i,j)>0 && mat(i,j)<9999)
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{
// cout «  j
loc_l_ind[loc_n]=j; 
loc_n=loc_n+l;
}
}
// cout «  endl « "  loc_n=" «  loc_n << endl;
if (loc_n<2) // if only 1 vertex or none in the subgraph weird things
happen.
{gloc[i]=9999999;}// I ignore these in totting up the Glocal - see below
else
{
// prepare local subgraph matrix 
int s,t;
for (s=0;s<loc_n;s++)
{
loc_l(s,s)=0;
for (t=s+l;t<loc_n;t++)
{
loc_l(s,t)=mat(loc_l_ind[s],loc_l_ind[t]); 
loc_l(t,s)=mat(loc_l_ind[t],loc_l_ind[s]);
}
}
// Floyd-Warshall Algorithm function
// prepare intial iteration: shortL(0) 
for (t=0;t<loc_n;t++)
{
for (s=0;s<loc_n;s++)
{
if (s!=t && loc_l(s,t)==0)
{loc_shortL (s, t)=9999999;}
else
{loc_shortL (s, t) = loc_l(s, t);}
>
}
// the algorithm
for (k=0; k<loc_n; k++)
{
for (s=0; s<loc_n; s++)
{
for (t=0; t<loc_n; t++)
{
DistAdder = loc_shortL(s, k) + loc_shortL(k, t); 
if( DistAdder < loc_shortL(s, t))
{
loc_shortL(s, t) = DistAdder; // Update dist matrix 
}}
// calculation of the measure from Marchiori and Latora 
sum_recipr_dglob=0;
// cout «  "shortest paths for vertex " «  i «  endl;
for (t=0;t<loc_n;t++)
{
for (s=0;s<loc_n;s++)
{
// cout «  loc_shortL(s, t) «  " ";
if (s!=t)
{
tmp=loc_shortL(s, t) ;
sum_recipr_dglob=sum_recipr_dglob+(1/tmp);
// cout «  endl «  "added " «  (1/tmp) «  endl;
}
)
// cout «  endl «  "sumreciprdglob=" «  (float) sum_recipr_dglob «  endl;
}
float dglob;
gloc[i]=loc_n*(loc_n-l)/sum_recipr_dglob;
} // close the if for only one vertex
) // close the i for loop for all actors neighbour cliques
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float glocal;
cout «  "glocal vals" «  endl;
/ /
// calculate the overall glocal 
/ /
int counter;
counter=0;
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
<
cout «  endl «  i «  " " «  gloc[i];
if (gloc[i]> 999999) // testing for one vertex subgraph cases
{counter=counter+l;} // when the neighbour clique is a single vertex
else // I don't know what to do in this case
{glocal=glocal+gloc[i];} // but obviously the sum of the paths is
undefined
} //as there are no paths in a one or zero vertex
graph
glocal=glocal/(n-counter); //cut it from both numerator and denominator 
cout «  endl «  "overall glocal value=" «  glocal «  endl;
// output section (if needed)
/ /
//char ofilename[20]; //
//cout «  "Enter output file name (20 chars max): ";
//cin »  ofilename;
//ofstream file_out(ofilename); // create output stream; call it file_out
//file_out «  "shortest paths" «  endl;
//for (j=0;j<n;j++)
/ /  {
// for (i=0;i<n;i++)
/ /  (
// file_out «  shortL(i, j) «  " ";
/ /  )
// file_out «  endl;
/ /  }
//file_out.close(); // close output stream
return 0;
}
Listing 3: Program for creating a regular matrix for use in comparison when testing for 
small worlds
#include <iostream.h> // defines cout/cin 
#include <fstream.h> // needed for output to files
#include "TwoDIntArray.h" // library routine for handling matrices
int main (){
int n; 
int i,j,k;
cout «  "Enter n (vertices) integer: "; 
cin »  n;
// Construct matrices
/ / = _ = =  = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
TwoDIntArray mat(n,n);
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// make empty matrix 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
mat(i,j)=0;
}
}
int el;
cout «  "Enter distance between connected vertices: (integer)"; 
cin »  el;
int r;
cout «  "Enter range r=2k where k is degree: "; 
cin »  r;
// create regular matrix
int g, jright, jleft; 
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
for (g=l;g<=r;g++)
{
jright=(i+g)%n; 
jleft=(i-g+n)%n;
// cout «  jright «  " " «  jleft «  endl;
mat(i,j right)=el; 
mat(i,jleft)=el;
}
}
cout «  "breakpoint";
// output section 
/ /
char ofilename[20]; //
cout «  "Enter output file name for regular matrix (20 chars max): "; 
cin »  ofilename;
ofstream file_out(ofilename); // create output stream; call it file_out
file_out «  n «  endl; 
for (j=0;j<n;j++)
{
for (i=0;i<n;i++)
{
file_out «  mat-(i, j) «  " ";
}
file_out «  endl;
>
file_out.close (); // close output stream
return 0;
}
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Appendix 5. Actor grades for hypothesis 4
name grade title grade
ChiracJ(i) president 0.1
JospinL(i) PM 0.2
RaffarinJP(i) PM 0.2
AubiyM(i) senior minister 0.5
FillonF(i) senior minister 0.5
Strauss-KahnD(i) senior minister 0.5
DelevoyeJP(i) average minister 0.7
BasP(i) sec gen presidency 0.7
GayssotJ-L(i) smaller minister 0.9
CharpinJM(i) commisaire du plan 1
DevysC(i) dir cabinet jospin 1
SeillereEA(i) president medef 1
CherequeF(i) union head 1
CreysselJ dg medef 1.5
Salat-BarouxF(i) adj sec gen presidency 2
CirelliJF(i) dir adj cabinet Raffarin 2
MarcelD(i) dir cabinet aubry 2
FaugereJP(i) dir cabinet fillon 2
LevyM(i) external expert 2.5
SoubieR(i) external expert 2.5
Barrotl(i) head o f maj. party 2.5
Carrere-G6eMC(i) cabinet elysee 2.7
BrasPL dir adj cabinet aubry 2.7
Pisani-FerryJ(i) senior cabinet bercy 2.7
PaoliniJ senior cabinet fillon 2.7
MuetP(i) cabinet jospin 3
RigaudiatJ cabinet jospin 3
AmbielD(i) cabinet raffarin 3
ChertierJD(i) cabinet raffarin 3
el KarouiH(i) cabinet raffarin 3
RocchiJF(i) dir cabinet fonc publ 3
KesslerD(i) neg medef 3
SarkozyG(i) neg medef 3
TaupinB senior journalist 3
DeroussenJL union neg 3
DevyB(i) union neg 3
le DuigouJC union neg 3
MorgenstemS union neg 3
ToulisseJM union neg 3
ChastelX(i) cabinet aubiy 5
DavanneO(i) cabinet aubry 5
MacquartB(i) cabinet aubry 5
Fulachier(i) cabinet bercy 5
MeyeurP cabinet fillon 5
LegrosF experienced academic 5
BertrandX rapporteur assemblee 5
CailaP(i) cabinet fonc publ 6
GrimaldiS(i) cabinet fonc publ 6
LhostisA(i) cabinet transport 6
PechT union officer 6
QuintinAF(i) union officer 6
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name grade title grade
BlairT(i) PM 0.2
BrownG(i) Senior Minister 0.5
DarlingA(i) Senior Minister 0.5
BallsE Perm Sec 1
GrayP Dep Sec 2
McCartneyl(i) Junior Minister 2
MacPherson
N
Head of Division 3
ReynoldsH(i) 3 3
HeywoodJ(i) Senior Private Sec to 
PM
4
MallickN(i) Senior Lawyer 4
MillibandD(i) Senior Policy Adviser to 
PM
4
OppenheimC Senior Policy Adviser to 
PM
4
BallJ 5 5
BettsP(i) 5 5
CockettN 5 5
CoulingN 5 5
HolgateN(i) 5 5
JohnstonE(i) Special Adviser 5
KellyK(i) Senior Private Sec 5
MillibandE Special Adviser 5
SearleP 5 5
WilliamsM(l) 5 5
HomibrookB 6 6
AstillS 7
EatockD 7
FarrellC 7
LindsellE(i) 7
NewmanC 7
WakelyR(i) 7
WardD 7
WoodS 7
FeketeM Econ Assistant 8
MacDonaldJ Econ Assistant 8
PateC Econ Assistant 8
PhippsJ Econ Assistant 8
RogersB(i) HEO 8
Note: italics show reported but unconfirmed data
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Appendix 6. Full lists of considered actors
Important note: This is a list of all actors that were considered for inclusion in the NFP 
from any source whatsoever. Some were from press cuttings, others mentioned causally 
in conversation with interviewees or other experts. The third column is given only to 
illustrate the sort of detective work that could be going on in the background of the data 
collection and sampling process. It is not part of the analytical work of the thesis.
FRANCE
N.B. Some of the actors here are unnamed and so have codes that refer to their institutional positions. None of the 
information here is verified. It is merely illustrative of the process.
Surname First name(s) Further information
Acoyer UMP
Ambiel Dominique Cons. Comm. Cab. Raffarin
Artus D Academic
Ashieri Syndicat
Aubry Eric Cons. Aff. Soc
Aubry Martine Former Min. Emploi et Solidarite (June 1997)
Ayranet J-M
Bachy TF1
Balladur Edouard Former PM UMP
Barrot Jacques Assemblee
Bas Philippe Cons. Elysee
Bazile F Pres. Observatoire des retraites
Becresse Jean-Francis Les Echos
Bertrand Xavier Assemblee UMP
Bichot J Academic Uni Lyon II
Blanchet Didier Chef etudes econ INSEE
Blondel Marc CGT/FO
Blouet Karine Cons.PM Comptes Sociaux
Bras Pierre-Louis Anc. Dir. Aff.Soc./ cab. Aubry
Brimont Stephane Cabinet Raffarin
Brocas Anne-Marie Fonc. Sec Gen COR
Buguet Robert Pres. UPA (Union Prof. Artisanelle)
Cai'la Philippe Cons. Tech. Cab. Delevoye
Carrere-Gee Marie-Claire Cons. Technique Cab Chirac
Chantepy Christophe Cons. Fonction publique
Charpentier Francois Liaison Sociale
Charpin Jean-Michel Anc. Comm. Au Plan (INSEE)
Chastel Xavier Cons. Tech. pensions Cabinet Aubiy
Chereque Francois Sec Gen CFDT
Chertier Jean-Dominique Cons. Social PM
Chevrier Vincent Dir Soc Sec 3C Regimes Prof
Chirac Jacques President
Cirelli Jean-Francois Cons.PM Dir. Adj. Cab
CNAV Admin Admin conact of Dir ec soc in CNAV
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Coen Eli
Comilleau
Creyssel Jacques
Davanne Olivier
Delaneau
Delevoye Jean-Paul
Delie
Deroussen Jean-Louis
Devy Bernard
Devys Christophe
Domeizel Claude
Douste-Blazy Philippe
Duhamel Pierre-Mathieu
Dumas M
el Karoui Hakim
Evin C
Fabius Laurent
Famoux Laure
Faugere Jean Paul
Fillon Francois
Fitoussi Jean-Paul
Fulachier Jean-Luc
Gaillard Roland
Gayssot Jean-Luc
Geulaud
Gremetz
Grimaldi Stephane
Guigou Elizabeth
Guilhembet N
Hollande Francois
Hue Robert
INSEE Model
Israelewitz E
Jacquart Denis
Jospin Lionel
Juppe Alain
Kessler Denis
Labroille Francois
Lassus-Minvielle Dominique
le Duigou Jean-Christophe
Le Garrec J
Le Morvan Frank
LeRoux Mireille
Lefebvre Eric
Legros Florence
Lemoine
Academic Sciences-Po 
OFCE
MEDEF - directeur general 
Dauphine (Cons Tech. Aubry)
Min Fonc. Pub. UMP
CFTC Spec. Retraites (Conf. 
franc.trav .chretiens)
Force Ouvriere - Retraites 
Dir Cabinet Jospin 
Senat
Assemblee Natioanal 
Dir. Du Budget 
Syndicat
Cons. Pensions Cab. Raffarin 
Politician
Anc Min Econ (Seine Maritime/PS HQ) 
Direction Sec Soc. Bur. Reg. Gen 
Aff.Sociale - Drt Cab 
Min. Sec Soc. UMP 
OFCE
Cons Sociale Min Finance (Budget) Strauss- 
Kahn
Force Ouvriere
PCF Anc Min Transport (Jospin)
Le Monde
PC (assemblee Somme)
Cons. Comms Cab. Delevoye 
Anc Min. Emploi et Solidarite (Oct 2000) 
Dir Soc Sec 6 Sous-dir adj 
PS
Anc.Pres..Comm.
INSEE Modelling link to MinFin Budget 
Journalist
RPR-UMP rapporteur 
Anc.PM Soc.
Anc. PM UMP 
ex-MEDEF SCOR 
Federation syndicale unitaire 
Dir Soc Sec 3 A Regime de base 
CGT - Specialist retraites
Dir de la Sec Soc
Dir Soc Sec 3B Regimes Speciaux 
Dir Soc Sec 6C Etudes 
Academic 
Conseiller
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Levy Maurice Communications Expert (Publicis)
Lhostis Alain Cons Social Gayssot
Lianos Florence Dir Soc Sec Afff Communautaires et intemat.
Libault Dominique Dir de la Sec Soc
Loreuzi J-H Academic
Macquart Bruno Anc. Cons.Tech Aubry (Pompidou Centre)
Mahieux Sophie Dir du Budget
Maire Jacques UNSA
Mandraud Isabelle Le Monde
Marcel Dominique Dir du Cab. Aubry (Tresor)
Marini P Politician
Mauduit L Journalist
Mazerolles France2
Mehaignerie Pierre
Mer Francis Ministre de finance UMP (ex MEDEF)
Meyeur Pierre Conseiller tech. Cab. Fillon
MinFin Budget Min Finance Budget
MinFin Comptes Min Finance Comptes
MinFin Models Min Finance Models
Mitrofanoff Igor Cons. Aff. Soc
Moreau Yannick COR
Morgenstem Solange CFECGC - Prot. Sociale (Synd cadre)
Muet Pierre-Alain Cons. Econ Jospin
Nathan Herve Liberation
Notat Nicole Syndicat
Paolini Jerome Cons Aff. Soc.
Pech Thierry CGT/Republique des idees
Pele Louis-Paul Dir Soc Sec 6A Comptes
Pierre Jean-Philippe Cons. Pari. Cab. Fillon
Pisani-Ferry Jean Cons. Aupres Strauss-Kahn
Quinet Alain Cons.PM
Quintin Anne-Florence CFDT
Raffarin Jean-Pierre PM UMP
Rey Jean-Louis Dir Soc Sec 5 Sous-Dir
Richard Jacky DG admin et Fonc. Pub.
Ricordeau Pierre Dir Soc Sec Chef Service Adj au Dir
Rigaudiat Jacques Anc. Cons soc Jospin (Cour de comptes)
Rocard Michel PS (former PM)
Rocchi Jean-Francois Cons. Fonc. Publ.
Salat-Baroux Frederic Sec Gen Adj. Elysee
Sapin Michel Anc min fonc publique (Mars 2000)
Sarkozy Guillaume MEDEF
Sauttec C
Schramek O Cons. Soc PM
Seillere Ernest Antoine President MEDEF
Seux D Les Echos
Soubie Raymond Expert independent (PDG Altedia)
Soulage B
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Sterdyniak Henri OFCE
Strauss-Kahn Dominique Anc Min Econ (June 1997) (Val d'oise/PS)
Taddei D
Taupin Beatrice Le Figaro btaupin@lefigaro.fr
Teulade R
Thibault Bernard CGT
Tisserond Stephanie Joumaliste Tribune
Toulisse Jean Marie CFDT
Touraine Alain
Touraine Marisol PS - Resp Prot. Soc.
Vasselle Alain Senat
Vigouroux Robert Dir du cabinet Guigou
Villeroy de Galhau Francois Chef Cabinet Strauss-Kahn
Waquet Cecile Dir Soc Sec 5B Legislation Financiere
Wenz-Dumas Liberation
Zucarelli Emile Former Min. Fonc. Pub (June 1997)
UK
N.B. The information for the UK is much less illuminating about the process as there was much more infor
available to me from the start as a result of my personal experience in the policy area in the UK.. Even so, again r
the information here is verified as accurate. It is for illustrative purposes of how the procedure works.
Surname First name(s) Further information
Akroyd Emily DWP
Astill Stuart DWP (LSE)
Athow Jonathon HMT
Ball John DWP
Balls Ed HMT
Bartlett Phil DWP
Betts Pete HMT
Bielby Mike IR
Bilsborough Mark HMT
Blair Tony No. 10
Broome Mara DWP
Brown Gordon HMT
Cockett Norman DWP
Couling Neil DWP
Cunliffe Harry DWP
Darling Alastair DT
Digace Norman FSA
Dodd Cherie DWP
Eatock Dave DWP
Eghan Daniel DoH
Farrell Claire DWP
Feighan Guy DWP
Fekete Mike DWP
Glassboro Stuart DWP
Gray Paul DWP
Guest Chris DWP
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Hawkins Deborah
Heminsley Steve
Heywood Jeremy
Hillary Jude
Holgate Nick
Homibrook Bridget
Hughes John
Johnson Paul
Johnston Elspeth
Kelly Kate
Lindsell Emma
Logan Frances
Lomax Rachel
MacDonald Jacob
Mackrell Paul
MacPherson Nick
Mallick Naomi
Mamey John
Mathieson Michelle
McCartney Ian
McClean Clare
Milliband David
Milliband Ed
Newman Cliff
Oppenheim Carey
Pate Charlie
Phipps James
Powell Sue
Rafferty Irene
Reynolds Hilary
Rodgers Gary
Rogers Bridget
Rooker Jeff
Ross Tom
Sanderson Andrew
Searle Pete
Smith Andrew
Thomas Gareth
Thome Charlotte
Tokley Steven
Tottie David
Wakely Rob
Warburton Raymond
Ward Donna
West Sally
Williams Mike
Wilson Richard
Wood Sarah
DWP 
DWP 
No. 10 
HMT 
HMT
DWP
DFE
DWP
HMT
DWP
Bank of England
DWP
DWP
HMT
DWP
1R
DWP
DWP
DWP
DFE
HMT
DWP
NolO
HMT
DWP
DWP
DWP
DWP
DWP
DWP
ODPM
PPG
HMT
DWP
HMT (chief Sec.)
DWP
HMT
DWP
DWP
DWP
DoH
DWP
HtA
HMT
Former Cabinet Sec 
HMT
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A p p e n d i x  7. T h e  in t e r v i e w  l in k s  s h e e t
Actor C ode D ate
Interview form - contacts table
In terview ee f J ^ Z  "T ...... 3 1 1 1
Contact: Organisation label: Functional label:
Link strength (1 - lowest, 5- highest)
Type of contact I
•s' 
Face 
to 
face
~ 
T
elephone 
- 
3 
em
ail
.3 
W
ritten
B .x .a  Information provision/ receipt
B .x .b  Policy decision s
B .x .c  Policy d iscu ssion
B .x .d  Overall contact
B .x .e  Non-policy contact
Contact: Organisation label: Functional label:
Type of contact
Link strength (1 - lowest, 5 - highest)
<i) Face 
to 
face
S. 
T
elep
h
on
e- 
3 
em
ail
.3 
W
ritten
O
verall
B .x .a  Information provision/ receipt
B .x .b  Policy d ecision s
B .x .c  Policy discu ssion
B .x .d  Overall contact
B .x .e  Non-policy contact
Functional label:Contact: Organisation label:
Link strength (1 - lowest, 5- highest)
(ii)III(ii)I
Type of contact
B .x.a  Information provision/ receipt
B .x .b  Policy decision s
B .x .c  Policy discu ssion
B .x .d  Overall contact
B .x .e  Non-policy contact
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A p p e n d i x  8. T h e  in t e r v ie w  3 rd  p a r ty  r e p o r t i n g  
s h e e t
A ctor C o d e
I n t e r v i e w  f o r m  - R e p o r t i n g  3 rd  p a r t y  l i n k s
In te r v ie w e e
D a te
Link s tr e n g th  (1 - lo w e s t ,  5 -  h ig h e s t )
Overall
strength
Inform
ation 
J
 
provision/ 
x
 
receipt 
d n
P
olicy 
d
ecision
s 
j o
Policy 
>* 
d
iscu
ssion
 
j ~o
O
verall 
>» 
con
tact 
^ 0)
N
on-policy 
>» 
con
tact 
j
Contact
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
From : To:
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Appendix 9. Extract of data for one interviewee
This table
from
1003
: should be read in conjunction with the form in
link reported type of link
to
value by contact identity
1001 5 1003  a ( i i ) I
1003 1001 5 1003 a ( i i ) I I
1003 1001 5 1003 a ( i i ) I I I
1003 1001 5 1003 a i
1003 1001 3 1003 b ( i i )  I
1003 1001 2 1003 b ( i i ) I I
1003 1001 2 1003 b ( i i ) I I I
1003 1001 2 1003 b i
1003 1001 5 1003 c ( i i )  I
1003 1001 3 1003 c ( i i ) I I
1003 1001 3 1003 c ( i i ) I I I
1003 1001 5 1003 c i
1003 1001 4 1003 d i
1003 1001 1 1003 e i
1003 1002 5 1003 a ( i i )  I
1003 1002 1 1003 a ( i i ) I I
1003 1002 1 1003 a ( i i ) I I I
1003 1002 2 1003 a i
1003 1002 5 1003 b ( i i )  I
1003 1002 1 1003 b ( i i ) I I
1003 1002 1 1003 b ( i i ) I I I
1003 1002 1 1003 b i
1003 1002 5 1003 c ( i i )  I
1003 1002 1 1003 c ( i i ) I I
1003 1002 1 1003 c ( i i ) I I I
1003 1002 5 1003 c i
1003 1002 5 1003 d i
1003 1002 5 1003 e i
1003 1004 1 1003 a ( i i )  I
1003 1004 4 1003 a ( i i ) I I
1003 1004 2 1003 a ( i i ) I I I
1003 1004 3 1003 a i
1003 1004 4 1003 b ( i i )  I
1003 1004 2 1003 b ( i i ) I I
1003 1004 3 1003 b ( i i ) I I I
1003 1004 3 1003 b i
1003 1004 4 1003 c ( i i )  I
1003 1004 2 1003 c ( i i ) I I
1003 1004 3 1003 c ( i i ) I I I
1003 1004 3 1003 c i
1003 1004 2 1003 d i
1003 1004 1 1003 e i
1003 1005 5 1003 a ( i i )  I
1003 1005 1 1003 a ( i i ) I I
314
Appendices
A p p e n d i x  10. S c r e e n s h o t  o f  t h e  i n p u t  f o r m  in 
M ic r o s o f t  A c c e s s
Note: should be read in conjunction with the interview links sheet in Appendix 7 and the 
Data for one interviewee in Appendix 9.
Bj contacts_tabte J n p u t ; Form
Actor code
From actor
u
Contact
j
r j
Record: 14 |
(0 0)1 0)11 (o ra
a
hnkval hnkval hnkval hnkval
b
Ink val hnkval hnkval hnkval
hnkval hnkval hnkval Ink val
c
h n k v a l
d
Enter
link val
e
1 ► 1 H |» * )  of 4128
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Appendix 11. Labels for hypotheses 1 and 2
Name_________ Functional Label Organisation Label
AstillS Analyst DWP
BallJ Analyst DWP
BallsE Special Adviser Treasury
BettsP Generalist Treasury
BlairT Politician No. 10
BrownG Politician Treasury
CockettN Generalist DWP
CoulingN Generalist DWP
DarlingA Politician DWP
EatockD Generalist DWP
FarrellC Generalist DWP
FeketeM Analyst DWP
GrayP Generalist DWP
HeywoodJ Generalist No. 10
HolgateN Generalist Treasury
HomibrookB Lawyer DWP
JohnstonE Special Adviser DWP
KellyK Generalist DWP
LindsellE Generalist Treasury
MacDonaldJ Analyst DWP
MacPhersonN Generalist Treasury
MallickN Lawyer DWP
McCartneyl Politician DWP
MillibandD Special Adviser No. 10
MillibandE Special Adviser Treasury
NewmanC Generalist DWP
OppenheimC Special Adviser No. 10
PateC Generalist Treasury
PhippsJ Analyst DWP
ReynoldsH Generalist DWP
RogersB Generalist DWP
SearleP Generalist DWP
WakelyR Generalist DWP
WardD Analyst DWP
WilliamsM Generalist Treasury
WoodS Generalist Treasury
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Name__________ Functional Label_________ Organisation____________ Party__________ Qrg. label Func./party label
AmbielD Cabinet 1 Matignon droite md cd
AubryM Politician ministry social affairs socialiste (mass Ips
BanroU Politician | legislature leg pd
BasP Cabinet presidence (pres (cd
BertrandX Politician legislature leg Pd
BrasPL Cabinet ministry social affairs socialiste mass cs
CaflaP Cabinet ministry fbnction publique droite fpd cd
Carrere-GeeMC Cabinet I presidence (pres cd
CharpinJM Haut Fonctionnaire ([single] X h
ChastelX Cabinet (ministry social affairs socialiste mass (cs
CherequeF Social Partner Chief Syndicat (union) s spc
ChertierJD Cabinet (Matignon droite md cd
ChiracJ Politician : presidence pres Pd
CirelliJF Cabinet ( Matignon droite md (cd
CreysselJ Social Partner Chief (MEDEF medef (spc
DavanneO Cabinet ministry social affairs socialiste mass cs
DelevoyeJP Politician (ministry fbnction publique droite fpd Pd
DeroussenJL Social Partner Negotiator (Syndicat (union) s (spn
DevyB Social Partner Negotiator ■ Syndicat (union) s (spn
DevysC Cabinet Matignon socialiste ms cs
el KarouiH Cabinet ( Matignon droite md (cd
FaugereJP Cabinet (ministry social affairs droite masd (cd
FillonF Politician ministry social affairs droite masd Pd
Fulachier Cabinet ; ministry social affairs socialiste mass cs
GayssotJ-L Politician : Ministry of Transport socialiste (mts (PS
GrimaldiS Cabinet 1 ministry fbnction publique droite fpd (cd
JospinL Politician (Matignon socialiste ms Ips
KesslerO Social Partner Negotiator (MEDEF medef (spn
le DuigouJC Social Partner Negotiator Syndicat (union) s (spn
LegrosF Academic ! [single] X (a
LevyM Expert [single] X e
LhostisA Cabinet (Ministry of Transport socialiste (mts cs
MacquartB Cabinet (ministry social affairs socialiste mass (cs
MarcelD Cabinet (ministry social affairs socialiste mass (cs
MeyeurP Cabinet (ministry social affairs droite ;masd (cd
MorgenstemS Social Partner Negotiator (Syndicat (union) s (spn
MuetP Cabinet (Matignon socialiste ms (cs
PaoliniJ Cabinet (ministry social affairs droite masd cd
PechT Social Partner Officer (Syndicat (union) s spo
Pisani-FerryJ Cabinet (Bercy socialiste bs cs
QuintinAF Social Partner Officer (Syndicat (union) s spo
RaffarinJP Politician Matignon droite md PS
RigaudiaU Cabinet Matignon socialiste (ms cs
RocchiJF Cabinet 1 ministry fonction publique droite fpd cd
Salat-BarouxF Cabinet (presidence pres cd
SarkozyG Social Partner Negotiator MEDEF medef spn
SeillereEA Social Partner Chief (MEDEF (medef spc
SoubieR Expert [single] X e
Strauss-KahnD Politician (Bercy socialiste bs (PS
TaupinB Journalist ([single] X j
ToulisseJM Social Partner Negotiator Syndicat (union) (s spn
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Appendix 12. The stages for hypothesis 4
Note: F-W-gd stands for Floyd-Warshall geodesic, the average path length to all other nodes
UK stages:
name F-W-gd stage
AstillS 3.7 Both
BallsE 3.6 Both
BrownG 2.9 Both
DarlingA 2.7 Both
FeketeM 4.1 Both
MillibandE 2.7 Both
NewmanC 3.1 Both
PhippsJ 5.6 Both
RogersB 4.9 Both
WardD 4.6 Both
BallJ 8.4 Shaping
BlairT 6.1 Shaping
CoulingN 3.5 Shaping
GrayP 4.3 Shaping
HeywoodJ 5.2 Shaping
HolgateN 5.3 Shaping
JohnstonE 3.7 Shaping
LindsellE 3.3 Shaping
MacDonaldJ 5.6 Shaping
MacPhersonN 3.5 Shaping
MillibandD 6.1 Shaping
OppenheimC 8.1 Shaping
SearleP 4.7 Shaping
WilliamsM 5.6 Shaping
BettsP 4.7 Pre-legislative
CockettN 4.0 Pre-legislative
EatockD 5.3 Pre-legislative
FarrellC 5.7 Pre-legislative
HomibrookB 6.2 Pre-legislative
KellyK 5.4 Pre-legislative
MallickN 6.6 Pre-legislative
McCartneyl 6.9 Pre-legislative
PateC 4.4 Pre-legislative
ReynoldsH 6.9 Pre-legislative
WakelyR 6.9 Pre-legislative
WoodS 4.9 Pre-legislative
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France stages: 
name 
BasP
Carrere-GeeMC
CherequeF
Chirac J
CreysselJ
DeroussenJL
DevyB
le DuigouJC
LegrosF
MorgenstemS
Qu intin AF
Salat-BarouxF
SeillereEA
TaupinB
ToulisseJM
AmbielD
BarrotJ
BertrandX
CailaP
CharpinJM
ChertierJD
CirelliJF
DelevoyeJP
el KarouiH
FaugereJP
FillonF
GrimaldiS
LevyM
MarcelD
MeyeurP
PaoliniJ
RaffarinJP
RocchiJF
SarkozyG
SoubieR
AubryM
BrasPL
ChastelX
DavanneO
DevysC
Fulachier
GayssotJ-L
JospinL
KesslerD
LhostisA
MacquartB
MuetP
PechT
Pisani-FerryJ
RigaudiatJ
Strauss-KahnD
F-W-gd stage
6.5 Both
6.9 Both
4.9 Both
6.3 Both
6.2 Both
7.3 Both
7.3 Both
4.9 Both
6.8 Both
6.1 Both
7.0 Both
7.4 Both
6.4 Both
6.0 Both
4.1 Both
6.7 Legislative
7.0 Legislative
9.8 Legislative
7.1 Legislative
6.5 Legislative
6.3 Legislative
5.3 Legislative
6.5 Legislative
7.4 Legislative
4.8 Legislative
4.6 Legislative
7.9 Legislative
8.0 Legislative
6.6 Legislative
5.3 Legislative
5.5 Legislative
5.4 Legislative
7.3 Legislative
5.9 Legislative
8.0 Legislative
7.1 Preparative
7.1 Preparative
8.0 Preparative
8.4 Preparative
6.2 Preparative
8.9 Preparative
8.5 Preparative
6.5 Preparative
6.4 Preparative
7.7 Preparative
9.1 Preparative
7.1 Preparative
7.9 Preparative
7.4 Preparative
5.3 Preparative
7.3 Preparative
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Appendix 13. T-tests for the stages hypothesis
U K  t-tests:
t-Test: T w o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Both Shaping
Mean 3.79 5.23
Variance 1.02 2 .57
O bservations 10 14
H ypothesized M ean Difference 0
df 22
tS ta t -2 .704
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .006
t Critical one-tail 1 .717
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail
0 .013
2 .0 7 4
t-Test: T w o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Shaping Pre-leg
Mean 5.23 5.64
Variance 2 .57 1.08
O bservations 14 12
H ypothesized M ean Difference 0
df 22
tS ta t -0.781
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .222
t Critical one-tail 1 .717
P(T<=t) two-tail 0 .443
t Critical two-tail 2 .074
t-Test: T w o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Both Pre-leg
Mean 3.79 5 .64
Variance 1.02 1.08
O bservations 10 12
H ypothesized M ean Difference 0
df 19
tS ta t -4 .2 2 8
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .000
t Critical one-tail 1 .729
P{T<=t) two-tail 0 .000  
t Critical two-tail 2 .0 9 3
France t-tests:
Significant
Non-significant
Significant
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t-Test: Tw o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Both Pre-leg
Mean 6 .27 7.42
Variance 0 .93 1.05
O bservations 15 16
H ypothesized Mean Dil 0
df 29
tS ta t -3 .195
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .002
t Critical one-tail 1.699
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail
0 .003
2 .045
t-Test: Tw o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Both Legist
Mean 6.27 6.61
Variance 0 .93 1.66
O bservations 15 20
H ypothesized Mean Dil 0
df 33
tS ta t -0 .869
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .196
t Critical one-tail 1 .692
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail
0.391
2 .035
Non-significant
t-Test: T w o-Sam ple A ssum ing Unequal V ariances
Legist Pre-leg
Mean 6.61 7.42
Variance 1.66 1.05
O bservations 20 16
H ypothesized Mean Dil 0
df 34
tS ta t -2 .10
P(T<=t) one-tail 0 .02
t Critical one-tail 1.69
P(T<=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail £y'x Jl
0 .04
2 .0 3
Appendices
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Appendix 14. Interviewees
List of interviewees - France
Xavier Bertrand - ‘Rapporteur’/ Deputy (Now Minister for Health)
Pierre-Louis Bras -  Chef de Cabinet Martine Aubry/ Directeur de Securite Social (Now Head o f  
the Inspection Generale de Securite Sociale)
Stefan Brimont -  Conseiller Technique (Finance) Raffarin 
Anne-Marie Brocas -  Secretaire Generale du COR 
Jacques Creyssel -  Directeur General de MEDEF 
Jean-Jacques Deroussen -  Negotiator for CFTC
Jean-Paul Fitoussi -  Director o f  OFCE and member o f  the Conseil Economique et Social
Florence Legros -  University Paris X - Dauphine
Jean-Christophe Le Duigou -  Negotiator for CGT
Franck Le Morvan -  Assistant Director in Securitie Sociale
Isabelle Mandraud -  Journalist at ‘Le Monde'
Pierre Mayeur -  Conseiller Technique (Pensions) to Fillon 
Solange Morgenstem -  Negotiator for -CGC 
Bruno Palier -  Academic at Science-Po 
Jerome Paolini -  Conseiller aupres de Fillon
Thierry Pech -  CFDT officer (now Director o f  think-tank ‘La Republique des Idees’)
Jacques Rigaudiat -  Conseiller affaires sociales Jospin (Now Cour des Comptes)
Michel Rocard - Former Prime Minister (Now MEP)
Henri Sterdinyak -  Academic at OFCE 
Beatrice Taupin -  Journalist on ‘Le Figaro’
Jean-Marie Toulisse -  Negotiator for CFDT
An anonymous highly placed source
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List of interviewees - UK
John Ball - Head o f  Pensions Analysis Division, DWP 
Ed Balls - Chief Economic Adviser, HMT (Now MP)
Norman Cockett - Head o f  State Pension Strategy Division, DWP
Neil Couling - Private Secretary to Alastair Darling, DWP (now Head o f  SE Region 
Jobcentreplus)
Dave Eatock - Policy Manager, State Pension Strategy Division, DWP 
Claire Farrell - Policy Manager, State Pension Strategy Division, DWP 
Mike Fekete - Assistant Economist Pensioner IRBs, DWP 
Paul Gray - Acting Second Permanent Secretary (Head o f  Policy Group), DWP 
Bridget Homibrook - Lawyer, DWP
Jacob MacDonald - Assistant Economist, Pensioner IRBs, Pensions Analysis Division, DWP 
Nick MacPherson - Head o f  Group, HMT (now Permanent Secretary, HMT)
Ed Milliband - Special Advisor to Gordon Brown (now MP)
C liff Newman - Policy Manager, State Pension Strategy Division, DWP 
Carey Oppenheim - Senior Policy Adviser - Welfare, No. 10 
Charlie Pate - Economic Advisor, HMT
James Phipps - Assistant Economist, Pensioner IRBs, Pensions Analysis Division, DWP 
Tom Ross - Chair o f  Pensions Provision Group and Vice President Council o f  Faculty o f  Actuaries
Pete Searle - Senior Policy Manager, State Pension Strategy Division, DWP 
Donna Ward - Economic Adviser - Private Pensions, Pensions Analysis Division, DWP 
Sarah Wood - Team Manager, HMT
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